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 Abstract 
Why are states sometimes unable to avoid the occurrence of civil war? Most existing 
theories of civil war focus on rebels’ motivation and capabilities, while taking government’s 
actions as givens. Not only is the government a key player in the process leading up to civil war, 
but it is also a non-unitary actor composed of individuals and groups with diverging aspirations. 
Thus, understanding civil war requires an explanation of the conditions that facilitate or impede 
what governments do to provide political order. 
To fill this gap, this dissertation proposes a state-centered theory that explains civil war 
as an indirect function of state environment, defined in terms of structural and institutional 
conditions under which governments operate. The argument is that state environment determines 
the scope of leaders’ consensus on accommodation and coercion, two strategies that 
governments rely on to provide political order. Specifically, harsh socioeconomic conditions 
reduce leaders’ strategic consensus. Moreover, leaders’ divisions in socioeconomically poor 
societies are further exacerbated by democratic institutions. In turn, the lack of consensus on 
accommodation and coercion increases the risks of civil war.  
Quantitative and qualitative methods are used to test the theory. The quantitative analysis 
relies on mediation techniques and on a cross-sectional time series of 162 countries from 1960 to 
2007. The results support the theoretical argument. Socioeconomic development is indirectly and 
inversely related to civil war. About two-thirds of its effect is transmitted through 
accommodation, while one-third occurs through coercion. Moreover, democratic institutions are 
positively associated with civil war. When socioeconomic development is low, states with open 
institutions are the least accommodative and the most coercive. 
 The qualitative methods of “structured, focused comparison” and “process tracing” are 
used to investigate three cases (Côte d’Ivoire, Romania, and Benin). The findings show that the 
emergence of sociopolitical dissidence often results from changes in the structure of the state’s 
socioeconomic or political environment. However, the risks of escalation into civil war are 
highest when leaders lack consensus about a strategy to resolve the issue at stake. In turn, 
leaders’ disunity about a bargaining strategy is found to be a product of calculations for political 
survival.   
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 1.1 The Puzzle 
Why are governments sometimes unable to avoid the occurrence of civil war? This 
question remains a major puzzle to students of political instability. It is especially perplexing 
given that a core function of the state is to provide political order (Hobbes [1651] 1994). In fact, 
governments have financial resources and public force, which they are generally expected to use 
to ensure that citizens have little motivation or opportunities to rebel. Even when rebellion 
occurs, governments can still maintain order by engaging in a peaceful settlement with dissidents 
or by resorting to force to compel them. Despite all these options available to the state, it is 
puzzling why civil wars occur.   
In this dissertation, civil war refers to “a sustained military conflict, primarily internal, 
pitting the central government against an insurgent force capable of effective resistance,” which 
results in more than 1000 battle-related deaths per year with at least 5% of this number caused by 
the weakest side (Small and Singer 1982, 214-216; see also Levy and Thompson 2010; 
Sambanis 2004). This definition is sometimes criticized by scholars. For instance, Salehyan 
(2009, 66) argues that reliance on the 1000-death threshold is arbitrary because “authors offer no 
good explanation” for it. Gleditsch et al. (2002) contend that this threshold is too high, and thus 
excludes well-known conflicts with lower numbers of fatalities.  
Although this dissertation will capture different types of civil war in its quantitative 
analysis, Small and Singer’s (1982) definition is preferred because it emphasizes several 
important criteria. First, to qualify as civil war, a conflict must not only oppose the government 
to a non-governmental group, but the hostilities must also occur within the boundaries of a state. 
2 
Second, the hostilities must involve armed forces on both sides that are capable of “effective 
resistance.” This means that both sides need to be organized and prepared to inflict and sustain 
attacks, whereby the weaker side must inflict at least 5% of the number of the fatalities it sustains 
(Sarkees 2010). Finally, the conflict must result in at least 1000 battle-related deaths 
between/among all war participants. The purpose of these criteria is to differentiate civil wars 
from massacres by one side or riots by unorganized groups (Sarkees 2010).   
Previous explanations of civil war often rest upon three major theoretical grounds. First, 
the “grievance” framework (Davies 1962; Gurr 1970) explains civil war as a function of 
objective injustices that lead citizens to strike against the state. Second, the “resource 
mobilization” theory (Tilly 1978) emphasizes opportunities that enable citizens to acquire the 
means to challenge the government. Third, the “greed” approach models civil war in terms of 
profitable opportunities and costs of rebellion (Grossman 1991, 1999). In this view, civil war is 
more likely when the benefits of rebellion outweigh its costs (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004).  
Relying mostly on these theoretical frameworks, scholars empirically investigate civil 
war in relation to political, economic, and structural factors. However, empirical research on 
civil war is plagued with competing explanations and inconsistent findings. For example, 
economic and political studies offer rivaling accounts about why poverty is empirically shown to 
be a major cause of civil war (Dixon 2009; Hendrix 2010). In the economic view, which relies 
on the greed approach (Grossman 1991, 1999), poor economic conditions lower the costs of 
recruitment to rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Yet, political analyses, inspired by the 
resource mobilization framework (Tilly 1978), insist that low country income only indicates 
weak government capacity (Fearon and Laitin 2003).  
3 
In addition to these competing explanations, empirical studies of civil war also produce 
inconsistent results, especially with regard to the effects of regime type. For instance, many 
works based on the grievance (Davies 1962; Gurr 1970) and the resource mobilization (Tilly 
1978) theories show no steady relationships between democracy and civil war. A number of 
scholars find democratic regimes to be negatively associated with civil war (Hegre et al. 2001), 
while others indicate no association between democracy and civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004). Still other research findings suggest that the effect of democracy is conditional on the 
level of economic development (Hegre 2014).  
In light of these gaps in theoretical and empirical research on civil war, a number of 
scholars have called for a shift from a rebel-centric to a state-centered approach (Goldstone et al. 
2010; Bates 2008; Kisangani 2012). In their view, priority should be given to a theoretical 
framework that “focuses on political structures and elite relationships, rather than simply on state 
resources or insurgent capabilities” (Goldstone et al. 2010, 191). They contend that citizens in 
most states always have grievances that challengers can take advantage of. In addition, states 
often have a comparative advantage in capabilities over their challengers (Goldstone et al. 2010).  
In recent years, studies based on the state-centered approach have proposed that civil war 
is more likely to occur in states “where regimes are paralyzed or undermined by elite divisions 
and state-elite conflicts” (Goldstone et al. 2010, 191; Kisangani 2012). They argue that a “united 
and administratively competent regime can defeat any insurgency” (Goldstone et al. 2010, 191). 
However, this claim has yet to be formulated in a comprehensive theory that provides answers to 
two questions. First, what accounts for unity or disagreement among state elites? Second, how 
does such unity or such disagreement determine the likelihood of civil war? 
4 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to provide answers to these two questions. Thus, the 
focus is on explaining the determinants and the impacts of elite behavior on political order. 
Doing so will shed light, not only on why governments fail to deter social dissidence, but also on 
why they may fall short at averting its escalation into civil war. Achieving this goal may 
ultimately be critical to solving the puzzle of why governments are sometimes unable to avoid 
the occurrence of civil war despite the resources and capabilities at their disposal.  
 
  1.2 The Argument 
This dissertation builds upon existing theories of civil war to propose a state-centered 
framework that explains civil war as an indirect function of state environment. The term “state 
environment” refers to the structural and institutional conditions under which governments 
operate. As highlighted in figure 1.1, the main argument is that state environment indirectly 
affects civil war through the mediated effect of leaders’ strategic consensus. Strategic consensus 
describes the proportion of political leaders committed to the implementation of a strategy that is 
aimed at providing political order.  
The indirect impact of state environment on civil war occurs through a two-stage process.  
First, when leaders assume office, they must decide whether they should accommodate citizens’ 
needs by supplying public goods or coerce them into compliance as a means to remain in office.
1
 
When the state’s structural and institutional conditions incentivize only a few state leaders to 
commit to accommodation or coercion, the government will be less effective at providing public 
                                                 
1
 A public good refers to a good that is non-excludable and jointly supplied to all people. Besides political order, 
other examples of public goods supplied by the state may include, among others, public safety, social justice, public 
education, public healthcare, transportation infrastructure, and social welfare (see Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 
29). 
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goods and imposing high costs to dissention. This raises the likelihood of public discontent and 
social dissidence.  
Second, when the government is challenged by dissatisfied groups, leaders must decide 
whether they should accommodate challengers through a peaceful settlement or coerce them 
through military force. Unless leaders share broad consensus on these strategies, civil war is 
more likely as a result of failed negotiations or ineffective repression. This is because a large 
group of leaders opposed to the government’s crisis bargaining strategy will seek to undermine 
its execution. They might even be willing to provide support to dissidents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirically, two dimensions of state environment will be critical in explaining civil war. 
First, the level of the country’s socioeconomic condition determines the proportion of leaders 
committed to accommodation and coercion. Socioeconomic environment describes the physical 
quality of life in society (Jaffee 1998). One of the predictions is that poor socioeconomic 
conditions not only reduce the proportions of leaders committed to accommodation, but they also 
encourage leaders’ polarization about the political benefits of coercion. In turn, such lack of 
State Environment 
(Socioeconomic, Political) 
Leaders’ Consensus 
(Accommodation, Coercion) 
Civil War 
(Adapted from Kisangani 2012, 7) 
a b
c
Figure 1.1 A Model of Strategic Consensus and Civil War 
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consensus among leaders regarding accommodation and coercion will result in poor governance 
and failed crisis bargaining strategies. This significantly raises the risks of civil war.  
The second decisive characteristic of state environment in accounting for civil war 
through leaders’ strategic consensus is political openness. This refers to the extent to which all 
politically active members of society are allowed, in principle, to participate in the selection of 
leaders and be selected (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016, 22; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). It 
is predicted that the impact of political openness will be contingent on the state’s socioeconomic 
condition. In societies that are socioeconomically underdeveloped, open institutions further 
reduce the proportions of leaders committed to accommodation while exacerbating leaders’ 
divisions about coercion. In more advanced states, however, open institutional arrangements 
broaden the scope of leaders’ commitment to accommodation and opposition to coercion.   
The proposed argument draws on research from two different fields. First, it relies on a 
body of literature on strategic consensus developed by business management scholars (see 
Kellermanns et al. 2005). From their perspective, strategic consensus refers to the “level of 
agreement among senior managers concerning the emphasis placed on a specific type of 
strategy” (Homburg, Krohmer, and Workman 1999, 340), whereby agreement is understood as 
the “product of […] management commitment to, and understanding of, strategy” (Wooldridge 
and Floyd 1990, 235) .
2
 According to this field of research, the business environment impacts 
managers’ ability to achieve strategic consensus (Dess and Origer 1987; Knight et al. 1999), 
which in turn affects the performance of the organization (Bourgeois 1980).  
                                                 
2
 Business management scholars offer different definitions of the concept of strategic consensus. For a survey of 
these definitions, see Kellermanns et al. (2005, 721). 
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Second, this dissertation’s argument draws on the logic of political survival also known 
as the selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). This well-established framework in 
political science suggests that institutional arrangements for selecting political leaders determine 
their policy performance once in office. This contention is based on the assumption that political 
leaders are motivated by their desire to obtain and maintain public office (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. 2003). Unlike the selectorate theory, however, this dissertation relies on explicit assumptions 
about the properties of the goods supplied by the state and about the preferences of citizens 
regarding these goods. 
 
  1.3 Scope and Significance of the Study 
This dissertation is both theoretically and methodologically significant. Theoretically, it 
suggests an indirect relationship between civil war and state environment described as 
socioeconomic conditions and political institutions (see figure 1.1). Most studies tend to model 
civil war as a direct function of structural, economic, and political factors. Thus, they overlook 
the possibility that these elements may affect the policy process, and thus indirectly determine 
whether or not the government produces public goods such as political order. Rare exceptions 
include Kisangani (2012) and Young (2013). While Kisangani’s (2012) analysis is limited to 
Congo, Young’s (2013) mediation model examines repression only. Thus, this study takes a 
different approach. It argues that the impact of socioeconomic and political conditions on civil 
war is mediated through leaders’ consensus around accommodation and coercion, which are two 
main strategies on which leaders rely for survival in office (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010).  
 By suggesting that the effect of state environment is mediated through leaders’ strategic 
consensus, this dissertation unpacks a black box that extant research on civil war often 
8 
overlooks.
3
 As Aldrich (1995) contends, the provision of public goods is a result of “collective 
action” within government. Yet, most civil war studies based on grievance, greed, and resource 
mobilization theories simply assume the state to be a unitary actor, and are thus unable to 
provide insight in the dynamics and challenges facing members of the government during the 
policy process. Moreover, they tend to focus on rebels’ attitude while taking government 
behavior as given. They seem to neglect the fact that civil war is the consequence of strategic 
interactions between the state and its citizens (Bates 2008; Young 2013). This is in fact a major 
issue of model specification in extant research on civil wars that this dissertation addresses.  
The present work is also methodologically significant. Unlike the majority of previous 
studies which rely on either quantitative approach or qualitative analysis, this dissertation uses 
both methods. Relying on only one of these methods to study civil war may be a limited 
approach. Quantitative methods “are often unable to untangle competing causal stories or 
determine causal ordering, and require a deeper analysis to validate a proposed mechanism” 
(Clayton 2014, 18-19). On the other hand, the use of qualitative studies alone limits 
generalization of findings (George and Bennett 2005). Combining both methods therefore 
enhances confidence in the empirical findings (George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney and Goertz 
2006). As Clayton (2014, 18-19) argues, “the combination of methods can help quantitative 
researchers address measurement issues, assess outliers, discuss variables omitted from the large-
N analysis, and examine cases incorrectly predicted” by their models.    
By taking a different theoretical and methodological approach, this study hopes to make 
significant contributions to the study of civil war. First, the results of the mediation modeling 
will enable evaluation of the competing economic and political explanations of the effects of 
                                                 
3
 A black box refers to “unobserved mechanisms by which an input affects an output” (Mackinnon 2008, 4).   
9 
economic development. Second, unlike existing theories, the strategic consensus framework 
offers a single explanation for several puzzles and inconsistencies in extant research on civil war. 
Specifically, it sheds light on (1) why poor countries are more prone to civil war than wealthy 
societies while explaining the differences within these two types of environment; (2) why 
democracies are more likely to experience civil war than autocracies while accounting for 
variations among these regime types; (3) why anocracies or mixed regimes are particularly prone 
to civil war; (4) why and when repression may or may not reduce the odds of civil war; and (5) 
why states have weak or strong accommodative and repressive capabilities.  
 
  1.4 Plan of the Dissertation 
This dissertation contains eight additional chapters. The next chapter provides a review of 
extant literature on the causes of civil war.  Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical development. The 
argument is that socioeconomic and political openness indirectly affect civil war through their 
impact on leaders’ consensus on their strategies for political order. The following chapter 
conducts a time series cross-sectional analysis to determine whether or not there is a statistically 
significant relationship between indicators of state environment and the scope of leaders’ 
consensus on accommodation and coercion on one hand, and between such consensus, or the 
lack thereof, and the prospects of civil war, on the other.  
Chapter 5 highlights the qualitative methodologies of “structural focused comparison” 
and of “process tracing” (George and Bennett 2005; Goldstone 1998; Mahoney 2012) through 
the use of “critical antecedents” and “critical junctures” (Slater and Simmons 2010). Chapters 6 
through 8 apply these methodologies to examine the findings of the statistical model by 
investigating 3 cases that include a civil war in Côte d’Ivoire (2002), the Anti-Ceaucescu 
10 
Revolution in Romania (1989), and a military mutiny in Benin (1992). The last chapter outlines 
the policy implications of the findings, and identifies potential avenues for future research.      
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
The literature on civil war has expanded since the end of the Cold War. Yet, it is still 
plagued with puzzles and inconsistent findings that need to be reconciled. This chapter seeks to 
examine the various works accomplished by scholars in the field, and identify potential gaps to 
be filled. It is organized into two sections. The first provides a review of extant research on civil 
war. The second outlines a critical analysis of the theoretical and methodological approaches 
underlying previous studies. 
   
  2.1 A Review of the Empirical Research  
Three theoretical frameworks dominate the study of the causes of civil war. They include 
grievance (Davies 1962; Gurr 1970), state capacity or resource mobilization (Tilly 1978), and 
greed (Grossman 1991, 1999). However, statistical analyses mostly model civil war in terms of 
political, economic, and structural approaches (Kisangani 2012, 7). Thus, the review of the 
literature will be organized along these lines in order to facilitate understanding of this vast body 
of research. 
 
 2.1.1 Political Determinants of Civil War 
A large body of research on civil war in the political science tradition revolves around the 
notion of “objective grievance.” This literature dates back to Davies’ (1962) suggestion that 
revolutions originate from an evolving gap between individual aspirations and actual economic 
status. Gurr (1970) popularized this idea in his seminal work on “relative deprivation,” which 
describes “a perceived discrepancy between men value expectations and their value capabilities.” 
The argument is that rebellion is a function of public discontent that arises from a sense of 
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relative deprivation. People who feel that they are deprived of the goods and conditions they 
“ought” to receive from their political community are likely to politicize and actualize their 
discontent through instigation of violence against the government. Thus, violence against the 
state becomes more likely as the intensity of public grievance increases.   
The main hypothesis is that grievance increases the prospects of civil war. To investigate 
this relationship, researchers operationalize grievance in a number of ways. The first is “vertical 
inequality,” which refers to an uneven distribution of socioeconomic and/or political power 
among individuals in society (Østby 2013). Common measures of vertical inequality include the 
Gini index and the ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) index. The former captures the 
distribution of income or land assets among the residents of a country. The latter gives the 
probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country are from different ethno-linguistic 
groups (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 78). 
The empirical findings about the effects of vertical inequality on civil war are 
inconclusive (see Lichbach 1989). In his statistical analysis, Muller (1985) examines the effects 
of economic inequality (measured as income distribution) on political violence. The study covers 
European, American and Asian countries between 1958 and 1977. The results provide support 
for a positive relationship (see also Gurr 1968).  
Later works lack statistical evidence to support a positive relationship between vertical 
inequality and civil war. Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) estimates of ethnic and religious 
fractionalizations are statistically insignificant. Similarly, their measures of inequality based on 
the Gini coefficient are not significantly related to civil war. Relying on these same indicators, 
Theisen (2008) discovers no relationship between vertical inequality and civil war. Collier and 
Hoeffler (1998; 2004) show no significant effect between measures of the Gini coefficient and 
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civil war. However, they do find a non-linear association between ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization and civil war. They argue that, rather than ethnic fractionalization itself, it is the 
degree of fractionalization which most facilitates rebel coordination that relates to civil war. 
Another measure of grievance is horizontal inequality. First introduced by Stewart and 
her colleagues (Stewart 2008a), the term “horizontal inequality” describes “inequalities in 
economic, social, or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups” 
(Stewart 2008b, 3). Proponents of this measure prefer it to the traditional ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (ELF) indicator which only captures individual-level rather than group-level 
inequality (Stewart 2008a; Denny and Walter 2014). They contend that “ELF values may not 
measure the dimensions of ethnicity most likely to be linked to conflict” (Denny and Walter 
2014, 107). They insist that “it is not the dominance of one group, but rather a host of other 
factors (political inclusion, geographic location, group homogeneity, etc.) that connects ethnicity 
with conflict” (Denny and Walter 2014, 107).  
The main proposition is that the likelihood of civil war is higher in countries where a 
particular group is economically, politically, or culturally disadvantaged relative to other groups 
in society (Gurr 1993, 2000). The causal mechanism linking horizontal inequality to civil war 
may involve two processes. Not only does such inequality produce grievance, but it also 
facilitates ethnic mobilization for violence (Gurr 2000; Denny and Walter 2014).  
A number of studies seem to support the suggestion that horizontal inequality is 
positively related to civil war. Stewart and her colleagues (Stewart 2008a) qualitatively examine 
a number of cases. The results show that horizontal inequalities were a cause of the civil wars in 
Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire and Sri Lanka (Stewart 2008a). Statistical studies also confirm the 
horizontal inequality hypothesis. They often rely on the share of excluded population as a 
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measure of inequality provided by the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Cederman, 
Wimmer, and Min 2010). Koubi and Böhmelt (2014) use this dataset and find that the share of 
excluded population is positively and significantly related to civil war. 
Repression is another indicator of grievance that scholars often relate to civil war. Gurr 
(1968) provides a positive relationship between repression and political violence. When the 
government suppresses civil liberties and political rights, it generates discontent among the 
oppressed people who will eventually strike against the government (Hegre 2014). Thus, 
repressive regimes would be at high risks of civil war while accommodative regimes that grant 
civil and political rights to their citizens would be less prone to civil war.  
Empirical investigation of the repression-conflict nexus is inconclusive. In her qualitative 
analysis of the Iranian Revolution, Rasler (1996) finds that repression decreased protests in a 
short term while increasing it in a long term. She also shows that government inconsistency in 
the use of repression and concessions increased protest in the Iranian case.  
Quantitative studies often rely on regime types as proxies for repression and 
accommodation. Using the Polity index or the Freedom House data, most studies show evidence 
that repressive regimes are negatively related to civil war (Muller and Weede 1990; Hegre et al. 
2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Goldstone et al. 2010).
4
 In contrast, anocracies, regimes that mix 
repressive and accommodative features, appear to be particularly prone to civil war (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Muller and Weede 1990; Hegre et al. 2001).  
The results about accommodative regimes are inconsistent. Some studies find democratic 
regimes to be negatively associated with civil war onset (see Muller and Weede 1990; Hegre et 
                                                 
4
 The Polity index is a 21-point measure of political regime constructed from five component variables. Freedom 
House is a U.S.-based non-governmental organization that publishes the Comparative Survey of Freedom, which 
rates the level of democracy or freedom in all independent states and some disputed and dependent territories.  
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al. 2001), while others show no relationship between democratic regimes and civil war (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Still other works discover that the effect of 
accommodative regimes is conditional and negative when democracy is interacted with 
economic development (Hegre 2003, 2014).  
In addition to grievance, studies in the political science tradition also rely on state 
capacity to investigate the causes of civil war.
5
 This approach dismisses the importance of 
grievance as a determinant of civil war, focusing instead on political and military conditions that 
make rebellion feasible (Cederman et al. 2011). The state capacity framework echoes Tilly’s 
(1978) theory about resource mobilization (Goldstone et al. 2010). In this perspective, civil war 
is a function of opportunities that facilitate resource mobilization by potential rebels (see also 
Olson 1965; Lichbach 1995). This includes the “incapacity or unwillingness of the agents of the 
government to suppress” challengers (Tilly 1978, 200). In other words, the occurrence of civil 
war is closely related to the government’s coercive capabilities and its ability to reach into rural 
areas (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 80).  
Many statistical studies examine the relationship between state capacity and civil war. 
Operational measurements of state capacity include, among others, military expenditure, military 
personnel per capita, mountainous or rough terrain, bad neighborhood, expert assessment of 
bureaucratic quality, and foreign support to rebels in the form of sanctuary or material support 
(see Hendrix 2010 for a review on measures of state capacity).  
The common finding is that states that lack the military and administrative capacity to 
effectively control their territory are more prone to civil war. For instance, Fearon and Laitin 
                                                 
5
 The term “state capacity” often describes the government’s “capacity to penetrate society, to provide order, to 
protect groups, to arbitrate groups’ issues, and to produce social goods” (Kisangani 2012, 4). 
16 
(2003) rely on GDP per capita as the main proxy for the state’s military and administrative 
capability, and find that low-income states are associated with high risks of civil war.
6
 Other 
measures of capacity that positively correlate with civil war include mountainous or rough 
terrain, large population size (Fearon and Laitin 2003), and bad neighborhood operationalized as 
the number of neighboring countries in conflict or experiencing state weakness (Goldstone et al. 
2010; Salehyan 2009). Gibler and Miller (2014) also show statistical evidence that external 
territorial threats reduce the risks of civil war. They argue that such threats enable the 
government to legitimately increase their coercive capabilities.  
 
 2.1.2 Economic Causes of Civil War 
The economic approach models civil war as a function of greed (Grossman 1991). 
According to this view, civil war is more likely when the benefits outweigh the costs of 
insurgency. The objective of every rebellion is to either “capture the state or secede from it,” thus 
inducing some benefits to conflict participants (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 564). Yet, there are 
costs associated with participation. The lower the costs are in comparison to the benefits, the 
more attractive civil war becomes. Like criminals motivated by greed, insurgents will not pass up 
any “profitable opportunity” to rebel (Grossman 1991, 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Thus, 
civil war is explained by the balance between opportunities for profit and costs of rebellion. 
One of the initial empirical tests of the greed argument is performed by Collier and 
Hoeffler (1998). They operationalize opportunity for profit in terms of a “taxable base” that is 
                                                 
6
 However, Hendrix (2010) suggests that the use of GDP per capita as a proxy for state capacity does not allow 
researchers to distinguish between competing explanations. For instance, low GPD may also be capturing grievance 
among low-income people or cheap recruitment as research in the economic tradition suggests (Justino 2009; Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004). 
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attractive to rebels. This is captured through per capita income measured in purchasing power 
parity (PPP), the natural resource endowment (share of primary commodity exports to GDP), 
donations from the diaspora, and financing from foreign governments. The cost of rebellion, 
which relates to the “loss of income sustained during the conflict and the costs of coordination” 
(Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 566), is proxied by per capita income, ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, conflict capital, and the size of the population.  
The results provide support to the greed explanation of civil war. Per capita income is 
significantly and inversely related to the risks of civil war, which Collier and Hoeffler (1998) 
interpret as evidence for the cost of rebellion (loss of income) rather than profit opportunity. The 
effect of natural resources is also significant but non-monotonic. The possession of natural 
resources initially increases the risk of civil war before decreasing it. States with larger 
populations are found to have higher risks of civil war. The effect of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization is also significant but non-monotonic, which they argue is evidence for the 
coordination-cost hypothesis.  
In another empirical investigation, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) expand their 
operationalization to include more measures of greed. Additional indicators include male 
secondary schooling, economic growth (forgone income), time since the last conflict or peace 
duration (conflict capital), forests, mountainous terrain, geographic dispersion, population 
density, and rates of urbanization (proxies for the government military capability). 
The results show that two of their three measures of profit opportunity are significantly 
related to the onset of civil war. The export of primary commodity tends to increase the risks of 
conflict. This relationship is however curvilinear, with a pick when such exports constitute 33% 
of GDP. Donation from diaspora is also significant and positive. Several of the cost measures are 
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also significantly related to civil war. These include male secondary schooling, per capita 
income, economic growth, and duration of peace. Low levels of these measures increase the risks 
of conflict. In addition, large populations significantly raise the prospects of civil war while 
proxies of weak military capacity (mountainous terrain, geographic dispersion, and social 
fractionalization) are found to be positive and significant. These findings are also supported by a 
later study by Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009).  
A number of scholars cast doubt on the greed argument. Reynal-Querol (2002) shows 
that primary commodity exports are correlated only with the onset of non-ethnic wars. According 
to Hegre (2002), primary commodities are related to civil war (conflict with 1000 battle deaths) 
but not to low-intensity conflicts. Fearon and Laitin (2003) fail to confirm that primary 
commodities are associated with civil war, as does a replication of Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) 
data by Fearon (2005). Ross (2004a) discovers that a category that includes oil, non-fuel 
minerals, and agricultural goods is not robustly associated with the onset of civil war.  
Several qualitative studies also fail to confirm a positive relationship between civil war 
and primary commodity (see Ballentine and Sherman 2003). An analysis of 13 cases of civil war 
by Ross (2004b) yields no support to the looting mechanism suggested by proponents of the 
greed argument. Examining the Columbian civil war, Guáqueta (2003) shows that economic 
factors and actors were relevant to the intensity and duration of the conflict. Yet, she argues that 
the onset of the conflict was more related to socio-political factors. Ndikumana and Kisangani 
(2005) also find no relationship between natural resources and the onset of civil war in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (see also Kisangani 2012). 
Contrary to primary commodity, oil export seems to be linked to the onset of civil war 
(Ross 2004a; Bates 2008). Fearon and Laitin (2003) report that countries whose oil exports 
19 
exceed one-third of their total export revenues are prone to civil war (see also Humphreys 2005). 
In a recent quantitative study, Koubi and Böhmelt (2014, 25) confirm that oil exporting countries 
face high risk of domestic conflict.  
Another common proposition within the economic tradition is that poverty positively 
relates to civil war because it provides cheap recruitment to rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler 
1998, 2004; Justino 2009). Poverty is often measured in terms of GDP per capita, per-capita 
energy consumption, literacy rate, infant mortality, and OECD dummy (see Dixon 2009). The 
results of empirical studies overwhelmingly show that poor countries are prone to civil war 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Dixon 2009; Goldstone et al. 2010).  
Scholars offer different explanations to the finding relating poverty to civil war. Contrary 
to the economic contention that poverty provides cheap recruitment for rebel groups, Fearon and 
Laitin (2003, 86) argue that country income is a proxy for state capacity. Low-income states are 
prone to civil war because they often possess poor counter-insurgency capabilities, thus making 
them unable to effectively deter or repress rebellion (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Also, in his 
analysis of political disorder in Africa, Bates (2008, 25) suggests that when public revenues are 
low, leaders tend to turn to predation of state resources rather than providing security.       
 
 2.1.3 Structural Origins of Civil War 
Studies based on the structural approach seek to explain the occurrence of civil war 
through the impact of “environmental scarcity.” The main contention within this research 
tradition is that civil war may be caused by a shortage of renewable resources such as cropland, 
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fresh water, forests, and fisheries, among others.
7
 Homer-Dixon (1999, 142-146) argues that 
when social groups are forced to compete over scarce resources, they “might opt for violence 
against those they perceive as their oppressors.” In addition to generating a sense of deprivation, 
environmental scarcity may also provide opportunity for rebellion as it weakens the state’s 
capacity to cope with potential challengers (Kahl 2006, 44; Homer-Dixon 2010). Also, Kahl 
(2006, 50-51) suggests that environmental scarcity may provide government leaders “incentives 
and opportunities to instigate violence as a strategy to stay in power.” 
Scholars operationalize environmental scarcity in terms of supply-induced scarcity, 
demand-induced scarcity, and structural scarcity (Homer-Dixon 1994, 2010). Supply-induced 
scarcity refers to resource shortage that occurs when resource degradation outpaces generation of 
renewable resources. Measures of supply-induced scarcity often include land degradation, 
deforestation, and freshwater shortage (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998). Demand-induced scarcity 
describes scarcity due to rapid population growth or an increase in consumption per capita. It is 
often captured through demographic factors such as population growth or population density 
(Urdal 2005, 2008). Finally, structural scarcity is shortage resulting from unequal distribution of 
resources among social groups (Homer-Dixon 1994). It is usually measured through indicators of 
income or land inequality, ethnic or religious fractionalization (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998).  
A number of studies seem to support the environmental scarcity hypothesis. Several case 
studies find a positive link between resource scarcity and conflicts (Bretthauer 2014). Kahl’s 
(2006) examination of a communist insurgency in the Philippines as well as ethnic land clashes 
in Kenya also suggests a positive relationship between “demographic and environmental stress” 
                                                 
7
 Structural arguments draw on Malthus’ ([1798] 2003) claim that the growth of food production would be 
arithmetical, while that of human population would be exponential, thus leading to serious food shortages and 
human misery at some point (Urdal 2005, 418).  
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and violent conflict. Qualitative analyses by Homer-Dixon (1994, 1999) also confirm the 
proposed relationship. In their quantitative study, Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) test Homer-
Dixon’s hypotheses and found that resource scarcity is positively related to low-intensity 
conflicts, and to a lesser extent to the onset of civil war. They claim that land degradation “seems 
in general to have the strongest effect on the likelihood of domestic conflict.” 
However, many works fail to support the proposition linking environmental scarcity to 
civil war (see Gleditsch 2012; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Urdal 2008). For example, Urdal’s 
(2005) statistical analysis shows that measures of population growth, population density (a proxy 
for scarcity of cropland), and urban population growth are unrelated to civil war (measured as 25 
battle-death conflicts). When replicating Hauge and Ellingsen’s (1998) model, Theisen (2008) 
finds no relationship between civil war and measures of scarcity such as deforestation, 
freshwater availability, water per capita, drought, population growth, and population density. 
Also, Bretthauer’s (2014) fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis of 31 cases concludes that 
scarcity conflicts are unlikely to occur if the local population does not rely on agriculture as a 
way of subsistence, and if the state does not lack the ingenuity to cope with the scarcity it faces. 
 
 2.2 A Critical Overview of Extant Literature 
The empirical works reviewed here point to a number of puzzles. One is related to regime 
type studies of civil war. It is still unclear how regime type affects civil war. For instance, the 
diverging results about the effects of democracy remain perplexing. Also, existing theories offer 
little explanation as to why anocracies or mixed regimes lack the repressive capacity attributed to 
autocracies and the administrative capability of democracies (Fearon and Laitin 2003).  
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Economic studies of civil war also leave out some critical gaps to be filled. By insisting 
that natural resource abundance causes civil war because it provides rebels with opportunities for 
greed, these works overlook some other mechanisms through which natural resource may relate 
to civil war. For instance, exploitation of natural resources might generate grievance among the 
local population over insufficiently compensated land expropriation, environmental degradation, 
inadequate job opportunities, and labor migration (Klare 2001). It could also provide residents in 
resource-rich areas an incentive to seek secession from the central government (Le Billon 2001). 
Alternatively, state leaders can be divided over how to allocate the benefits derived from the 
resource rents, thus leading to a political crisis (Kisangani 2012). 
Another important issue associated with the economic approach is the mechanism 
through which economic development impacts civil war. Economic studies contend that poverty 
provides cheap and easy recruitment for rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). However, 
political works insist that poverty is rather a proxy for state capacity (Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
They also contend that poverty may affect the behavior of state leaders (Bates 2008). In other 
words, the competing explanations about the impact of poverty on civil war invite further 
analyses.  
Finally, structural arguments on the causes of civil war are often criticized in the 
literature on theoretical grounds. Scholars who object to the environmental scarcity hypothesis 
contend that the impact of demographic pressures on conflict is probably conditional on the 
government’s overall capacity. Specifically, the quality of political institutions, state policies, as 
well as technologies will improve the availability of resources despite rapid population growth 
(Deudney 1990). Even in the presence of resource scarcity, large-scale violence is unlikely in the 
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absence of political struggles that set elites in opposition to the state (Goldstone 2001; Peluso 
and Watts 2001). 
These irregularities in extant literature on civil war may be the result of a number of 
limitations. First, scholars tend to model civil war as a direct function of political, economic, and 
structural factors. Thus, most studies do not distinguish the impact of government policies such 
as repression and the provision of public goods from that of political institutions, economic, and 
structural conditions. Many works fail to recognize that the effects of these systemic factors on 
civil war may be mediated through their impact on government policy. In other words, they 
overlook the fact that structural and institutional factors may affect the public policy process, and 
thus indirectly determine what public goods governments produce.  
The inconsistencies in the empirical findings may also be the consequence of another 
shortcoming. Although civil war is the result of a strategic behavior between government and 
citizens (Bates 2008; Young 2013), previous explanations tend to focus on rebels’ motivations 
and capabilities, and state resources (Goldstone et al. 2010). Less attention has been paid to the 
role of elite relationships in the occurrence of civil war (Goldstone et al. 2010; Bates 2008; 
Kisangani 2012). By not focusing on government behavior, many existing theories overlook an 
important “black box”: how leaders behave with regard to the policy process. In a recent study, 
Hegre and Nygård (2014) refer to this black box as “informal governance.”  They explain that: 
“even if decisions are made with the sincere intention to reduce poverty and provide public 
goods, decisions have to be implemented to be effective. Successful implementation requires that 
the bureaucratic apparatus is competent and nonbiased and that the government carries out 
economic policies that are suitable to achieve its political goals” (Hegre and Nygård 2014, 8). 
 
To fully understand civil war, one must therefore unpack the black box represented by 
the public policy process, which refers to the circumstances surrounding the adoption and the 
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implementation of state policies by the government. There are two reasons why unpacking the 
black box is critical. First, contrary to what existing theories often assume, the government is a 
non-unitary actor (Allison and Zelikow 1999). As Aldrich (1995, 32) contends, “Everything 
governments […] produce constitutes goods that are primarily public, and collective action is 
required to secure them.” Thus, failing to examine how potential collective action problems 
within government may affect its ability to supply political order limits understanding of the 
causes of civil war.  
Second, political leaders make decisions based on their beliefs and interests. Yet, these 
beliefs and interests often result from the leaders’ surrounding environment. In general, state 
leaders strive to simultaneously reconcile several imperatives when making decisions (Putnam 
1988, 460). Such imperatives may be domestic or international, and they can be associated with 
the state’s political, sociological, and economic conditions. Therefore, understanding civil war 
requires explanation of how a state’s structural and institutional environment shapes the policy 
process that leads to the provision of public goods. Ultimately, this process will determine “the 
quality of the bureaucratic apparatus, the extent of political corruption, and the appropriateness 
of the economic policies chosen by political leaders,” all of which “also affect governments’ 
ability to prevent domestic violent conflicts” (Hegre and Nygård 2014, 2).  
At this point, the black box has not been fully unpacked. Although Hegre and Nygård 
(2014) identify the policy process as being the black box, which is an important step, they do not 
examine the process itself. Instead, they focus on the outcomes produced by the process, 
including factors such as bureaucratic quality, rule of law, level of corruption, quality of 
economic policies, repression, and political exclusion.  
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A limited number of scholars have attempted to unpack the black box. For example, 
Kisangani (2012) shows how “politics of exclusion” and “control of rents” can generate elite 
divisions and lead to civil war. Also, a study by Bates (2008) demonstrates how social, 
economic, and political conditions may lead government agents to favor predation of resources 
over provision of political order.  
These studies are, however, limited to specific regions. While Kisangani (2012) examines 
only civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bates’ (2008) analysis is focused on 
Africa. Thus, there is still a need for a comprehensive theoretical framework that addresses the 
causes and effects of elite behavior in its relation to civil war.  
In the light of the gaps identified in the literature, the next chapter develops a theoretical 
argument that attempts to unpack the black box. It will do so by offering an explanation of how 
leaders’ behavior during the policy process mediates the effects of state environment on civil 
war. This theoretical approach will allow empirical investigation of the indirect and direct effects 
of socioeconomic development and political institutions on civil war. In addition, it will provide 
an understanding of (1) why the government may be unable to implement policies that reduce the 
level of grievance in society (Gurr 1970), and (2) why it may sometimes fail to maintain strong 
capabilities or implement policies that successfully deny rebels opportunity to organize and 
mobilize resources (Tilly 1978; Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
To achieve its purpose, this dissertation draws on a number of studies across different 
fields. First, it relies on research on strategic consensus from business management scholars (e.g. 
Bourgeois 1980; Wooldridge and Floyd 1989; Dess and Priem 1995; Knight et al. 1999; 
Markóczy 2001; and Kellermanns et al. 2011). According to these scholars, an organization’s 
performance is a function of consensus among its managers regarding strategic matters such as 
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priorities, goals, methods, and resources (Kellermanns et al. 2011). In turn, strategic consensus 
among managers is determined by the organization’s environment (Dess and Origer 1987) and 
the managers’ personal background (Knight et al. 1999).  
The consensus-performance logic offered by business management scholars imply that, if 
applied to political science, the state’s environment might determine leaders’ consensus on 
strategic matters related to the provision of political order. In turn, leaders’ strategic consensus 
may affect the government’s performance and the existence of political order.       
Second, given the difference between politics and business, this dissertation also relies on 
a comparative politics theory. Thus, it draws on the “logic of political survival” that underlies the 
selectorate theory proposed by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). The selectorate theory offers a 
comprehensive explanation of political leaders’ behavior and performance in office. It first 
assumes that the behavior of political leaders is motivated by their desire to obtain and retain 
public office. From this logic, it then suggests that “selection institutions – the mechanisms that 
determine how leaders are chosen or deposed – explain the differences in policy choices across 
all regime types” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 26).  
In the view of proponents of the selectorate theory, two institutional arrangements, the 
“selectorate” and the “winning coalition,” often “shape the incentives leaders have to promote or 
inhibit social welfare” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 9). The selectorate refers to “the set of 
people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to 
choose the government’s leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled 
out by the government’s leadership” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 42). The “winning 
coalition” is “the subgroup of the selectorate who maintain the incumbents in office and in 
exchange receive special privileges” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 42).  
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This dissertation, however, departs from the approach adopted by Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. (2003) in two ways. First, in contrast to the selectorate theory, the present study assumes that 
the government is a non-unitary actor (Tsebelis 2002). This allows examination of the dynamics 
that take place within government during the policy process.  
Second, the theory proposed by this dissertation makes explicit assumptions about the 
goods supplied by the state and the preferences of members of the selectorate with regard to 
these goods. Rather than presuming that people universally prefer public goods over private 
goods, this study assumes that public goods and private goods have different properties that may 
lead to a variation across space and time with regard to how much people value one over the 
other. As a result of variations in how much people value these goods, leaders may or may not 
prioritize the provision of public goods. 
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Chapter 3 - Theoretical Development 
This chapter seeks to develop a theoretical framework that explains civil war as an 
indirect consequence of state environment through the mediated impact of leaders’ behavior (see 
Figure 1.1). In doing so, it treats the onset of civil war as a result of a strategic interaction 
between citizens and the government. As Bates (2008, 5) argues, political order exists when 
“rulers … choose to employ the means of coercion to protect the creation of wealth rather than to 
prey upon it and private citizens choose to set weapons aside and to devote their time instead to 
the production of wealth and to the enjoyment of leisure.”  
From this dissertation’s perspective, the government-citizen interactions that determine 
the occurrence of civil war take place at two levels. First, upon assuming office, the government 
adopts and implements policies that impact the lives of citizens. When the outputs of government 
policies meet the priorities and aspirations of citizens, the latter are unlikely to challenge the 
established order (Gurr 1970). In contrast, in case citizens are unhappy with the outputs produced 
by government actions, they may seek to mobilize and drive members of government out of 
office, by violence if necessary. This study refers to this first level as the governance stage.  
The second phase of the government-citizen interactions leading up to civil war occurs 
when citizens are unsatisfied with the outcomes produced by the state. This is the crisis 
bargaining stage.
8
 At this level, the government must adopt and implement actions in response 
to citizens’ demands. When the execution of these actions fails to convince or compel citizens to 
renounce violence, political disorder occurs. In other words, the crisis bargaining stage will 
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 There is abundant literature on crisis bargaining between the state and its domestic or international rivals (see for 
instance Fearon 1995). 
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likely result in civil war if the government’s actions fail to dissipate citizens’ grievances or deny 
them opportunity to sustain military operations against its troops.  
Students of political violence suggest two types of strategy that governments rely on in 
their strategic interactions with citizens at each of these two stages. According to Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith (2010, 949), “[l]eaders can ameliorate revolutionary threats by either 
increasing the provision of public goods, such that citizens are satisfied, or by suppressing their 
ability to organize” (see also Tilly 1978; Gurr 1970; Poe and Tate 1994; Rasler 1996). This study 
refers to these strategies as accommodation and coercion respectively. 
An accommodation strategy consists in the provision of all forms of public goods. These 
may be tangible goods, such as electricity, water, public hospitals, transportation infrastructure, 
and schools. Public goods can also refer to intangible goods such as civil liberties, justice, and 
security (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). An accommodation strategy serves two goals. First, at 
the governance stage, accommodation seeks to deter political dissidence by lowering the levels 
of grievance in society. The logic is that supplying public goods provides satisfaction to citizens, 
and people who are satisfied are unlikely to rebel against the state (Gurr 1970). Second, at the 
crisis bargaining level, the purpose of accommodation is to resolve disputes with domestic 
challengers through peaceful settlements. This may involve negotiations or judiciary actions.   
The second strategy that governments rely on to provide political order is coercion. A 
coercion strategy also serves two purposes. First, at the governance stage, coercion is often 
intended to deter dissention by denying citizens the possibility of organizing and challenging the 
established order. In general, this form of coercion occurs through suppression of some 
intangible public goods, such as freedom of speech or of assembly. Second, at the crisis 
bargaining level, the goal of a coercion strategy is to resolve potential political dissidence 
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through the use of force. Governments that adopt a coercion strategy at the second stage are 
prepared to use violence to repel any domestic challenge to their rule.  
Together, the main theories of civil war reviewed in chapter 2 imply that effective 
implementation of accommodation or coercion would reduce the likelihood of civil war. 
Specifically, if the government successfully executes an accommodation strategy in the 
governance stage, the levels of grievance would be low (Gurr 1970) and social dissidence is 
unlikely. Also, if accommodation is successfully implemented at the crisis bargaining stage, civil 
war is unlikely because social conflicts can be resolved peacefully (Hegre and Nygård 2014).  
Similarly, the resource mobilization and the greed theories imply that successful 
execution of coercion would reduce the risks of civil war. If coercion is successfully 
implemented during the governance stage, social dissidence is unlikely because dissatisfied 
people would be unable to organize (Tilly 1978) and coordinate their actions (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004). At the crisis bargaining level, successful coercion would enable the government 
to repel any nascent rebellion before it escalates into civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
  Assuming that these theories are pertinent, civil war is still likely to occur because of 
potential flaws in the adoption and the implementation of accommodation and coercion 
strategies. For instance, faulty policies may be adopted by the government. Alternatively, even 
sound policies might be wrongly executed (Hegre and Nygård 2014). Moreover, implementation 
of flawless policies could suffer from insufficient resource allocation or from a lack of technical 
skills. Thus, understanding why accommodation and coercion might fail requires explanation of 
the causes of shortcomings in the adoption and implementation of these strategies. 
One of the major challenges faced by the government with regard to the adoption and 
implementation of accommodation and coercion is that it is a non-unitary actor. As suggested by 
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Tsebelis (2002) and Allison and Zelikow (1999), the government is composed of several 
branches and subunits that perform different tasks. In general, two types of actors are involved in 
the process that results in the adoption and implementation of government strategies. These are 
bureaucrats and political leaders. Consequently, the flaws that may occur during the policy 
process could result from the behavior of bureaucrats and political leaders alike.  
Bureaucrats are government officials who implement, execute, and enforce state law and 
policy (Dickovick and Eastwood 2013). They include managers and agents of public agencies 
such as the police, the military, the judiciary, the diplomatic corps, or the intelligence force. 
While these actors might partly shape decisions about the government’s strategies, they are 
almost always responsible for implementing them. Thus, success or failure of accommodation 
and coercion might be a function of the attitude of bureaucrats.  
For theoretical purposes, this dissertation takes the attitude of bureaucrats as a given. It 
assumes that the behavior of bureaucratic managers and agents is determined by the actions of 
political leaders. This assumption is a simplification of reality because political leaders and 
bureaucratic managers may actually have conflicting goals, or they may face other principal-
agent problems (see Eisenhardt 1989 for a review on agency theory). However, it is generally 
admitted that bureaucrats care about their promotion and about budgetary resources (Allison and 
Zelikow 1999). Thus, it is realistic to presume that their behavior will reflect the preferences of 
leaders who have the power to promote them and allocate resources to their agencies. 
Consequently, this dissertation rather focuses on explaining the attitude of political leaders.  
Commonly, the role of political leaders is four-fold. First, they provide policy guidance to 
bureaucrats, and decide which policy option will be implemented. Second, they allocate 
resources required for the implementation of the adopted policies. Third, they are in charge of 
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recruiting, promoting, and appointing bureaucratic managers and agents. Last, political leaders 
often have the responsibility of overseeing the actions of bureaucratic agencies involved in the 
implementation of public policy.  
When incumbent political leaders prioritize these four functions, one can expect 
bureaucratic agencies to successfully implement the government’s strategy about 
accommodation or coercion. Yet, political leaders may have conflicting preferences and 
motivations. Aspirations of leaders of the executive might not match the priorities of some 
legislators. Thus, disagreements may occur within the political leadership with regard to these 
critical functions. For instance, some leaders may favor policies that accommodate the needs of 
their citizens while others would prefer coercive policies. Even those who support 
accommodation may still disagree as to what accommodative policies should be given 
precedence. For instance, should provision of education prevail over that of electricity?  
Differences may also occur regarding resource allocation. For example, whether state 
revenues should primarily serve public or private goods may become a dividing issue among 
political leaders (see Kisangani 2012). Also, discords are likely to emerge when these leaders 
consider appointment of individuals who manage implementation of public policy. Finally, some 
leaders may commit their time to overseeing the actions of state agencies while others might 
prioritize private or lucrative activities instead. In short, state leaders face a type of “collective 
action” problem throughout the policy process (Aldrich 1995; see also Olson 1965, 1990). 
Understanding civil war thus requires elucidation of the conditions that determine 
political leaders’ ability to achieve consensus on the key functions related to the adoption and 
implementation of accommodation and coercion. To provide these explanations, this dissertation 
takes three steps. First, it clarifies the consensus-performance logic, showing how consensus 
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among leaders, or the lack thereof, affects organizational performance. Second, it examines the 
circumstances that may increase or reduce leaders’ consensus on accommodation and coercion. 
The third step is to shed light on how such consensus, or the lack thereof, impacts the 
government’s ability to supply political order.     
 
  3.1 Strategic Consensus and Government Performance 
This study draws on the business management literature to explain government 
performance as a function of consensus among political leaders. According to scholars in this 
field, consensus is a complex and multi-dimensional concept (Dess 1987; Wooldridge and Floyd 
1989). It varies along two different dimensions. The first is a cognitive dimension, often referred 
to as “shared understanding,” which refers to the collective state of managers’ knowledge about 
whether and how a specific strategy will achieve its desired goal (Floyd and Wooldridge 1992; 
Kellermanns et al. 2005). The second dimension of consensus, which is “common commitment,” 
describes how managers are committed to a specific strategy (Floyd and Wooldridge 1992). A 
group of managers share a common commitment to a strategy when they strongly support that 
strategy and are willing to devote resources and time toward its adoption and implementation.  
 This dissertation relies on Floyd and Wooldridge’s (1992) definition of consensus based 
on the combination of these two dimensions. According to this conceptualization, consensus is 
“strong” when the levels of both “understanding” and “commitment” are high. Thus, consensus 
on accommodation is strong when leaders not only share understanding about whether and how 
this strategy will lower grievance in society, but also commit to its implementation. Similarly, 
consensus on coercion is strong when leaders share the belief that this strategy will increase the 
costs of dissention, and also commit to its implementation. 
34 
The government being a large organization, consensus might be strong in one part but not 
in others. For instance, a policy might enjoy strong consensus within the executive but not in the 
legislative branch, or vice versa. Therefore, the focus of this study is on the scope of consensus 
among political leaders across all branches. The term “scope of consensus” indicates the 
proportion of leaders with shared understanding of and strong commitment to a strategy 
(Wooldridge and Floyd 1989; Markóczy 2001).  
In order to make predictions about the scope of strategic consensus, further clarification 
about the concept is necessary. Anytime an accommodative or coercive measure m is being 
considered by the government, one can presume that leaders may broadly support it, broadly 
oppose it, or they may be divided about it. For theoretical purposes, this study refers to these 
three respective possibilities as broad consensus, broad dissensus, and polarization.  
Assuming that p, the proportion of leaders represented in government, varies between 0 
and 1, these values of the scope of consensus can be understood as follows. Broad consensus 
exists among leaders about m when psupport, the proportion of leaders supporting m, is close to 1. 
There is broad dissensus about m when poppose, the proportion of leaders opposing m, is close to 
1. Polarization occurs when there is neither broad consensus nor broad dissensus.  
These variations in the scope of leaders’ consensus about public policy have implications 
for government performance. More specifically, broad consensus among leaders about a policy 
aimed at improving government performance increases the chances of success of that policy. 
This is because almost all leaders will cooperate and coordinate their efforts in order to ensure 
effective adoption and implementation of the policy. In the case of broad dissensus, a policy has 
little chance of being adopted. The effect of broad policy dissensus m will thus tend to depend on 
the scope of leaders’ consensus on alternative options after m is rejected.  
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In contrast, leaders’ polarization reduces government performance. When leaders are 
polarized or divided about a policy, it might or might not be adopted. However, if adopted, that 
policy is unlikely to be successfully implemented. This is because the counter-efforts by leaders 
opposing the policy will likely cancel out the positive actions of those who support it. In short, 
government performance with regard to political order should be a function of the conditions that 
broaden or weaken leaders’ consensus about accommodation and coercion. 
    
 3.2 State Environment and Strategic Consensus  
This dissertation argues that the scope of state leaders’ consensus on the government’s 
strategy for political order is determined by state environment, which describes the structural and 
institutional conditions under which governments operate. This claim is based on a premise that 
systemic factors such as socioeconomic conditions, sociological elements, and political 
institutions impact individual-level variables like political leaders’ beliefs and interests. These 
structural and institutional factors might ultimately determine whether broad consensus, broad 
dissensus, or polarization exists among leaders regarding accommodation and coercion. 
 
 3.2.1 Leaders’ Consensus on Accommodation 
The use of accommodation as a strategy to deter dissidence or resolve domestic crisis 
implies that the government predominantly commits to the provision of public goods. One might 
distinguish between two types of public goods: tangible and intangible goods (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003). Tangible public goods are material goods supplied by the state that benefit 
whole society. These include, among others, public schools, hospitals, roads, water, electricity, 
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and public housing. Intangible public goods describe non-material goods that the state provides 
to all members of society. These are, among others, security, justice, and civil liberties.   
In order to make predictions about the determinants of leaders’ consensus on the 
provision of these goods, a number of assumptions are in order. First, this dissertation assumes 
that the behavior of political leaders is driven by their desire to obtain and remain in office 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Thus, when the government considers a specific measure m to 
provide tangible or intangible public goods, an incumbent leader’s support or opposition to m 
depends on how implementation of m would affect her chances at remaining in office. 
The political survival assumption has the following implications for the scope of leaders’ 
consensus. When considering a measure m, broad consensus on m is likely to emerge within 
government if psupport, the proportion of leaders whose political survival is positively tied to the 
implementation of m, is close to 1. Similarly, the likelihood of broad dissensus is higher if poppose, 
the proportion of leaders who might lose office because of the implementation of m, is close to 1. 
In contrast, leaders are more likely to be polarized about m, if most of them are unclear about the 
political implications of m, or if psupport and poppose are approximately of equal sizes.   
Another assumption is that public and private goods have different properties. Private 
goods tend to generate immediate dividends to recipients while public goods might take longer to 
produce benefits. For instance, resources invested by the government in public education might 
take several years to yield profits for citizens. In contrast, when those same resources are 
distributed as private goods, their recipients can immediately feel the benefits. In addition, 
private goods might enable leaders to exclude opponents while rewarding supporters. Yet, the 
provision of public goods might not convey to supporters this sense of reward for their efforts.  
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The immediacy of benefits and the discriminatory properties associated with private 
goods have two major implications. First, office-seeking political leaders are likely to prefer 
provision of private goods to members of society who have the institutional power of selecting 
them into and out of office. As Clark, Golder, and Golder (2013, 395) contend, “leaders always 
prefer to use private goods to keep their winning coalition loyal.”  
A second implication is that members of society may accept or reject private goods 
offered by political leaders. This will depend on their discount factors. The term “discount 
factor” describes “the rate at which future benefits are discounted compared with today’s 
benefits” (Clark, Golder, and Golder 2013, 138). When people have low discount factors, they 
tend to value today’s benefits much more than what they will receive tomorrow. Thus, 
individuals with low discount factors are likely to accept private goods because of the immediate 
benefits they produce. In contrast, individuals with high discount factors are more likely to value 
future benefits almost as much as what they get today. Consequently, citizens with high discount 
factors will generally prefer the government to supply public goods, even though such provision 
may take time to generate dividends. 
It follows that leaders’ commitment to accommodation is a function of the distribution of 
discount factors within their selectorate. For instance, when members of the selectorate 
overwhelmingly value the present more than the future, leaders who supply private goods are 
more likely to be selected into office. Once in office, these leaders will tend to oppose policies 
that do not generate immediate dividends. In contrast, when members of the selectorate 
overwhelmingly value the future more than the present, leaders who supply public goods are 
more likely to be selected into office. During their tenure in office, these leaders will likely 
support policies that supply public goods.  
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Information about the distribution of discount factors within the selectorate is difficult to 
obtain. However, it can be assumed from two critical dimensions of state environment. These 
two elements can thus be used to predict the scope of leaders’ consensus on accommodation. The 
first is the state’s socioeconomic condition, which refers to the physical quality of life in society. 
At the lowest socioeconomic level, most members of society have little to no education, and lack 
the capacity to cover basic needs such as food, healthcare, and decent housing. As societies 
advance socioeconomically, so does the quality of life of their members. In the most advanced 
societies, most citizens are well educated, and have the means to cover their basic needs. 
At the lowest socioeconomic levels, most citizens will tend to have low discount factors. 
They are therefore less likely to have a preference for public goods given the harsh 
socioeconomic pressure upon them. With little or no education and trying to survive, they will 
likely prefer goods that generate immediate benefits over others that may take longer to produce 
dividends. As a result, broad dissensus on accommodation is likely among their leaders, who 
need to supply private goods in order to retain office.  
As the society’s socioeconomic level improves, the scope of leaders’ consensus on 
accommodation increases. The proportion of leaders relying on public goods to obtain and retain 
office will rise gradually. However, this means that leaders of societies at mid-level of 
socioeconomic development are likely to be polarized about accommodation. Ultimately, broad 
consensus on accommodation is likely in advanced societies, where citizens in large majorities 
have high discount factors. Thus, the prediction is that: 
 
H1: The scope of leaders’ consensus on accommodation increases as societies develop 
socioeconomically.  
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A second dimension of state environment that is relevant to the scope of leaders’ 
consensus on accommodation is political openness. This refers to the extent that all the 
politically active population has the institutional power, in principle, to select leaders and be 
selected (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). In some societies, 
institutional arrangements are “open” with regard to who gets to select leaders or to who can be 
selected as a leader. In others, they are “closed,” which means that the institutional rules for 
selecting political leaders are restrictive. Restrictions may be related to, among other things, race 
(apartheid regimes), religion (theocratic regimes), political ideology (communist regimes), 
profession (military regimes), or social class (aristocratic regimes). 
The effect of political openness on leaders’ consensus on accommodation is, however, 
conditional on the state’s socioeconomic environment. At the lowest socioeconomic level, open 
institutions will further broaden leaders’ dissensus about accommodation because almost all 
leaders must supply private goods in order to obtain or retain office. Thus, poppose, the proportion 
of leaders opposed to accommodation, would be closed to 1. At mid-level of socioeconomic 
development, open institutions will likely exacerbate leaders’ polarization about the political 
benefits of accommodation. This is because the proportion of supporters will tend to equal that of 
opponents. It is only at high socioeconomic levels that open institutions will generate broad 
consensus among leaders about accommodation. At these levels, almost all leaders must rely on 
public goods to survive in office. This argument leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Open institutions reduce the scope of leaders’ consensus on accommodation at low 
socioeconomic levels, but increase it as societies develop. 
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 3.2.2 Leaders’ Consensus on Coercion 
A coercive strategy generally means that leaders must opt for suppression, rather than 
provision, of some public goods. Coercion implies a deliberate choice by leaders to impose 
physical and psychological constraints on others that cause suffering. Because of the pain 
suffered by the victims of coercion, one can expect them to seek retaliation by trying to drive 
incumbent leaders out of office by all means, including violence, if necessary. Additionally, 
coercion not only induces suffering for the victims. It also exposes the lives of the government 
agents who implement that strategy, especially when they attempt to repel armed challengers. 
Therefore, the scope of leaders’ commitment to coercion will be determined by their shared 
belief that this strategy will secure their individual chance to remain in office.   
The state’s socioeconomic condition will account for the scope of leaders’ consensus on 
coercion. Empirical studies indicate that “under conditions of scarcity, people give top priority to 
materialistic goals; while under conditions of prosperity, they become more likely to emphasize 
self-expression and emancipative values” (Welzel and Inglehart 2009, 131; see also Inglehart 
and Welzel 2005; Diener et al. 2013). In short, whether or not leaders commit to the protection of 
civil liberties will have to do with the socioeconomic environment in which they operate.  
At low socioeconomic levels, broad support and polarization are more likely among 
leaders than broad opposition to coercion. Because members of this type of society presumably 
care less about emancipative values, their leaders are less likely to share broad opposition to 
coercion. At mid-levels, polarization is more likely to occur because the proportion of leaders 
opposing coercion would approximate that of those supporting it. In contrast, broad opposition to 
coercion is more likely among leaders in societies with high socioeconomic levels. 
H3: The scope of leaders’ commitment to coercion weakens as the level of socioeconomic 
development increases.   
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The openness of the state’s political institutions also affects the scope of leaders’ 
consensus on coercion. In general, leaders’ consensus on coercion is likely to be broad when 
institutional arrangements restrain participation in the selection of leaders based on factors such 
as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, class, profession, or political ideology. Under such 
arrangements, incumbent leaders might overwhelmingly commit to coercion because their 
selectors most likely wish to maintain their privilege of being part of a closed selectorate.  
In contrast, the impact of open institutions will be conditional on the state’s 
socioeconomic environment. Unlike their counterparts in closed societies, leaders in open 
political systems lack unity about the political benefits of coercion. In societies with high levels 
of socioeconomic development, open institutions will further broaden the scope of opposition to 
coercion among leaders. At lower socioeconomic levels, however, leaders of politically open 
societies are more likely to be polarized about coercion.  
 
H4: Open political institutions further increase leaders’ polarization about coercion in poor 
states while broadening the scope of leaders’ opposition to it as societies develop. 
   
  3.3 Strategic Consensus and Civil War 
The scope of leaders’ consensus on accommodation and coercion will have implications 
for government performance regarding political order. As business management scholars 
contend, strong consensus among managers about a strategy increases the performance of the 
organization (Kellermanns et al. 2011). During the implementation of a business’ strategy, 
managers who share strong consensus will act independently but “in a way that is consistent with 
the actions of others and consistent with the spirit of the decision” (Amason 1996, 125; see also 
Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992; Walter et al. 2013). In contrast, the lack of consensus on a given 
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strategy decreases the likelihood of performance (see Walter et al. 2013; Floyd and Wooldridge 
1992; Kellermanns et al. 2005, 2011). Disagreements among managers about a given strategy 
may result in poor or failed implementation due to possible foot-dragging or counter-efforts by 
those who disagree with the strategy (Guth and MacMillan 1986; Wooldridge and Floyd 1989).  
 
 3.3.1 Consensus on Accommodation and Civil War 
The scope of leaders’ consensus on accommodation as a strategy to supply political order 
has implications for the occurrence of civil war. When leaders share broad consensus on 
accommodation, civil war is unlikely. In contrast, the lack of consensus on accommodation 
raises the prospects of civil war. The effect of leaders’ consensus on accommodation on civil war 
occurs through the two stages described at the beginning of this chapter.  
At the governance stage, broad consensus on accommodation will enable leaders from all 
branches of government to coordinate their efforts in order to guarantee that (1) policies that 
further pubic interests are adopted; (2) qualified bureaucrats are appointed; (3) sufficient 
resources are allocated to government agencies; and (4) the actions of bureaucrats are properly 
overseen. When leaders collectively commit to performing these functions, the quality and the 
performance of the bureaucracy increase. More oversight would ensure that state resources are 
spent on public services and goods are supplied effectively. As the government produces 
sufficient public goods to content most members of society, the levels of grievances will be low 
and social dissidence is unlikely (Gurr 1970). 
In contrast, the lack of consensus among leaders about accommodation will increase the 
likelihood of dissidence during the governance stage. When leaders are polarized or broadly 
oppose accommodation at this level, they are unlikely to invest in the policies and bureaucratic 
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capabilities that are necessary for the provision of public goods. State resources will be used to 
serve private interests and buy off segments of the population, including regime supporters or 
even members of the opposition. Leaders who care about private goods doled out by the 
executive will unlikely perform their oversight duty. Others who do not receive these benefits 
might engage in actions that seek to destabilize the regime. The consequence is likely to be a 
society that is poorly governed, with a weak administrative capacity and rising public discontent. 
This raises the probabilities of social dissidence (Gurr 1970). 
The second phase leading up to civil war is the bargaining stage, which occurs when 
dissatisfied groups decide to challenge the government. At this level, the government might still 
avoid escalation into civil war if there is broad commitment to accommodation among leaders. 
This is because societies where state managers share broad commitment to accommodation 
would have built in the past the type of bureaucratic capacity required for a peaceful settlement 
of social crises. In addition, their past behavior as an accommodative government signals to 
discontented groups that they can have trust in the negotiation process. Most importantly, the fact 
that there is broad consensus on accepting their demands means that aggrieved citizens who 
resort to violence would not enjoy support among political leaders. Together, these conditions 
increase the chances of peaceful settlement of a social crisis.  
     On the contrary, the lack of consensus on accommodation during the crisis bargaining 
phase puts leaders at higher risks of escalation into civil war. First, governments lacking 
consensus on accommodation have probably not built the type of state capacity required for 
peaceful settlement. Most likely, the justice system will not inspire confidence to dissidents, who 
might thus resort to violence. Second, these governments have not displayed the kind of 
consistency in accommodation that would reassure challengers to settle their dispute peacefully. 
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Third, in a polarized government, there will likely be some political leaders who choose to 
provide support to dissidents if they opt for violence. Together, these conditions reduce the 
chances for successful accommodation of dissidents, and increase the odds of escalation into 
civil war. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: Civil war is more likely when leaders lack consensus on accommodation. 
 
 
 3.3.2 Consensus on Coercion and Civil War 
The scope of leaders’ consensus on coercion also determines the risks of civil war. As 
stated in the previous section, coercion as a strategy for political order has a unique property in 
that it induces suffering on others. Retaliation by the victims and defection by agents who 
implement it are potential costs that leaders must accept to incur. Thus, for coercion to reduce the 
odds of civil war, broad consensus among leaders is required.  
The effect of leaders’ consensus about coercion on civil war occurs through a two-stage 
process. At the governance stage, state managers who share broad consensus on coercion will 
cooperate and coordinate their efforts in order to adopt policies that successfully coerce 
opponents and coopt supporters. They will agree to appoint supporters who identify themselves 
with the regime and its goals. Also, they will most likely allocate sufficient resources to and 
properly oversee government agencies involved in the implementation of coercive measures. 
These agencies often include, among others, the police, the intelligence and the military.  
Through the endowment of private goods to selective groups, the government can also ensure the 
loyalty of its supporters. Together, these measures are likely to result in strong coercive 
capabilities and practices that might prevent dissidents from organizing (Tilly 1978).    
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In contrast, leaders who lack consensus on coercion during the governance stage are more 
likely to face dissidence. One reason is that their coercive measures will likely fail to deter 
challengers. When there is no broad consensus on coercion, executive leaders who engage in 
imposing high costs to dissention are more likely to marginalize a large proportion of the 
political leadership. Because their actions do not enjoy broad support, these executive leaders 
may also have difficulty securing the support of key segments of the bureaucracy. The 
consequence is likely to be a society with rising public discontent and poor coercive capabilities 
and practices. These conditions increase the odds of social dissidence (Gurr 1970; Tilly 1978).  
At the second stage, when the government is challenged by aggrieved groups for any 
given reason, broad consensus on coercion might also enable leaders to escape civil war. 
Governments whose members broadly share consensus on coercing their citizens are more likely 
to succeed in de-escalating a nascent crisis. They have probably built in the past strong coercive 
capabilities that they can rely on to locate or repel challengers (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Also, 
their past repressive behavior, coupled with strong capacity, signals to challengers that their 
chances of victory are low. This may allow the government to force challengers into 
surrendering to its terms. Moreover, there will be little support to challengers when the costs 
imposed by the government are high. Consequently, the risks of escalation into civil war are 
lower when leaders’ consensus on coercion is broad. 
  On the contrary, the crisis bargaining phase is more likely to result in civil war when 
leaders lack consensus on coercion. First, governments that are divided about the political 
benefits of coercion have certainly not built strong repressive capabilities in the past. A 
government with weak coercive capacity has more difficulties locating and repelling its 
challengers (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Second, these governments have not displayed consistency 
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in coercive measures in their past behavior that would signal strength to challengers. Thus, 
dissidents might believe they have high chances of victory against government forces. Third, 
with polarization within the political and the bureaucratic leadership there will likely be some 
members of government who are willing to provide support to dissidents if they choose 
escalation into violence. These state managers might also engage in counter-efforts aimed at 
undermining the government’s strategy. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H6: Civil war is more likely when leaders lack consensus on coercion. 
 
This chapter has argued that civil war is an indirect function of state environment. This 
indirect effect is mediated through the scope of political leaders’ consensus about the 
government strategy to supply political order. The main predictions are that (a) the scope of 
leaders’ consensus on accommodation and coercion varies as a consequence of the country’s 
socioeconomic conditions; (b) the state’s socioeconomic environment moderates the impact of 
political openness on leaders’ consensus on accommodation and coercion; and (c) the lack of 
consensus about accommodation and coercion raises the prospects of civil war. The next chapter 
relies on a quantitative method to test these propositions.    
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Chapter 4 - Quantitative Methods 
This chapter relies on quantitative models of civil war to statistically evaluate the 
theoretical claims outlined in chapter 3. Two main sections form this chapter. The first lays out 
the research design and describes the models to be used. The second presents, discusses, and 
summarizes the statistical findings.  
 
 4.1 Research Design and Models of Civil War 
The present analysis examines an unbalanced time series cross sectional (TSCS) dataset 
of 161 countries from 1960 to 2007. The unit of analysis is the country-year. The sample is 
unbalanced because a number of countries became independent after 1960. The choice of a 
temporal space that starts in 1960 and ends in 2007 is based on the lack of data on some of the 
key variables. The lack of data also explains why only 161 states are incorporated in the study. 
Appendix A provides a list of these countries. 
Figure 1.1 suggests that the relationship between state environment and civil war is 
mediated through the scope of strategic consensus among political leaders. State environment 
describes the socioeconomic conditions and political institutions under which the government 
operates. The scope of strategic consensus refers to the proportion of leaders committed to the 
government’s strategy for political order. The main contention is that some characteristics of 
state environment determine the extent to which political leaders rally around accommodation or 
coercion as ways to supply political order. In turn, the scope of leaders’ consensus on these 
strategies will affect the likelihood of civil war.  
  As a result, this dissertation relies on mediation modeling to investigate the causes of 
civil war. Baron and Kenny (1986, 1173) define mediation as “the generic mechanism through 
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which the focal independent variable is able to influence the dependent variable of interest.” 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 5 suggest that leaders’ consensus on accommodation mediates the effects of 
state environment on civil war. Following hypotheses 3, 4, and 6, the impact of state 
environment on civil war is mediated through leaders’ consensus on coercion.   
 
 4.1.1 Operational Definition of Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is civil war onset. Civil war refers to “a sustained military 
conflict, primarily internal, pitting the central government against an insurgent force capable of 
effective resistance,” which results in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year (Small and 
Singer 1982, 214-216). Civil war is a binary variable. It takes a value of 1 if a conflict starts in 
any given year and is coded by the Correlates of War (COW) as civil war for “central control” or 
over “local issues” (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Otherwise, it takes a value of 0. A number of 
scholars (e.g. Salehyan 2009) are critical of the 1000 battle-death threshold used by the (COW) 
project. To account for this criticism, a robustness check of the results is performed using lower 
thresholds of 25 battle-related deaths per year. Data are from Gleditsch et al. (2002).
9
   
 
 4.1.2 Mediating Variable: Strategic Consensus 
Two indicators operationalize leaders’ strategic consensus. The first is accommodation, 
which is a proxy for the scope of leaders’ consensus on accommodation. It is an index that is 
intended to capture the extent to which state leaders (1) adopt policies that further pubic 
                                                 
9
 The authors of this dataset distinguish between two categories of armed conflict: “minor armed conflict” and 
“war.” Minor conflicts those that resulted in at least 25 battle-deaths per year, but which have not reached 1,000 
battle-deaths in any given year over their course. War refers to conflicts with at least 1,000 battle-deaths in a year 
(UCDP/PRIO 2016, 8). 
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interests; (2) appoint qualified bureaucrats; (3) allocate sufficient resources for public agenda; 
and (4) properly oversee the actions of bureaucrats. Time series cross sectional data on the 
proportion of leaders committed to these four functions are unavailable. Thus, construction of the 
accommodation index relies on four indicators of governance, which capture the outcomes 
produced by governments across space and time. These governance indicators are provided by 
Hegre and Nygård (2014).  
The first component of the accommodation index is Hegre and Nygård’s (2014) indicator 
on “economic policies.” This measure it based on the World Bank’s score and assessments from 
the Economic Freedom Network (EF). These scores relate to economic management, structural 
policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector management. The EF 
evaluations center on areas such as the size of government (expenditures, taxes, and enterprises), 
access to sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and regulation of credit, labor, and 
business (Hegre and Nygård 2014, 10-11). 
The accommodation index is also based on Hegre and Nygård’s (2014) indicator on 
“bureaucratic quality.” This component combines ratings on administrative capacity from the 
World Governance Indicators (WGI) with scores from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). WGI scores assess ‘‘perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies’’ (Hegre and Nygård 2014, 9). ICRG ratings indicate, for a given year, the extent to 
which a country ‘‘tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an 
established mechanism for recruitment and training’’ (Hegre and Nygård 2014).  
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A third component of the accommodation index is Hegre and Nygård’s (2014) “rule of 
law” measure. It is based on assessments from three sources. The first is the WGI’s rule of law, 
which captures ‘‘perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence’’ (Hegre and Nygård 2014, 10). 
The second source is an evaluation of ‘‘commercial and economic law and security of property 
rights’’ provided by the Economic Freedom Network. Last, the rule of law indicator relies on the 
Freedom House scores on civil liberties. These scores classify countries according to whether or 
not they “have an established and generally fair system of the rule of law (including an 
independent judiciary), allow free economic activity, and tend to strive for equality of 
opportunity for everyone” (Hegre and Nygård 2014, 10).  
The fourth component of the accommodation index is Hegre and Nygård’s (2014) 
“corruption” indicator. This dimension relies on the ICRG corruption scores, the WGI control of 
corruption assessment, and the Transparency International index on corruption perception. These 
different ratings are all concerned with “actual or potential corruption” in different forms, as well 
as the “degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians” 
(Hegre and Nygård 2014, 10).  
Together, these four components of the accommodation index are believed to be a valid 
indicator of leaders’ commitment to the four functions that this proxy intends to capture. For 
instance, the economic policy dimension denotes whether or not leaders adopt policies that 
further pubic interests. The bureaucratic quality, corruption, and rule of law elements indicate 
whether political leaders appoint or recruit qualified bureaucrats, allocate sufficient resources for 
public rather than private agenda, and properly oversee the actions of government agencies.   
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Hegre and Nygård (2014) originally transformed the values of each of their indicators in 
order to have their mean and standard deviation equal 0 and 1 respectively. Using these 
normalized values, the accommodation index is constructed as an unweighted average of the four 
components. High values indicate broad consensus among state leaders regarding 
accommodation, while lower levels denote dissensus or polarization among leaders. In the 
sample, observations with the lowest values include Cambodia (late 1970s), Liberia (early 
1990s), and Somalia (early 1990s). Meanwhile, Canada (1982, 1993) and Switzerland (1981, 
1989) have the highest values. This measure is expected to be negatively related to civil war.  
The second measure of leaders’ strategic consensus is coercion. It is an index that intends 
to capture the extent to which state leaders (1) adopt policies that discriminate and increase the 
costs of dissention; (2) appoint bureaucrats that are committed to the execution of discriminatory 
and repressive policies; (3) allocate state resources for their coercive agenda; and (4) properly 
oversee the actions of bureaucrats involved in the implementation of coercion. 
The coercion index relies on three components. The first is Hegre and Nygård’s (2014) 
indicator on “political exclusion and repression.” It is based on the proportion of ethnic exclusion 
provided by the Ethnic Power Relations (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010) and on the 
Political Terror Scale’s ratings of government repression (Wood and Gibney 2010). It is intended 
to indicate the scope of leaders’ commitment to discriminatory and repressive policies as a 
means to provide political order. 
The second component of the coercion index is Hegre and Nygård’s (2014) indicator on 
“military in politics.” This variable combines the ICRG assessment of military participation in 
political affairs with military spending as a share of GDP from the World Bank. It is expected to 
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capture the extent to which leaders are committed to the use of the military and state resources 
for the execution of their political agenda.  
The third component of the coercion index is military personnel per capita. It indicates 
the number of army soldiers per inhabitant. The data are from the Correlates of War project 
(Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). This component intends to capture the extent to which 
leaders are committed to building and maintaining a coercive force that is sufficiently strong to 
deter or repel domestic challengers. 
Using these three components, the coercion index is built following Morris (1979). The 
indicators of “military in politics” and “political exclusion and repression” were originally coded 
by Hegre and Nygård (2014) so that high levels indicate good governance. In order to have them 
reflect coercion, they have been multiplied by -1. Next, all three components are rescaled to 
obtain values that range from 0 to 100 (Morris 1979). This requires the highest and the lowest 
scores for each of them. In the sample, the highest value of the new “military in politics” (MiP) 
variable is 3.38 and the lowest is -3.60. As for the new “political exclusion and repression” 
(PER) indicator, the highest value in the sample is 3.84 while the lowest is -2.34. The highest 
value of military personnel (MPC) is 76.89 while the lowest is 0.    
The following steps are taken to compute the coercion index. First, the MiP minimum is 
subtracted from its maximum and then divided by 100 (3.38-(-3.60))/100), obtaining 0.07. 
Second, the same procedure is followed for PER and MPC, obtaining 0.06 and 0.77 respectively. 
Third, the coercion index is computed as follows: coercion = ([MiP-(-3.60)/0.07]+[PER-(-
2.34)/0.06]+[MPC-0/0.77])/3. The coercion index is fairly highly correlated with Wood and 
Gibney’s (2010) Political Terror Scale’s ratings of government repression (0.76) and Cingranelli 
and Richards’ (2010) physical integrity rights index (0.68).   
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   4.1.3 Independent Variable: State Environment 
This dissertation argues that the likelihood of civil war is an indirect function of the 
state’s environment. Two variables measure state environment. The first is socioeconomic 
environment, which is operationalized in terms of gross domestic product per capita (GDP per 
capita). This measure divides, for every country-year, the gross domestic product by the mid-
year population size. Data are from the World Bank (2015) and are featured in constant 2005 US 
dollars. The raw data have a positive skew with a mean of 6997 and a standard deviation of 
11239. Thus, the natural log of these values is used instead.  
Compared to alternatives, GDP per capita is preferred because it is not only widely used 
in extant research on civil war, but its effect is also subject to rivaling interpretations (Dixon 
2009). While economic studies use it as a proxy for costs incurred during conflict (Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998; 2004), political works contend it is an indicator for state capacity. Relying on 
GDP per capita enables this dissertation to assess its direct and indirect effects on civil war, thus 
allowing evaluation of the competing economic and political explanations. Nonetheless, 
alternative indicators are considered. Appendix A provides the coding procedure of and the 
results produced by a quality of life index (PQLI) that combines infant mortality, life expectancy, 
and literacy rates.      
The second variable that operationalizes state environment is political openness. Political 
institutions for selecting leaders are “open” to the extent that “all the politically active population 
has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process” (Marshall, 
Gurr and Jaggers 2016, 22). Political institutions refer to the “rules regulating how political 
leaders are recruited and how citizens participate in this selection” (Hegre and Nygård 2014, 2; 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).  
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This dissertation relies on the variable de facto open to measure political openness. It 
indicates the “observed” political party system in a country in a given year. Most likely, a party 
system is a reflection of whether participation in the political process is open to all or restricted 
to a subset of the population. In addition, this measure does not capture how state managers 
behave. It can thus be used to test the effect of political institutions on leaders’ consensus on 
accommodation and coercion without engaging in a circular argument. Political openness is 
coded in terms of “open” versus “closed.” It takes a value of 1 (open) if at least two political 
parties exist in the country in a given year. Otherwise, it is coded as 0 (closed).  
Measurement of de facto open is based on Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland’s (2010) 
variable “defacto” or “existence of parties.” This is one of three measures of party system that 
they provide. The other two are “legal status of parties,” which indicates the number of parties 
legally allowed in the country, and “parties within the legislature,” which highlights the number 
of parties represented in parliament. Existence of parties is preferred to legal status of parties 
because “legal status alone is not always a good reflection of empirical reality” (Cheibub, 
Gandhi, and Vreeland 2009, 5). Also, the number of parties represented in parliament might not 
always indicate whether or not the system is restricted. However, robustness checks are 
performed using the other two indicators.  
The choice of the party system to operationalize political openness is based a number of 
reasons. First, it has the advantage of providing information about the political class in general 
rather than just the executive or the legislative. This is important because the theory outlined in 
chapter 3 seeks to explain the behavior of leaders of all political branches of government.  
The second reason why the party system is preferred is that, in comparison to many of the 
alternatives, it is a more valid and reliable measure of political openness as defined in this 
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section. For instance, the variable “competitiveness of executive recruitment” of the Polity data 
(Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016) seems to capture the state’s ability to enforce the selection 
rules in order to make the process competitive. Yet, enforcement of rules has to do more with the 
behavior of the government agents who are in charge of the selection process.  
Similarly, the Polity component “executive constraints” appears to be an indication of 
whether or not state managers from the legislative or from the judiciary are capable of 
constraining the executive. It might also be a proxy for the existence of a free and/or qualified 
press and civil society that are capable of constraining the executive. In other words, the 
“executive constraints” component is most likely a reflection of the government’s policy with 
regard to civil liberty or the state’s socioeconomic environment rather than that of political 
institutions.    
In short, if the theoretical contention is that the openness of institutional arrangements 
determines leaders’ behavior and performance, as it is in this dissertation, relying on a measure 
of institutions that captures how leaders behave or perform may lead to a circular argument. 
Thus, the traditional measures of regime type, including the Polity components (Marshall, Gurr, 
and Jaggers 2016), the Scalar Index (Gates et al. 2006), and the X-polity indicator (Vreeland 
2008), should not be used to operationalize political openness as conceived in this study.
10
 This 
is because these indicators are based on the components highlighted above.   
 
                                                 
10
 A potential valid measure of political openness would be the Polity component of “openness of executive 
recruitment.” However, this indicator might not reflect the institutional arrangements related to leaders of the 
legislative branch. Following the assumption about the government being a non-unitary actor, the institutions 
regarding the selection of legislative leaders must also be accounted for. 
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 4.1.4 Control Variables 
Three approaches dominate empirical research on civil war. First, political analyses 
emphasize the impacts of grievance and state capacity in determining the prospects of civil war.  
Second, economic works focus on the idea of greed. Third, structural models revolve around 
environmental scarcity. Unlike this dissertation, most of these studies posit a direct relationship 
between civil war and a state’s socioeconomic conditions and regime type. In order to check for 
the robustness of the indirect effects highlighted in chapter 3, the strategic consensus argument is 
tested using each of these three approaches.  
As indicated in chapter 2, operationalization of grievance in extant research generally 
revolves around the ideas of vertical inequality, horizontal inequality, and repression. This 
dissertation accounts for measures of vertical and horizontal inequality. Previous arguments 
about repression are tested through the results of coercion, the second mediating variable.   
Vertical inequality is controlled for in the forms of ethnic fractionalization and religious 
fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin 2003). These two variables are coded using the ethno-
linguistic fractionalization (ELF) index, which captures the probability that two randomly drawn 
individuals in a country are from different ethno-linguistic groups (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 78). 
Data are from Fearon and Laitin (2003). Their study does not extend beyond 1999. The original 
values are therefore extrapolated for every country to cover post-1999 years.   
Horizontal inequality is accounted for in terms of the share of excluded population. This 
variable indicates the proportion of excluded groups relative to the ethno-politically relevant 
population in a country in a given year. Data are from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) project 
(Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009), which identifies political status for all politically relevant 
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ethnic groups worldwide for all years since 1946.
11
 These three measures of grievance are 
expected to be positively related to civil war.  
 In addition to grievance, political studies also emphasize state capacity. Following these 
studies, this dissertation controls for mountainous terrain (Fearon and Laitin 2003), bad 
neighborhood (Goldstone et al. 2010), population size, oil dependency (Fearon and Laitin 2003), 
and external threat (Gibler and Miller 2014). The variable mountainous terrain indicates the 
proportion of the country that is mountainous. Data are from Fearon and Laitin (2003), and are 
extrapolated to cover more recent years. Bad neighborhood is represented by a measure of the 
number of countries at civil war in the region. Data are from the Center for Systemic Peace 
project on Major Episodes of Political Violence (Marshall 2016). 
The next indicator of state capacity is population size. Data are from the Correlates of 
War project (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). Logged values are used in order to minimize 
the effects of outliers (Koubi and Böhmelt 2014). The variable oil dependency is a dummy that 
equals 1 if a country’s oil exports in a given year surpass one third of its total GDP (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003). It is 0 otherwise. Data are from the World Bank (2015).  
One last state capacity measure is external threat. Gibler and Miller’s (2014) work shows 
that an external territorial threat reduces the likelihood of civil war because it increases the 
government’s ability to mobilize resources and coerce citizens. This is accounted for by relying 
on their measure of “external territorial threat.” It is a dummy coded 1 if a state has a new or an 
ongoing territorial dispute with a land-contiguous neighbor in a given year and 0 otherwise.  
                                                 
11
 The variable share of excluded population is one of the components of the coercion index. Thus, it is excluded 
from models that include coercion. 
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The strategic consensus argument is also tested using economic modeling of civil war. 
Economic studies typically rely on opportunity for profit and costs of rebellion. This dissertation 
relies on Collier et al.’s (2009) work to operationalize opportunity and costs. Two measures of 
opportunity are included. The first is mineral resource rent, which is the share of mineral exports 
as a percentage of GDP. Economic analyses (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 2004; Collier et al. 
2009) show that the relationship between this variable and civil war is curvilinear. Thus, its 
squared term is also incorporated. Data are from the World Bank (2015). The second opportunity 
indicator is a post-Cold War dummy to measure “financing from foreign governments” (Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004). It equals 1 for all years after 1989 and 0 otherwise.  
Following Collier et al. (2009), five variables operationalize cost of rebellion. The first is 
economic growth, which indicates forgone income during conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). It 
is measured as growth in total GDP and data are from the World Bank (2015). Collier et al. 
(2009) uses growth in the previous year. Therefore, economic growth is lagged one year. 
Economic studies also operationalize cost of rebellion in terms of the “duration of peace,” 
which is a proxy for the costs associated with conflict capital (weapons and military skills). In 
their work, Collier et al. (2009) include both a dummy that captures the occurrence of a previous 
civil war and a continuous variable that indicates the number of years since the last civil war. 
They contend that such a dummy is a control for potential “fixed effects” that might have caused 
the initial war while making the country more vulnerable to further conflicts. In contrast, the 
peace years would account for the “legacy effects which might be expected gradually to fade” 
(Collier et al. 2009, 10). Thus, two variables that indicate previous war and peace duration are 
included. Data are from the Correlates of War (COW) project (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). The 
coding of the peace years starts from 1816, the first year for which data are available.  
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Another measure of insurgency cost in the economic tradition is social cohesion, a proxy 
for coordination costs. As recommended by Collier et al. (2009), this variable is obtained by 
multiplying a country’s value on ethnic fractionalization by its value on religious 
fractionalization. Data are from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and are extrapolated to recent years. 
Collier and his coauthors point out that this coding implies that societies with a score of 0 with 
respect to either religion or ethnicity might be coded as homogeneous on both because of the 
multiplicative approach (Collier et al. 2009, 15). In the sample used here, only Mauritania and 
Somalia fall under this category.  
The last two measures of cost of conflict included in economic models are mountainous 
terrain and logged population (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 2004; Collier et al. 2009). Fearon and 
Laitin’s (2003) data on mountainous terrain are used, while data on population are from the 
Correlates of War project (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). 
Finally, the strategic consensus argument is tested using structural models of civil war. 
These studies revolve around the idea of environmental scarcity (Homer-Dixon 1999, 2010; 
Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Urdal 2005; Theisen 2008). Environmental scarcity is often 
operationalized in terms of “supply-induced scarcity,” “demand-induced scarcity,” and 
“structural scarcity” (Homer-Dixon 1999; Hauge and Ellingsen 1998).  
Supply-induced scarcity is measured through drought. This variable is from Slettebak 
(2012), and indicates, for every country-year, the number of drought instances that have either 
affected 100 or more people, led to declaration of a state of emergency and/or a call for 
international assistance. Climate disasters in the form of drought may be associated with scarcity 
in critical resources such as water and crop. Slettebak (2012) find a significant relationship 
between drought and civil war. However, the relationship is negative.  
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Three variables operationalize demand-induced scarcity. These are logged population 
(Urdal 2008), population density (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998), and population growth (Urdal 
2005). These measures are proxies for the resource pressure exercised by rapid demographic 
changes on society. They are lagged one year. Data are from the World Bank (2015).   
Last, structural scarcity is measured through ethnic fractionalization and religious 
fractionalization (Urdal 2008). Data are from Fearon and Laitin’s (2003). Each of these 
indicators of environmental scarcity is expected to be positively related to civil war.  
To control for time dependency (Carter and Signorino 2010), three additional variables 
are included in the political and structural models. These are peace years, peace years square, 
and peace years cubed. Data are from the Correlates of War (COW) project (Sarkees and 
Wayman 2010). The coding starts from 1816, the first year for which data are available. 
Table 4.1 highlights the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the present 
analysis. There are a total of 132 instances of civil war onset in the sample. This represents 
roughly 2% of all country-years. Appendix A provides a list of all the cases included in the 
sample.  
Accommodation, the first mediator, has a mean value of -0.05 and a standard deviation of 
0.90. Its minimum and maximum values are -2.31 and 2.60, and were respectively produced by 
Cambodia in 1976 and Canada in 1982. The accommodation index is highly correlated with the 
indicator of socioeconomic environment (0.80), but less so with political openness (0.31). The 
second mediator, coercion, has a mean value of 33.40 and a standard deviation of 9.29. Its 
minimum and maximum values are 9.33 and 87.53, and were respectively generated by New 
Zealand in 1965 and Iraq in 1990. 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Civil War  6563 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Accommodation 6561 -0.05 0.90 -2.32 2.60 
Coercion 6275 1.93 3.14 0.00 36.71 
GDP per capita 5439 6996.57 11238.87 69.58 81788.95 
De Facto Open 6540 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Ethnic Fractionalization 6459 0.40 0.29 0.00 0.93 
Religious Fractionalization 6459 0.38 0.22 0.00 0.78 
Excluded Population 6013 0.18 0.26 0.00 0.98 
Mountainous Terrain 6484 17.33 20.66 0.00 82.20 
Bad Neighborhood 6546 3.53 2.21 0.00 10.00 
Population  6555 34503.66 115089.80 122 1324655.00 
Oil Exporter 4631 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
External Threat 6552 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Economic Growth 5442 4.08 6.79 -64.05 149.97 
Mineral Rent 4793 0.91 3.07 0.00 42.42 
Mineral Rent Square 4793 10.24 67.54 0.00 1799.30 
Post-Cold War 6563 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Social Cohesion 6459 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.65 
Drought 6563 0.07 0.27 0.00 3.00 
Population Density  6311 114.68 388.94 0.63 6602.30 
Population Growth 6448 1.97 1.60 -6.34 17.62 
Peace Years 6563 43.57 46.82 0.00 191.00 
Peace Years Square 6563 4090.51 7574.81 0.00 36481 
Peace Years Cubic 6563 516609.30 1236504 0.00 6967871 
 
The descriptive statistics of the two indicators of state environment are as follows. The 
first, logged GDP per capita, has a mean value of 7.67 and a standard deviation of 1.58. Its 
minimum and maximum values are 4.24 and 11.31 respectively. The minimum value is from 
Liberia in 1995 while the maximum is from the United Arab Emirates in 1980. The second 
indicator of state environment is de facto open. A total of 4,762 observations are coded as 
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politically open, which is about 73% of the sample. A correlation test indicates no strong 
correlation (0.23) between the two measures of the independent variable.  
 4.1.5 Statistical Models and Methodological Issues 
This dissertation posits that strategic consensus mediates the effect of state environment 
on civil war. Thus, the statistical analysis must assess the indirect effect of state environment on 
civil war through the measures of leaders’ consensus on accommodation and coercion. There is 
little precedent of mediation modeling in the study of civil war.
12
 However, researchers in other 
fields including medical research, psychology, and communication more often investigate 
mediating effects (Mackinnon 2008; Hayes 2009). The methodology adopted in this analysis 
mainly relies on mediation approaches described in Mackinnon (2008).  
Table 4.2 provides seven models to test the six hypotheses suggested in chapter 3 and the 
mediation argument outlined in chapter 3. Four of the models are used to test the indirect impact 
of state environment on civil war through leaders’ strategic consensus as highlighted by paths a 
and b in figure 1.1. Specifically, models 1 and 2 evaluate path a relating state environment to 
leaders’ strategic consensus. These two models are also used to test hypotheses 1 through 4. 
Models 3 and 4 investigate path b, which links leaders’ strategic consensus to civil war. They are 
also relied on to test hypotheses 5 and 6. While model 5 is an evaluation of the total effect of 
state environment on civil war, models 6 and 7 are used to assess the indirect effect of state 
environment on civil war (path c in figure 1.1).  
A few methodological issues are of concern. For instance, models 1 and 2 confront the 
possibility of endogeneity between the two measures of state environment and each of the 
strategic consensus indicators. However, the results of several Hausman tests of simultaneity 
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 Young (2013) is one the rare exceptions.  
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(Hausman 1978; Gujarati 2003, 753-757) are inconclusive. Some tests suggest that the 
independent and the mediating variables are interrelated while others show that they are not.
13
 In 
case of simultaneity, the use of ordinary least square (OLS) regressions does not produce 
consistent estimates. Meanwhile, relying on alternative statistical methods when there is no 
simultaneity yields consistent but inefficient estimators (Gujarati 2003, 753). Given the 
inconclusiveness of the simultaneity test, the OLS method is used.  
Another potential issue is multicollinearity between the two independent variables. On 
one hand, computation of the variance inflation factors (VIFs) was unable to detect 
multicollinearity of logged GDP per capita and de facto open with the constant in each of the 
models. The mean VIF value for all models used vary between 1.05 and 2.06. On the other hand, 
the two mediating variables, accommodation and coercion, are fairly highly and inversely 
correlated (-0.65). Thus, both indicators are not included in the same models. 
 
 4.2 Statistical Analysis  
This section discusses the findings of the statistical analysis. It first relies on models 1 
through 4 in table 4.2 to provide the results of the empirical investigation of the six hypotheses 
formulated in chapter 3. Second, an assessment of the mediation argument is performed using the 
findings of the models in table 4.2. Next, a number of robustness tests are performed based on 
traditional political, economic, and structural modeling of civil war. The analysis ends with 
computation of the direct and indirect effects of state environment on civil war.   
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 The results of the Hausman test vary depending on the variables included in the right-hand side of the reduced 
equations. 
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The dependent variable or civil war is dichotomous. Consequently, population-averaged 
logit regressions with robust standard error (Gujarati 2003) are used to estimate civil war. The 
two mediating variables, accommodation and coercion, are continuous. Thus, their estimation 
relies on OLS regressions with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). Beck and Katz (1995) 
recommends the use of PCSE estimator when the number of cross-national units is greater than 
the number of time units. The present data fit this condition because the sample covers 161 
countries over a 48-year period.  
All 7 models in table 4.2 fit the data quite well as indicated by the highly significant chi-
square statistics. Model 1 investigates the relationship between state environment and 
accommodation. It includes logged GDP per capita, de facto open, and their interaction term 
GDP x open as explanatory variables. The results show that logged GDP per capita is positively 
and significantly (1 percent level) related to accommodation. The slope coefficient for logged 
GDP per capita is 0.22. This supports hypothesis 1, which states that the scope of leaders’ 
consensus on accommodation increases as societies develop socioeconomically.  
The slope coefficient for de facto open is negative (-1.53) and significant at 1 percent 
level. Meanwhile, that for the interaction term GDP x open is positive (0.26) and also significant 
at 1 percent level. The results about the interaction term suggest that improvement in 
socioeconomic development increases accommodation regardless of regime type. Following 
Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), testing the conditional effect of political openness as 
suggested by hypothesis 2 would require illustration of the marginal effects of de facto open.  
Figure 4.1 displays the marginal effects of de facto open at different values of logged 
GDP capita. It appears that, at lower levels of socioeconomic development, open party systems 
are associated with the lowest values of accommodation. Among poor states, the performance of 
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politically open regimes is lower than that of closed ones. Yet, at higher levels of socioeconomic 
development, open regimes outperform closed ones by far. As shown by the shaded area 
indicating the 95 percent confidence interval, these results are significant at low and high levels 
of GDP per capita. This provides support for hypothesis 2, which predicts that open political 
institutions reduce the scope of leaders’ consensus on accommodation in poor states but increase 
it as societies develop socioeconomically.
14
  
 
Figure 4.1 Marginal Effects of Party Systems on Accommodation (95% CIs) 
 
Model 2 tests the effects of state environment on coercion. This model also includes 
logged GDP per capita, de facto open, and their interaction term GDP x open as explanatory 
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 Appendix A displays the results of model 1 using alternative specifications and statistical methods. These include 
an OLS PCSE model that accounts for accommodation in the previous year, as well as random effects and fixed 
effects OLS models. The direction of causality and the statistical significance of the findings do not change.   
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variables. The results indicate that logged GDP per capita is negatively and significantly (1 
percent level) related to coercion. This seems to support the predictions of hypothesis 3 that the 
scope of leaders’ support to coercion weakens as the society’s socioeconomic level increases. 
 
Table 4.2 Models of Strategic Consensus & Civil War 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Accommodation Coercion 
Civil 
War 
Civil 
War 
Civil 
War 
Civil 
War 
Civil 
War 
Ln GDP  Capita
♀
 0.22*** -1.33*** 
  
-0.57*** -0.36*** -0.45*** 
 
(0.01) (0.11) 
  
(0.09) (0.12) (0.08) 
De Facto Open
♀
 -1.53*** 11.56*** 
  
0.87** 0.99*** 0.94*** 
 
(0.11) (1.04) 
  
(0.35) (0.34) (0.36) 
GDP x Open 0.26*** -1.71*** 
     
 
(0.01) (0.14) 
     Accommodation
♀
 
 
-0.91*** 
  
-0.64*** 
 
   
(0.14) 
  
(0.24) 
 Coercion
♀
 
  
0.06*** 
  
0.06*** 
    
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
Constant -2.03*** 44.60*** -4.29*** -6.28*** -0.72 -2.49*** -3.66*** 
  (0.09) (0.93) (0.16) (0.36) (0.60) (0.92) (0.81) 
Observations 5,439 5,392 6,402 6,336 5,287 5,287 5,241 
Pseudo R-squared 0.68 0.24 
     Chi Square 10395.03*** 2033.60*** 39.82*** 57.57*** 48.30*** 57.99*** 83.38*** 
♀ These variables are lagged one year in the civil war models.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
 
 
Model 2 also shows that de facto open is positively and significantly (1 percent level) 
related to coercion. Meanwhile, the slope coefficient for the interaction term GDP x open is 
negative and significant at 1 percent level. Following Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), this 
suggests that the effect of socioeconomic development on coercion holds regardless of regime 
type. To assess the conditional impact of political openness as suggested by hypothesis 4, an 
illustration of the marginal effects is required (see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).  
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Figure 4.2 indicates that when socioeconomic development is low, open regimes are 
associated with the highest levels of coercion. However, when per capita income is high, the 
levels of coercion in politically open states are lower than those of closed regimes. Apparently, 
open political institutions further increase the divisions about coercion among leaders in poor 
states, which explains the high levels of coercion. Meanwhile, this same type of institutions 
seems to reduce coercion in advanced societies. The shaded area around the marginal effect on 
figure 4.2 shows that these findings are significant at low and high levels of GDP capita. These 
results support hypothesis 4, which states that open institutions further polarize leaders in poor 
states about coercion, while broadening their opposition to it as societies develop.
15
 
 
Figure 4.2 Marginal Effects of Party Systems on Coercion (95% CIs) 
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 Appendix A displays the results of model 2 using alternative specifications and statistical methods. These include 
an OLS PCSE model that accounts for coercion in the previous year, as well as random effects and fixed effects 
OLS regressions. The direction of causality and the statistical significance of the findings do not change. 
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Model 3 investigates the effect of accommodation on civil war. This model includes the 
accommodation index as the sole explanatory variable. The results indicate that accommodation 
is inversely associated with civil war. For a unit increase in accommodation, the odds of civil 
war decrease by -0.60 or about 60%.
16
 This suggests that the likelihood of civil war is higher at 
low levels of accommodation. This relationship is statistically significant at 1 percent level. 
These findings support the expectations of hypothesis 5 that civil war is more likely when 
leaders lack consensus on accommodation. 
Model 4 evaluates the relationship between coercion and civil war. It includes only the 
coercion index as explanatory variable. The results show that coercion is positively associated 
with civil war. A unit increase in coercion raises the odds of civil war by 1.062 or about 6.2%. 
This effect is statistically significantly at 1 percent level. This suggests that, unlike 
accommodation, coercion is not an effective strategy to avoid civil war. This is not surprising 
given that coercion induces suffering on victims, who might seek retaliation. However, as 
posited by hypothesis 6, one must assess whether the scope of consensus among leaders 
regarding its use affects this impact in any way. Thus, a comparison of the effects of coercion 
across political and economic environments is performed using the “clarify” software.17  
In the first “clarify” test, the differences in the probabilities of civil war are computed by 
changing the values of coercion and GDP per capita while holding de facto open at its mean. In 
the poorest country in the sample, increasing coercion from its mean to its maximum value raises 
the probability of civil war by about 54%. In the wealthiest state, however, such increase in 
                                                 
16
 The interpretation of the results of the logit models follows Gujarati (2003, 600-603).  
17
 The “clarify” software is a Stata program based on King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) that uses Monte Carlo 
simulations to convert raw outputs into results that convey meaning to a broader audience. The present test is based 
on the results of model 7 as displayed in table 2.  
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coercion leads to a surge of about 5% only in the probability of civil war. These results, which 
are statistically significant at 1 percent level, suggest that the use of coercion in poor societies 
significantly increases the risks of civil war. This is not surprising because leaders in poor 
societies are more likely to be divided about the political benefits of coercion. 
In the second “clarify” test, the differences in the probabilities of civil war are obtained 
by changing the values of coercion and de facto open while holding GDP per capita at its mean. 
In a closed state, the probability of civil war increases by about 13% when coercion changes 
from its mean to its maximum value. In an open regime, such an increase in the level of coercion 
doubles the probability of civil war to 26%. These findings, which are statistically significant at 
1 percent level, suggest that the use of coercion in politically open societies raises the prospects 
of civil war more than it does in closed ones. Together, the results of the two tests support 
hypothesis 6, which states that civil war is more likely when leaders lack consensus on coercion. 
The findings so far support the predictions of an indirect relationship between state 
environment and civil war through leaders’ strategic consensus.18 First, the effect of the 
socioeconomic environment seems to be mediated through leader’s consensus on 
accommodation and coercion. A mediation analysis will help assess and compute these impacts.  
Second, as suggested by hypotheses 2 and 4, the findings show that the effect of political 
institutions on leaders’ consensus on accommodation and coercion is conditional on the state’s 
socioeconomic environment. However, computation of conditional indirect effects often requires 
statistical techniques that are beyond the scope of this study (see Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 
2007). Thus, the mediation analysis below focuses on the effect of the socioeconomic indicator. 
                                                 
18
 Appendix A displays results that support the robustness of the civil war models to alternative specifications and 
statistical methods that account for random and regional effects. The direction of causality and the statistical 
significance of the findings do not change.   
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To investigate the mediated effect of socioeconomic development on civil war, this paper 
follows Baron and Kenny’s (1986) causal steps approach because it is the “most widely used 
method to assess mediation” (Mackinnon 2008, 68). It requires four tests for mediation to hold. 
First, the independent variable must affect the dependent variable (step 1). Second, the 
independent variable must also be significantly associated with the mediator (step 2). Third, the 
mediator must be significantly linked to the dependent variable when the independent variable is 
accounted for (step 3). Fourth, the effect of the independent variable must not be significant 
when controlling for the mediator (step 4).
19
  
 The results of models 1, 5, and 6 are used to test mediation between socioeconomic 
environment and civil war through accommodation. Model 1 shows that GPD capita and 
accommodation are significantly related, thus meeting the condition of step 2. Model 6 indicates 
that accommodation is negatively and significantly (1 percent level) associated with civil war 
when GDP capita is included. This meets the requirement of step 3. According to model 5, GDP 
capita is negatively and significantly associated with civil war when accommodation is not 
accounted for. This satisfies the condition of step 1. The sign and the significance of this effect 
remain unchanged when accommodation is included (model 6). However, the size of the slope 
coefficient for GPD capita drops from -0.57 to -0.36. This suggests partial, rather than full, 
mediation between GDP capita and civil war through accommodation (see Mackinnon 2008).    
The test for mediation through coercion relies on models 2, 5, and 7. The findings of 
model 2 indicate that GDP capita and coercion are significantly related, meeting the conditions 
of step 2. Similarly, the results of models 5 and 7 satisfy the requirements of steps 1 and 3 
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 Although Baron and Kenny (1986) require these four conditions, Mackinnon et al. (2002) show that steps 2 and 3 
are the most critical requirements for mediation to hold.  
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respectively. Additionally, when accounting for coercion in model 7, the effect of GDP capita on 
civil war remains significant, but the size of its slope coefficient drops from -0.57 to -0.45. This 
partially meets the requirement of step 4. Together, these findings suggest that the impact of 
socioeconomic environment on civil war is partially, not fully, mediated through coercion.    
A number of tests are performed to assess the robustness of the findings. The first 
investigates whether the results of the hypothesis testing are robust to alternative theoretical 
arguments. Table 4.3 summarizes the results of five models that account for the measures of 
grievance and state capacity often emphasized by studies using the political approach. Models 8 
and 9 investigate the determinants of accommodation and coercion respectively, while models 10 
through 12 are civil war models. All five models fit the data fit quite well as indicated by the 
highly significant chi-square statistics.  
The results indicate that accounting for control variables emphasized by political studies 
does not alter the findings in any significant way. In models 8 and 9, the significance and the 
direction of the effects of logged GDP per capita, de facto open and GDP x open on 
accommodation and coercion remain unchanged. This confirms the findings about the effects of 
state environment and leaders’ strategic consensus. The three civil war models also perform in a 
similar way. The only important change is that the impact of logged GDP per capita on civil war 
loses statistical significance when accommodation is accounted for. Following Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) method, this suggests that the effect of GDP capita on civil war is fully mediated 
through accommodation (see also Mackinnon 2008). 
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Table 4.3 Political Models of Strategic Consensus & Civil War 
Variables 
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Accommodation Coercion Civil War Civil War Civil War 
Ln GDP per Capita
♀
 0.29*** -1.97*** -0.24** -0.04 -0.21** 
 
(0.01) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) 
Political Openness
♀
 -1.15*** 6.47*** 1.15*** 1.24*** 0.99** 
 
(0.10) (1.07) (0.40) (0.38) (0.44) 
GDP x Open 0.20*** -0.98*** 
   
 
(0.01) (0.15) 
   Accommodation
♀
 
   
-0.69** 
 
    
(0.32) 
 Coercion
♀
 
    
0.05*** 
     
(0.01) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.06*** -0.80*** 0.88* 0.85* 0.82 
 
(0.02) (0.21) (0.52) (0.51) (0.58) 
Religious Fractionalization 0.41*** -3.13*** -0.03 0.22 0.51 
 
(0.03) (0.38) (0.54) (0.56) (0.56) 
Excluded Population 
  
1.24*** 0.93** 
 
   
(0.37) (0.38) 
 Mountain 0.00 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Bad Neighborhood 0.01*** 0.33*** 0.13** 0.14** 0.15** 
 
(0.00) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Ln Population
♀
 0.03*** 0.09 0.23** 0.29*** 0.25** 
 
(0.01) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Oil Exporter -0.55*** 3.48*** 1.55*** 1.35*** 1.32*** 
 
(0.05) (0.61) (0.40) (0.38) (0.35) 
External Threat -0.12*** 3.14*** -0.67*** -0.81*** -0.79*** 
 
(0.01) (0.31) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) 
Peace Years 
  
-0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
   
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Peace Years Square 
  
0.00 0.00 0.00 
   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Peace Years Cubed 
  
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -2.95*** 46.90*** -6.47*** -8.76*** -8.69*** 
  (0.13) (1.21) (1.53) (1.50) (1.71) 
Observations 4,435 4,395 3,969 3,969 4,341 
Pseudo R-squared 0.73 0.32 
   Chi Square 24396.9*** 9504.8*** 157.6*** 192.2*** 178.4*** 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
♀ These variables are lagged one year in the civil war models 
 
The results of the political control variables in the civil war models mostly support the 
predictions of previous studies (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The grievance measures, excluded 
population and ethnic fractionalization (to a limited extent) have a positive and significant 
impact on civil war. All five state capacity indicators are also significantly related to civil war. 
Mountainous terrain, oil dependency, population size, and bad neighborhood have a positive and 
significant effect on civil war while external threat decreases the risks of civil war.  
Table 4.4 highlights the results of additional models of civil war that rely on the 
economic and the structural modeling. As the findings of models 13 through 15 show, the 
strategic consensus argument is robust to the economic explanation of civil war. While the 
impacts of de facto open and the two mediators remain statistically significant across all models, 
the effect of GDP capita barely retains significance when accommodation is accounted for. This 
provides further evidence that the effect of GDP capita is at least partially mediated through 
accommodation. The mediation is also supported by the fact that the impact of economic growth 
loses statistical significance when accommodation is included.    
The findings displayed in table 4.4 also indicate the strategic consensus argument is 
robust to structural explanations of civil war. As shown by the results of models 16 through 18, 
de facto open, accommodation, and coercion remain statistically and significantly associated 
with civil war. The effect of GDP capita, however, loses statistical significance when 
accommodation is accounted for. This further supports the mediation contention about 
socioeconomic environment and civil war through leaders’ consensus on accommodation. 
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Table 4.4 Economic & Structural Models of Civil War 
Variables 
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Civil War Civil War Civil War Civil War Civil War Civil War 
Ln GDP Capita (lag) -0.46*** -0.26* -0.38*** -0.45*** -0.20 -0.37*** 
 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) 
Political Openness (lag) 1.28** 1.33*** 1.44*** 0.87*** 0.96*** 0.91*** 
 
(0.50) (0.49) (0.53) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) 
Accommodation (lag) 
 
-0.64** 
  
-0.76*** 
 
  
(0.29) 
  
(0.21) 
 Coercion (lag) 
  
0.05*** 
  
0.05*** 
   
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
Mineral Rent 0.02 0.00 -0.01 
   
 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
   Mineral Rent Square -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
   
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   Post-Cold War -0.52* -0.47* -0.64** 
   
 
(0.28) (0.27) (0.27) 
   GDP Growth (lag) -0.03** -0.03 -0.03* 
   
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Previous War -1.03 -1.07 -1.07 
   
 
(1.10) (1.12) (1.03) 
   Peace Duration -0.00 0.00 0.00 
   
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   Social Cohesion 1.45* 1.45** 1.47* 
   
 
(0.76) (0.73) (0.76) 
   Mountainous 0.01** 0.01** 0.01* 
   
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
   Ln Population (lag) 0.17* 0.20** 0.18 0.18** 0.21*** 0.19** 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Drought 
   
-0.43 -0.42 -0.41 
    
(0.30) (0.31) (0.32) 
Ln Population Density (lag) 
  
-0.06 0.01 -0.05 
    
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
Population Growth (lag) 
  
0.01 0.02 -0.04 
    
(0.13) (0.10) (0.12) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
  
0.41 0.37 0.49 
    
(0.56) (0.55) (0.58) 
Religious Fractionalization 
  
0.88 1.15** 0.92 
    
(0.55) (0.54) (0.59) 
Peace Years 
   
-0.03** -0.03** -0.02 
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(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Peace Years Square 
  
0.00 0.00 0.00 
    
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Peace Years Cubed 
  
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
    
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -3.53*** -5.54*** -6.16*** -3.12** -5.96*** -6.02*** 
  (1.34) (1.46) (1.49) (1.35) (1.37) (1.28) 
Observations 4,472 4,472 4,432 5,125 5,125 5,085 
Chi Square 95.78*** 105.56*** 109.00*** 139.00*** 176.35*** 145.05*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
 
The next test evaluates whether the indirect effect of socioeconomic environment on civil 
war is robust to alternative mediation methods. Scholars are critical of Baron and Kenny’s 
(1986) approach because it does not quantify, but simply infers the indirect effect by testing a set 
of hypotheses (Hayes 2009, 410). Thus, a computer-intensive method called “binary_mediation” 
is used to compute the direct and indirect effects of the economic environment on civil war 
through accommodation and coercion. It is a Stata user-written program (Ender, n.d.) that 
computes indirect effects based on the “product of coefficients approach” (Sobel 1982). The 
significance of the effects is tested using the bootstrap command (see Hayes 2009).  
Table 4.5 provides a summary of the findings of the indirect and direct effects of GDP 
per capita on civil war using the binary_mediation method. The test relies on 1000 replications 
of each of models A, B, C, and D. While models A and C replicate models 6 and 7, models B 
and D include the control variables emphasized by political, economic, and structural studies.  
The results show that about half to two thirds of the total effect of GDP per capita is 
mediated through accommodation. Also, about one third of the relationship between GDP per 
capita and civil war is transmitted through coercion. While the indirect effect is statistically 
significant (1 percent level) across all four models, the direct impact fails the bootstrap 
significance test when control variables are included in the accommodation model. These 
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findings provide further evidence that a state’s socioeconomic condition indirectly affects civil 
war through its effect on the actions of state managers.  
 
Table 4.5 Effects of Socioeconomic Environment on Civil War 
  Through Accommodation Through Coercion 
Variables Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Total Effect -0.51*** -0.28*** -0.48*** -0.32*** 
 
(0.04) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) 
Indirect Effect -0.25*** -0.19** -0.12*** -0.10*** 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.02) (0.03) 
Direct Effect -0.26*** -0.10 -0.35*** -0.23** 
 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.05) (0.09) 
Proportion Mediated 49% 68% 25% 31% 
Observations 5,287 3,905 5,241 4,273 
Results are based on 1000 replications.  
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
The findings of the mediation analysis strengthen political explanations of civil war while 
weakening the economic argument. For instance, the statistical significance and the magnitude of 
the indirect effects of GDP capita in models A through D suggest that this variable substantially 
impacts the behavior of government leaders. In addition, the statistical insignificance of the 
direct effect in model B and the performance of economic growth in models 13 and 14 cast doubt 
on the economic proposition of forgone income (see Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004).     
The results about state environment, strategic consensus and civil war are robust to other 
tests. For instance, the effects of socioeconomic environment on strategic consensus and on civil 
war remain significant when an index composed of infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy 
rates is used instead of GDP per capita. The results are also unchanged when these indicators are 
used individually. Moreover, the impacts of political openness do not change when using 
alternative indicators that capture the legal party system or the number of legislative parties 
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represented within the legislature. The results of all civil war models are also robust to the 
inclusion of regional dummies and to the use of the random effect method. Finally, the results 
generally hold when the 1000-battle-death measure of civil war is replaced by internal armed 
conflicts that resulted in at least 25 battle deaths. Appendix A provides the results of all the tests.  
 The last step of the analysis briefly reports the risks of civil war with regard to state 
environment as a whole. Based on their socioeconomic conditions and political institutions, 
states are categorized into four types of environment: closed & poor, open & poor, closed & 
advanced, and open & advanced.
20
  
Figure 4.4 displays the odds of civil war associated with each of these four types of state 
environment. The results are based on model B. The safest environment appears to be one that 
has above-average GDP per capita and where the party system is closed. Economic and political 
conditions in these societies certainly enable leaders to commit to accommodating the economic 
needs of their citizens while imposing high costs to dissention, especially when the government 
is challenged by dissatisfied groups.  
In contrast, poor states with an open political system are by far the most prone to 
instability. The odds of civil war in this type of environment are about seven times higher than in 
closed advanced societies. Leaders of open poor societies are the most inclined to elite divisions 
about how to govern and about how to resolve a sociopolitical crisis. As a result, these polities 
are not only more likely to experience public discontent and domestic conflict, they are also 
more exposed to escalation of dissidence into civil war.  
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 Poor states are those whose GDP per capita is below the sample mean while advanced countries have above-mean 
GDP per capita. 
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These findings have major implications for the study of civil war. First, they help explain 
why poor states are at higher risks of civil war than wealthy states while accounting for 
variations within each of these two categories. For instance, poor socioeconomic conditions limit 
the proportion of leaders devoted to the provision of public goods. Yet, some poor countries 
might be at higher risks of conflict than others because they have an open political system that 
exacerbates leaders’ divisions about accommodation and coercion.  
 
Figure 4.3 State Environment & Civil War 
 
 
Second, these results contribute to explaining why some states have weak 
accommodative and coercive capabilities while others do not. Due to their polarization, leaders 
in an open poor environment are unlikely to succeed in building and maintaining strong 
bureaucratic and military capabilities. Third, the findings imply that repression increases the 
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risks of civil war. However, the prospects of civil war are higher when coercion is used in an 
environment where leaders are divided about the political benefits of using repression at home.  
These findings also provide explanation about how regime type relates to civil war. The 
effect of democracy on civil war might vary depending on the state’s environment. When 
combined with advanced socioeconomic conditions, democratic institutions are likely to reduce 
the risks of conflict because they will further increase the proportion of leaders committed to 
accommodation as a strategy to retain office. This may explain why some previous studies find a 
negative impact between civil war and the so called “consolidated” or “consistent” democracy 
(Hegre et al. 2001).  
In contrast, democratic institutions raise the odds of civil war in poor states. In these 
countries, open institutional arrangements intensify the divisions among leaders regarding their 
strategies for governance and crisis bargaining. These polities are consequently more likely to 
have weak accommodative and coercive capacity as well as failed accommodation and 
ineffective repressive policies. This matches the findings about mixed regimes (anocracies) in 
the literature (Fearon and Laitin 2003).  
This chapter has relied on a statistical analysis to investigate the indirect and direct 
effects of state environment on civil war through leaders’ consensus on accommodation and 
coercion. Overall, the findings support the predictions that socioeconomic environment reduces 
the risks of civil war through its impact on leaders’ consensus on accommodation and coercion. 
The use of two different mediation methods reveals that half to two-thirds of its negative impact 
is transmitted through accommodation. Up to one third of that effect seems to occur through 
coercion. These results are robust to an alternative measure of socioeconomic environment that 
captures literacy, life expectancy, and infant mortality rates instead of country income. They are 
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also robust to alternative explanations, including the traditional political, economic, and 
structural modeling of civil war.  
The findings of the statistical analysis conducted in this chapter also show that political 
openness is positively and significantly associated with civil war. However, this relationship is 
conditioned by the state’s socioeconomic environment. In poor states, open institutions seem to 
broaden leaders’ opposition to accommodation while exacerbating their polarization about 
coercion. In advanced societies, this same type of institution is associated with high levels of 
accommodation and low values of coercion. To uncover the specific mechanisms through which 
these relationships occur, three cases are qualitatively examined in the next chapters.   
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Chapter 5 - Qualitative Research Design 
The statistical findings support the argument that the state’s socioeconomic environment 
and political institutions indirectly determine the likelihood of civil war through their impact on 
the scope of leaders’ consensus on accommodation and coercion. In addition, they confirm the 
prediction that the indirect effect of political institutions is conditioned by the socioeconomic 
level of the state. However, the use of a statistical approach alone may limit confidence in the 
argument because quantitative methods “are often unable to untangle competing causal stories or 
determine causal ordering, and require a deeper analysis to validate a proposed mechanism” 
(Clayton 2014, 18-19). Thus, complementing the quantitative investigation with a qualitative 
analysis can enhance confidence in the statistical results.
21
 
The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, often referred to as “mixed 
methods research” has some value (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner 2007; Greene, Caracelli, 
and Graham 1989). Rossman and Wilson (1985) suggest three reasons for combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods. First, a mixed approach enables corroboration of the 
quantitative and qualitative findings through triangulation. Second, mixed methods research may 
allow investigators to develop analysis in order to provide richer data. Third, it can be used to 
initiate new modes of thinking by highlighting paradoxes that emerge from the two large-N and 
small-N data sources. In short, convergence of findings produced by several methods “enhances 
our beliefs that the results are valid and not a methodological artifact” (Bouchard, 1976, p. 268). 
This chapter outlines the qualitative method used to examine cases of political instability 
in the next chapters. Section 5.1 describes the benefits of relying on a qualitative method. Section 
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 For further details on comparing and contrasting the quantitative and the qualitative approaches, see Ragin (1987), 
Levy (2007), and Mohoney and Goertz (2006). 
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5.2 provides details about the structured, focused comparison technique on which the cross-case 
analysis is based. Section 5.3 highlights the process tracing approach, which is a within-case 
examination tool.  
 
 5.1 Qualitative Approach 
The qualitative approach is “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode 
to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (George and 
Bennett 2005, 5). It generally involves combination of cross-case comparisons and within-case 
investigation. The purpose is to use within-case methods to minimize the risks of inferential 
errors that can arise from using comparative methods alone (George and Bennett 2005).  
George and Bennett (2005) identify four advantages of qualitative methods. First, case 
studies enable identification and measurement of the indicators that best represent the theoretical 
concepts. Second, they can be used to generate new hypotheses. Third, qualitative methods can 
help establish the specific causal chains through which variables of interest are related. Fourth, 
case studies are an effective tool for assessing complex causality such as the indirect and the 
conditional relationships posited in chapter 3.   
The use of case studies for causal inference requires two critical assumptions (King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1994). One is that of unit homogeneity. According to King, Keohane, and 
Verba (1994, 91, emphasis in original), “Two units are homogenous when the expected values of 
the dependent variables from each unit are the same when our explanatory variable takes on a 
particular value.”  The standard of unit homogeneity implies that the observations under study 
are, for analytical purposes, identical in relevant aspects (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 93). 
However, it must be noted that it is impossible for researchers to attain unit homogeneity. All 
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they can do is to acknowledge the degree of heterogeneity in their units of analysis, which would 
help them to estimate the degree of uncertainty to be attributed to the inferences they make 
(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 93-94).  
The second assumption required for causal inference when using case studies is 
conditional independence (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). This means that the values of the 
explanatory variables are presumed to be assigned independently of the values of the dependent 
variable. The goal of this assumption is to make sure that the values of the dependent variables 
did not cause those of the explanatory variables (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). This issue is 
similar to the endogeneity problem described in the statistical analysis. 
 
 5.2 Structured, Focused Comparison 
The method of structured, focused comparison was devised to study historical events in 
ways that would generate accumulative scientific knowledge (George and Bennett 2005). Prior 
to the emergence of this approach, researchers traditionally examined individual cases for the 
development of knowledge and theory. Yet, individual cases, even though they were often 
instructive in their own ways, did not allow comparison or “orderly cumulation” (George and 
Bennett 2005, 68). As a result, researchers’ interest in relying on case studies for theory 
development gradually diminished. Thus, accumulation of knowledge through the use of case 
studies required a new method that would enable systematic comparison. 
Two features characterize the method of structured, focused comparison. First, it is 
“structured.” This characteristic is borrowed from statistical and survey methods, and consists in 
asking a set of standard and general questions of each of the cases under study. These questions 
should be carefully designed to reflect the research objective and the theoretical focus of the 
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study (George and Bennett 2005). The second dimension is that it is “focused,” which means that 
cases “should be undertaken with a specific research objective in mind and a theoretical focus 
appropriate for that objective” (George and Bennett 2005, 70). By focusing their case study on 
objective and theoretical framework, researchers are better equipped to make contributions to 
theory development.         
The use of structured, focused comparison must meet three requirements in order to 
achieve its goal of theory development and testing. First, the researcher “should clearly identify 
the universe – that is, the ‘class’ or ‘subclass’ of events – of which a single case or a group of 
cases to be studied are instances” (George and Bennett 2005, 69). Second, the selection of cases 
within class or subclass of the phenomenon under investigation ought to be guided by a well-
defined research objective and a strategy to achieve it. In other words, cases “should not be 
chosen simply because they are ‘interesting’ or because ample data exist for studying them” 
(George and Bennett 2005, 69).  Third, for the purpose of explanation, investigation of cases 
must rely on variables of theoretical interest.  
The use of structured, focused comparison approach is valuable for the study of civil war. 
Chapter 3 outlines a number of causal factors and mechanisms in relation to civil war. In chapter 
4, the statistical relationship between these elements was investigated. The use of the structured, 
focused comparison method would allow for their qualitative examination in a comparative 
manner. The focus is on the impact of state environment on civil war through leaders’ strategic 
consensus.  
The questions that guide the use of structured, focused comparison in this dissertation 
highlight the motivations and the actions of the government at the two levels described in chapter 
3. The first is the governance stage or the phase leading up to citizens’ discontent. The second, 
85 
the crisis bargaining stage, relates to the government’s response to the demands of aggrieved 
citizens. By examining government actions and motivations at the two levels, this dissertation 
helps fill an important gap in extant research, which most often focuses on the motivations and 
actions of rebel groups alone. This approach also enables this study to analyze both why social 
dissidence arises in the first place and why it may or may not escalate into civil war. This is 
accomplished by providing answers to the questions displayed in table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1 Structured, Focused Comparison Questions 
G
o
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e 
1 What was the executive’s governance strategy and what motivated that choice? 
2 How much support did the executive’s governance strategy enjoy within the other 
branches of the government and why?  
3 How much did the executive’s governance strategy determine public discontent, and 
to what extent did leaders’ consensus contribute to that outcome? 
C
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 4 How did the executive respond to the demands of aggrieved groups and why? 
5 How much support did the executive’s response enjoy within the other branches of 
the government and why? 
6 Did the executive’s response result in escalation into or avoidance of civil war, and 
to what extent did leaders’ consensus to that outcome? 
 
 
 5.3 Process Tracing 
Process tracing is an important tool of qualitative research (Collier 2011; George and 
Bennett 2005; Beach and Pedersen 2013). It is sometimes defined as “the systematic examination 
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of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed 
by the investigator” (Collier 2011, 823). The purpose of this method is to trace the relationships 
between potential causes and outcomes. When using process tracing, the researcher “examines 
histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether a causal 
process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of 
the intervening variables in that case” (George and Bennet 2005, 6).  
Process tracing is fundamentally different from other methods. Unlike statistical analysis, 
which is more concerned with correlations of data across cases, process tracing “focuses on 
sequential processes within a particular historical case” (George and Bennet 2005, 13). Also, 
although it shares some similarities with historical explanations, the two approaches are 
different. The main difference is that process tracing emphasizes theory development and theory 
testing (George and Bennet 2005, 208-209), while historical accounts tend to be “narrative-
based” and often favor complex interpretations (Levy 2001). 
Scholars use different forms of process tracing techniques (George and Bennett 2005; 
Collier 2011; Beach and Pedersen 2013). This dissertation relies on the critical antecedent 
approach proposed by Slater and Simmons (2010).
22
 This method highlights the utility of 
“critical antecedents” and “critical junctures” in explaining outcomes (see figure 5.1). It is based 
on the idea that “factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture combine in a causal sequence 
with factors during a critical juncture to produce divergent long-term outcomes” (Slater and 
Simmons 2010, 887). It can thus be used to uncover the complex causal nexus that might exist 
between the independent, the mediating, and the dependent variables of this study.  
                                                 
22
 Recent studies that use the critical antecedent technique include Pfannenstiel (2015) and Mitchell (2016). Also, 
Kisangani (2012) relies on this technique to highlight the causes of civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
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An important advantage of the critical antecedent approach is that it enables the 
researcher to isolate the most decisive conditions preceding a critical juncture from less causally 
relevant elements. When explaining an outcome, investigators run the risk of getting lost in the 
search for the “cause of the cause” (Slater and Simmons 2010). Yet, not all factors of a historical 
context have the same causal weight, and thus deserve attention. The critical antecedent 
technique can help guard against the dangers of “infinite regress” (Slater and Simmons 2010).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation relies on these two methods to qualitatively examine three cases of 
political disorder. The first is the instance of civil war that started in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002. The 
second is the revolution that occurred in Romania in 1989. The third is a military mutiny that 
emerged in Benin in 1992. While these three cases are all incidents of political instability, only 
the Ivorian and the Romanian conflicts qualify as civil war according to the operational 
definition adopted by this study. Both are instances of “a sustained military conflict, primarily 
internal, pitting the central government against an insurgent force capable of effective resistance” 
(Small and Singer 1982, 214-216). In addition, according to the Correlates of War (COW) data, 
both conflicts resulted in more than 1000 battle-related deaths per year with at least 5% of this 
number caused by the weakest side. They are thus considered positive cases. In contrast the 
mutiny in Benin is a negative case because it did not result in the outbreak of civil war.    
Critical 
Antecedent 
Critical 
Juncture 
Divergent 
Outcome 
Figure 5.1 Critical Antecedents and Critical Juncture 
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The choice of these three cases meets the standards generally set by scholars for case 
selection (Levy 2007; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; George and Bennett 2005). The inclusion 
of positive and negative cases ensures variation in the dependent variable. The presence of 
diverging outcomes produced by similar environments shows that the argument is not 
deterministic (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Also, the two positive cases (Côte d’Ivoire and 
Romania) provide for geographic diversity. This minimizes concerns that the results are the 
product of geographic biases. Furthermore, these cases offer variation in the independent 
variable (state environment). Thus, the effects of different socioeconomic environments and 
political institutions can be explored across all three cases. 
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Chapter 6 - Côte d’Ivoire: The September 2002 Civil War 
Located on the Atlantic Coast in West Africa, the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire achieved its 
independence from France on August 7, 1960. Its total area is 322,463 km
2
. It is bordered by 
Guinea and Liberia in the West, Burkina Faso and Mali in the North, and Ghana in the East. 
Mostly flat, the Ivorian territory is marked by a few mountains in the Northwest. The current 
political structure in Côte d’Ivoire is a set of democratic institutions that emerged mainly in 
1990. The political landscape is composed of more than 150 registered parties, but less than 10 
parties are competitive in national elections (Election Guide 2017). 
Côte d’Ivoire is a multiethnic society that is composed of five major ethnic groups 
speaking about 66 languages (Keita 2013; Kouadio 2009). Table 6.1 highlights the proportions 
of the major ethnic groups to the total population. The Akan group is the largest in the country. 
The country is also home to several religions, including Islam, Christianity, and Animism, which 
is a religious system endogenous to many African societies (Kouadio 2009). 
The purpose of this chapter is to qualitatively investigate the causes of the civil war that 
started Côte d’Ivoire on September 19, 2002. It is organized into five sections. Section 6.1 
provides a brief history of Côte d’Ivoire, while section 6.2 is an overview of political 
developments in the country since independence. Section 6.3 answers the structured, focused 
comparison questions presented by table 5.1. Section 6.4 traces the causes of the 2002 civil war 
using the process tracing method highlighted by figure 5.1. The focus is on the critical 
antecedents and critical junctures that led to the outbreak of the conflict in September 2002. 
Section 6.5 summarizes and discusses the findings.  
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Table 6.1 Côte d’Ivoire: Ethno-Regional Configuration  
 
Ethnic Groups 
 
Major Subgroups 
 
Main Location 
in Country 
Estimated Percentage 
of Total Population 
1980 1998 
Akan-Lagunaire Baoulé; Agni; Abbe; 
Alladian 
East, Center & 
South 
35% 42% 
Kru Bété; Guéré; Kru West 18% 13% 
Northern Mande Malinké; Bambara; Dyula; 
Mahon  
North 15% 16% 
Voltaic (Gur) Senufo; Lobi North 17% 18% 
Southern Mande Dan (Yacouba); Gouro West 9% 10% 
Others    6% 1% 
Note: Estimations of the year 1980 are from Morrison, Mitchell and Paden (1989, 498) and those of the year 1998 are 
from Keita (2013, 32).  
 
 6.1 Brief History of Côte d’Ivoire 
The history of Côte d’Ivoire can be divided into three major periods: pre-colonial, 
colonial, and post-independence. The pre-colonial era was marked by the occupation of the land 
of contemporary Côte d’Ivoire by a variety of kingdoms and empires (Kablan 2013). These 
include the Gyaaman State, the Anyi and Baule Kingdoms, as well as the Kong, Mali, and Ghana 
Empires. For centuries, some of these polities struggled for domination of the region, either 
among themselves or against Islamic or European invaders (Kablan 2013). It is generally 
believed that the population of contemporary Côte d’Ivoire is the result of migrations by 
different ethnic groups following the collapse of the Ghana and Kong Empires (Kablan 2013). 
In the late nineteenth century, European competition over territories in Africa led to the 
Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 that resulted in the partition of Africa among European powers. 
France was attributed a large part of West and Central Africa. However, French attempts to 
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occupy these territories were met with resistance (Kablan 2013). In the northern part of what is 
now known as Côte d’Ivoire, French troops had to overcome a challenge by Samory Touré, the 
founder and the leader of the Wassoulou Empire, which covered the contemporary lands of 
northern Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, and Sierra Leone (Kablan 2013). France eventually 
established control over the region after its troops defeated and captured Touré in 1898 (Collet 
2006; Kablan 2013). 
During the colonial period, Côte d’Ivoire was ruled as a portion of the French West 
African federation, commonly referred to as the Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF). Like the 
other seven colonies of the AOF, Côte d’Ivoire underwent a series of social and political 
struggles imposed by the French policies of forced labor and political subjugation. Toward the 
end of World War II, French officials and representatives from French African colonies met at 
the Brazzaville Conference (Congo) in 1944 to decide on new orientations for the French 
colonial empire. The participants agreed on the need for social, political, and economic reforms. 
The main policy shift resulting from the summit was the so called assimilation, which sought to 
gradually assimilate African people into French citizens (Pedler 1979).     
The reforms undertaken by the French government led to the emergence of Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny as a key figure of the Ivorian politics who will later shape the future of his 
country. A medical doctor and a wealthy plantation owner, Houphouët-Boigny was a Baule 
(Akan ethnic group) born in central Côte d’Ivoire on October 18, 1905 (Nandjui 1995). He was 
one of the few Ivorians of his generation to attend the then-prestigious Ecole Ponty in Senegal, a 
school that trained Africans for jobs in teaching, administration, and medicine. Upon graduation, 
he was assigned as an “African doctor” in the southeastern region of Côte d’Ivoire. In 1940, he 
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returned to his home region in the center of the country to accept an appointment as chief canton, 
and to manage vast lands of cocoa and coffee that he inherited (Nandjui 1995; Glickman 1992).     
Houphouët-Boigny began his political ascension in the years after World War II. In 1944, 
he co-founded the Syndicat Agricole Africain (African Farmers’ Syndicate), which lobbied 
colonial authorities to improve work conditions for farmers (Kablan 2013). Elected to the French 
Constituent Assembly in October 1945, he later pushed for the adoption of the law of April 4, 
1946 that abolished forced labor in French colonies of Sub-Saharan Africa (Nandjui 1995). In 
October 1946, he convened leaders of different French African colonies to the Bamako 
Congress, which led to the creation of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA). This 
was the first political movement that advocated for the emancipation of the peoples of Sub-
Saharan Africa under French rule (Nandjui 1995). The same year, he founded the Parti 
Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), the Ivorian branch of RDA which later became the state 
party for several decades (Collet 2006). 
Contrary to other leaders in other colonies,
23
 Houphouët-Boigny showed no eagerness for 
his country’s independence from French colonial rule. As the Ivorian representative at the French 
Constituent Assembly in September 1946, he famously declared that “There are no separatists on 
these benches” (Hargreaves 1979, 71), indicating that his country was not seeking independence. 
Between 1956 and 1960, he was a member of all the French governments under the Fourth 
Republic (Nandjui 1995).  
The Ivorian charismatic leader was particularly involved in the process leading up to the 
creation of the French Community. In fall 1958, the French government introduced a new 
                                                 
23
 In other colonies such as Indochina and Tunisia, the French colonial rule was challenged in the 1940s by 
nationalist movements demanding independence.  
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constitution that was submitted to a referendum in the metropole and in the colonies alike. The 
new provisions gave African colonies the opportunity to leave the Community and attain 
independence. Houphouët-Boigny actively campaigned for a “No” vote. As a result, his country, 
along with all other colonies but Guinea, voted “No” on September 28. Thus, Côte d’Ivoire 
became an autonomous republic within the French Community (Nandjui 1995).  
Houphouët-Boigny’s political ascension was also materialized through his dominance of 
Ivorian politics under the French rule. In the March 1957 national and territorial elections, his 
party, the PDCI, won 80 percent of the vote and 58 out of 60 seats in the Territorial Assembly 
(Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989, 500). His leading role in the September 1958 referendum 
and the resulting “No” vote further consolidated his political prominence in the country.   
Two years into the existence of the French Community, Paris decided to grant 
independence to its African colonies. Thus, Côte d’Ivoire attained political independence on 
August 7, 1960. Three months later, a new constitution was adopted. According to the new 
institutional arrangements, the parliamentary system that was in place at independence would be 
replaced by a presidential system (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989). The new constitution 
conferred to the president enormous powers, including that of appointing and dismissing cabinet 
ministers, determining and conducting public policy, and appointing managers of the 
bureaucratic agencies and security forces (Loi nº 60-356, Unpublished).  
A few years after independence, Côte d’Ivoire signed a number of agreements with 
France that would later impact the course of the new country’s political development. According 
to these agreements, which remained secret for the most part, Côte d’Ivoire was to export its 
strategic resources to France as a matter of priority. In addition, it was to buy its military 
equipment from the former metropole. In return, France was to assist the newly independent state 
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with expertise in military and administrative matters. The agreements also required France to 
come to the defense of Côte d’Ivoire when the latter faced domestic or external threats to its 
security.
24
  
The post-independence era is marked by two main phases. The first, which extended 
through 1990, was dominated by Houphouët-Boigny’s rule over the country. During this period, 
which coincided with the Cold War, the PDCI was the only political party tolerated by Ivorian 
authorities (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989, 500-501) although the constitution legally 
allowed the existence of multiple parties (Loi nº 60-356, Unpublished). The Cold War years 
were also the most stable in the post-independence Ivorian history.  
The second phase of the post-independence era started when the country democratized in 
1990. The main change in the institutional order was the adoption of a multiparty system. For the 
first time, political competition was open to other political formations. Ironically, this second 
phase characterized by open political competition is also the most unstable of Côte d’Ivoire’s 
modern history. The next section provides an overview of political developments throughout 
these periods.       
 
 6.2 Post-Independence Political Developments in Côte d’Ivoire 
Political stability in Côte d’Ivoire has evolved significantly since its independence on 
August 7, 1960. Once one of the most stable states in Africa, the country has experienced two 
bloody civil wars in less than 10 years. Five regimes have succeeded each other in Côte d’Ivoire 
since independence (see table 6.2). First, Houphouët-Boigny ruled the country from August 
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 For copies of these French agreements with African countries, see 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/UNTSOnline.aspx?id=3. See also the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays. 
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1960 until his death on December 7, 1993. He was followed by Henri Konan Bédié, whose rule 
ended on December 24, 1999 when a military junta led by General Robert Guéi staged a military 
coup against his regime. General Guéi was succeeded by Laurent Gbagbo (October 2000 through 
April 2011), and Alassane Dramane Ouattara (April 2011 to the present).  
Houphouët-Boigny’s tenure in office was mostly associated with political stability. The 
first twenty years of his rule were characterized by steady economic prosperity (Collet 2006, 
Kablan 2013). During this period Côte d’Ivoire was often referred to as an African exception 
(Kouadio 2009). In the 1980s, however, Côte d’Ivoire started to experience economic recession. 
By the end of the decade, the country had lost its status of economic miracle.  
 
Table 6.2 Côte d'Ivoire's Regimes, 1960-2017 
Period Name of Chief Executive Ethno-Regional Origin 
Aug 1960 – Dec 1993 Félix Houphouët-Boigny Baule (Akan) – Central 
Region 
Dec 1993 – Dec 1999 Henri Konan Bédié Baule (Akan) – Central 
Region 
Dec 1999 – Oct 2000 Robert Guéi  Yacouba (Dan) – Western 
Region 
Oct 2000 – April 2011 Laurent Gbagbo Bete (Kru) – Western Region 
April 2011 - Present Alassane Dramane Ouattara Northern Mande – Northern 
region 
 
The peak of the economic recession coincided with the global wave of democratization 
that accompanied the end of the Cold War. Like many countries, Côte d’Ivoire underwent a 
series of political reforms that allowed for a transition from a single party system to democratic 
rule. Thus, for the first time since independence, multi-candidate presidential elections were held 
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in October 1990, followed by multiparty legislative elections a month later. Three years into his 
term as a democratically-elected president, Houphouët-Boigny died on December 7, 1993. 
     According to the Ivorian constitution, the President of the National Assembly was to 
succeed a deceased president. Thus, Henri Konan Bédié, the sitting president of the parliament, 
legally succeeded late Houphouët-Boigny on December 7, 1993. Like his predecessor and 
mentor, Bédié is a Baule (Akan ethnic group). He was born on May 5, 1934 in Dadiékro 
(Daoukro department) in the central eastern region of Côte d’Ivoire. He was educated in Senegal 
and France. At independence, he was appointed Ambassador to the United States and the United 
Nations until 1966. He then served in Houphouët-Boigny’s administration as a minister of 
economy and finance from 1966 through 1977. In December 1980, he was elected as President 
of the National Assembly (Bédié and Laurent 1999).  
Bédié’s tenure in office was marked by social unrest and political instability. The most 
dramatic instance was a military coup d’état that occurred on December 24, 1999. The coup was 
preceded by a mutiny of a group of soldiers. On the basis of alleged poor governance and 
ethnocentrism, the mutineers demanded that the president stepped down. As Bédié refused, he 
was deposed the following day (Adjagbe 2014; Kablan 2013). This was the first military coup in 
Côte d’Ivoire after almost 40 years of sovereignty (Akindès 2004). 
The transition that followed the coup was led by retired army General Robert Guéi. A 
member of the Yacouba tribe from the far western region, Guéi was born on March 16, 1941 in 
the department of Man. He was a graduate of the French Military Academy of Saint Cyr. In 
1990, he was appointed by Houphouët-Boigny as a Chief of Defense Staff, the highest military 
position in the country. He was dismissed by Bédié in October 1995, and retired in January 1997. 
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Under Guéi’s rule, which lasted about 10 months, the domestic tensions that motivated 
the coup did not dissipate. Upon assuming office, he promised to release power after holding 
corrupt politicians accountable. “Once we know that the house is clean and politicians can dance 
without tripping,” he declared, “we will withdraw after holding transparent elections” (cited in 
Collet 2006, 626). However, he became increasingly unpopular for reneging on his promises, 
especially after he announced his intention to run for the upcoming presidential election. In 
September 2000, just 9 months after he took over, a group of soldiers staged another coup d’état, 
which failed to overthrow his regime. The following month, he lost the presidential elections, but 
declared himself as the winner after dismantling the electoral commission. As protesters stormed 
the presidential palest, Guéi was forced to leave power and flee to his home town (The 
Economist 2000; Kouadio 2009). 
Guéi was succeeded in office by Laurent Gbagbo. A historian by profession, Gbagbo was 
born on May 31, 1945 in Gagnoa in the southeastern region of Côte d’Ivoire. He identifies as a 
Bété, an ethnic community that had long been opposed to Houphouët-Boigny’s rule. Gbagbo was 
imprisoned several times for speaking out against the regime. In the 1980s, he was forced to live 
in exile in France. In 1988, he returned to Côte d’Ivoire after being reassured by the Ivorian 
president for his safety (Gbagbo and Mattei 2014). After the transition to a democratic system, 
he emerged as the main opponent to the old regime. Founder of the Front Populaire Ivoirien 
(FPI), he was elected to the parliament in November 1990 after losing the presidential election 
(Kablan 2013, 146).  
Gbagbo’s rule lasted from October 26, 2000 through April 11, 2011 (Gbagbo and Mattei 
2014). Under his rule, political instability reached its worst levels. The first major episode of 
political violence, which is often referred to as the first Ivorian civil war, occurred in fall 2002. It 
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started in the night of September 18-19, as armed groups simultaneously attacked military and 
security facilities in Abidjan (south), Bouake (center), and Korhogo (north). The attackers were 
members of a movement later identified as the Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI). 
On November 28, two other movements, the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest 
(MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MPJ), emerged in opposition to the 
government (Ikpo 2015; Soro and Daniel 2005). Although the fighting between the government 
and these three movements ended in November 2004, the country remained portioned until April 
2007, when a unity government was formed (Adjagbe 2014; Kouadio 2009). The conflict 
resulted in 2,700 battle related deaths, of which 200 occurred on the government’s side (Sarkees 
and Wayman 2010).     
A second episode of civil war took place under Gbagbo’s rule. It lasted from March 13 
through April 27, 2011. This conflict broke out following a presidential election that opposed 
incumbent Gbagbo to Alassane Dramane Ouattara. After the Constitutional Court declared 
Gbagbo the winner, former rebels loyal to Ouattara took up arms and resorted to violence. After 
several weeks of fighting, the insurgents successfully attacked the presidential palest.  Gbagbo 
and his family were captured. He was later extradited to the International Criminal Court to face 
charges of crime against humanity and war crimes (Gbagbo and Mattei 2014; Ikpo 2015). 
After Gbagbos’ s forced departure, Allassane Ouattara assumed office on May 6, 2011. 
Born on January 1, 1942 in Dimbokro (center) to a Muslim family, Ouattara was educated in the 
United States. He earned a Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration from the Drexel 
Institute of Technology in 1965, a Master and a Doctorate in Economics in 1967 and 1972 
respectively (Diaby and Ouattara 2012; Diakité 2008; Cissé 2007). He served in various high-
level positions at international financial institutions. At the Central Bank of West African States, 
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he held the positions of vice-governor in 1984 and governor in 1988. He was also employed at 
the IMF as an economist from 1968 through 1973 before rising to the level of director of the 
African department in 1984 and later deputy managing director from 1994 to 1999 (Diaby and 
Ouattara 2012; Diakité 2008; Cissé 2007). 
Under Ouattara’s rule, which is still ongoing, the political situation in Côte d’Ivoire has 
been volatile. Although he was reelected on October 25, 2015 without major incidents, sporadic 
incidents of political violence have occurred. In early January and early February 2017, his 
regime was challenged by instances of military mutiny. Former rebels, who have returned to the 
armed forces, rose up to demand bonuses and better working conditions. In the bargaining over 
these demands, the mutinous soldiers went as far as holding the defense minister hostage (British 
Broadcasting Corporation 2017a, 2017b; Voice of Africa 2017). Despite the release of the 
defense minister and the president’s promises to satisfy the demands, domestic stability remains 
fragile in the country.   
This section provided an overview of the political developments in Côte d’Ivoire since 
independence. The remainder of this chapter focuses on explaining the causes of the civil war 
that started on September 19, 2002. Section 6.3 relies on the structured, focused comparison 
method to investigate the determinants of this conflict. In section 6.4, the analysis is conducted 
using the process tracing framework.  
 
 6.3 Structured, Focused Comparison 
The previous two sections provided a historical background and an overview of political 
developments in Côte d’Ivoire since its independence in 1960. Although two civil wars occurred 
in the country, the focus of the qualitative analysis is on the causes of the September 2002 
100 
conflict. This is because the second one is beyond the temporal domain covered by this 
dissertation. In this section, the structured, focused comparison approach is used to investigate 
the causes of the 2002 civil war. Two subsections will help achieve that goal. The first examines 
the one-party era (1960-1990), while the second analyzes the multiparty regimes that ruled the 
country between 1990 and 2002. The six questions highlighted in table 5.1 serve as the basis of 
the study of the actions of and the outcomes produced by these successive regimes.  
 6.3.1 The Single Party Rule: 1960-1990 
Between 1960 and 1990, Côte d’Ivoire was ruled by Houphouët-Boigny under a single 
party system. The ruling elite was selected among members of the Parti Démocratique de Côte 
d’Ivoire (PDCI). The party controlled all branches of government. This made Côte d’Ivoire 
under the PDCI a politically closed environment in addition to being a socioeconomically poor 
society. The outcome of this 30-year combination of closed institutions with poor socioeconomic 
conditions was a stable society with no major incidents of political violence as highlighted in 
section 6.2. To understand the relationship between Côte d’Ivoire’s relative stability before the 
1990s and its socioeconomic and political environment, the six questions highlighted in table 5.1 
must be answered. The first three examine the regime’s governance strategy, while the last three 
cover its bargaining strategy. 
The questions used to analyze the regime’s governance strategy under the one-party 
system are as followed. First, what was the executive’s governance strategy and what motivated 
or facilitated that choice? Second, how much support did the executive’s governance strategy 
enjoy within the other branches of the government and why? Third, how much did the executive’s 
governance strategy determine public discontent and to what extent did leaders’ consensus 
contribute to that outcome? 
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In his first 30 years, the Houphouët-Boigny administration relied on cooptation, a 
strategy that mixed accommodation and coercion. On one hand, the administration prioritized 
implementation of economic policies that increased production of commodities like cocoa and 
coffee. Part of the revenues generated by the exportation of these products was used to supply 
socioeconomic goods that benefited some communities more than others (Akindès 2004). For 
instance, the focus of distribution of economic dividends was primarily on those regions that 
produced cocoa, coffee, or timber, all of which were products that the government relied on for 
revenue (Kouadio 2009). However, it must be noted that Houphouët-Boigny generally tried to 
balance out these selective policies by awarding project infrastructures to the other regions. 
Illustrations of this point are the construction of sugar factories in the north and a sea port in the 
west, two geographic areas that might have otherwise felt marginalized (Kouadio 2009, 83). 
On the other hand, Houphouët-Boigny’s administration tolerated no criticism to its rule. 
Opponents were systematically imprisoned or forced into exile. Laurent Gbagbo, a university 
professor and union activist, consistently experienced the repressiveness of the Houphouët-
Boigny regime. In the 1970s, he was jailed for voicing against the lack of civil liberties in the 
country. In the 1980s, he was forced into exile in France, as the regime increased its pressure on 
him. Other activists and critics of the administration were subjected to similar treatments 
(Kouadio 2009). 
 The use of cooptation was largely intended to secure loyalty among supporters while 
making potential opponents fragile (Cohen 1974, 90). The choice of locations for the 
government’s public projects was tied to political support. In 1962, the head of the PDCI, the 
state party, personally provided the minister in charge of public infrastructure, a list of one 
hundred villages eligible for urbanization projects (Kouadio 2009, 108-109). Similarly, 
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allocation of public projects was used to punish communities for their hostile attitude toward the 
regime. Throughout the 1960s, the town of Agboville in the south, which was perceived to be 
hostile to the regime, was simply left out of most public programs (Kouadio 2009). 
Houphouët-Boigny’s cooptation strategy appeared to be widely approved within the 
government. At least, there is no records of open dissent among the ruling elite. For thirty years, 
the PDCI remained the only party in the political arena. Several reasons explain this unity among 
the ruling elite. The first is related to how the political party system shaped leaders’ instinct for 
political survival. The single party system implied that dissidence from the PDCI meant political 
suicide. Although the constitution, through its article 7, allowed for multiple parties, the “de 
facto” institution was a one-party rule.  
The de facto single party system was the result of a general consensus around the need 
for only one party. Observers indicate that this consensus arose after the PDCI overwhelmingly 
won the 1957 general elections when Côte d’Ivoire was an autonomous republic within the 
French Community. At independence, the country’s elite agreed that a one-party system was the 
best option they had, and thus decided to rally behind the PDCI. Consequently, any break from 
the PDCI would have indicated a breach of this historic agreement, and would have isolated the 
dissidents, leaving them with little chance for political survival.  
Another element that facilitated consensus among the ruling elite was Houphouët-
Boigny’s charisma and leadership style. Some scholars refer to this as “Houphouetism” (Akindès 
2004). In his role as a president, Houphouët-Boigny “emphasized regional and ethnic inclusion 
in the management of the affairs of the state” (Kouadio 2009, 83). Members of the parliament 
and party officials were selected across ethno-regional communities. Also, Houphouët-Boigny 
constantly associated “Traditional Chiefs” to his rule. These were well-respected moral figures in 
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local communities throughout the country. Following the Houphouët-Boigny administration’s 
guidelines, these local leaders were in charge of overseeing land property in their respective area 
of responsibility (Kablan 2013). In a country that heavily depended on agriculture, this was a 
substantial power. Thus, the chiefs became natural allies to Houphouët-Boigny’s regime, and 
were constantly relied upon to secure loyalty among the people.  
Houphouët-Boigny’s leadership style and his cooptation strategy were in line with the 
country’s sociological context. Kouadio (2009) describes it in terms of “African democracy.” 
The expectation among the general population in the African context is often that power and the 
benefits associated with it must be shared. In a society where individuals are highly attached to 
their ethno-regional identity, promoting people from tribes that are different from one’s own is 
usually praised as good governance. As a matter of fact, this context led Ivorians to refer to 
Houphouët-Boigny as the “Wise Man” or the “Nation’s Father” (Gadou 2009), which was a 
validation of his leadership and governance style.  
Houphouët-Boigny’s governance strategy based on cooptation thus enjoyed support 
among the ruling elite and within the general population. As a result, his administration faced 
little social unrest under the one-party rule. However, two instances of political violence 
occurred during this period. The first was an insurgency in December 1969 by members of the 
Agni tribe. The second was a revolt that occurred in October 1970 in the southwestern region of 
Gagnoa, also known as the Guébié Rebellion.  
These two events have, unfortunately, received little attention in the literature on Côte 
d’Ivoire. Nonetheless, a brief examination of the government’s handling of these incidents is 
conducted to investigate why they did not escalate into civil wars. The following three questions 
are used. First, how did the executive respond to the demands of dissatisfied people and why? 
104 
How much support did the executive’s response to the crisis enjoy within the other branches of 
the government and why? To what extent did leaders’ consensus contribute to avoiding 
escalation into civil war?  
The December 1969 revolt by members of the Agni tribe took place in the southeastern 
region along the borders with Ghana. The group of insurgents was known as the Sanwi 
Liberation Movement (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989, 502). Its goal was to obtain 
separation of the Sanwi region from Côte d’Ivoire (Touval 1999, 95). The movement, which was 
reportedly supported by Ghana’s President Kwame Nkrumah, was severely repressed by the 
military (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989, 502). Its leaders were imprisoned for several years. 
In 1981, the Houphouët-Boigny regime released the leaders of the movement, and successfully 
secured peace with the region (Amani 2013).  
The second instance of political instability under the single party system occurred in fall 
1970 in the southwestern region of Gagnoa, close to the borders with Liberia. In late October, a 
group of individuals led by an activist named Kragbé Gnagbé attacked several government 
facilities. The motives of the uprising are barely documented (Kouadio 2009; Morrison, Mitchell 
and Paden 1989, 502). It is believed that Gnagbé and his followers sought to denounce the unjust 
treatment inflicted upon the Bété tribe by the central government. In response to their actions, the 
Ivorian authorities deployed military troops in the region. Subsequently, the movement was 
brutally repelled within a few days (Kouadio 2009).   
In the absence of credible sources about the government’s handling of these incidents, 
explaining why they never escalated into civil war could be of great challenge. Arguably, the fact 
that the incidents remain largely undocumented despite their repression by the government may 
be an indication that the people of Côte d’Ivoire do not consider these events to be relevant. It 
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could also be that the country’s elite or the general population did not approve of the movements 
and their actions. In this case, the lack of interest in their investigation might be a sign of support 
to the government’s repressive response.   
Most certainly, the Ivorian government’s ability to effectively repress these two 
movements was facilitated by the political environment under which the government operated. In 
an open system, opposing or denouncing the government’s response would potentially provide 
political gains to dissenting leaders. In a closed environment, however, such a move would imply 
a political suicide. Thus, members of the PDCI, the ruling party, had no incentives to side with 
the movements. Also, Houphouët-Boigny enjoyed strong support from the French government, 
which had no reason to denounce or sanction repression by one of its main allies in Africa. 
In sum, the Ivorian single party rule between 1960 and 1990 largely resulted in political 
stability. The absence of major political violence seems to be a consequence of the general 
consensus around the de facto one-party system at independence. This closed institutional 
arrangement provided the ruling elite with no incentives for dissidence. Thus, they rallied around 
Houphouët-Boigny’s cooptation strategy, which helped consolidate the PDCI’s grasp on power 
for almost 30 years.             
 
 6.3.2 Multiparty Rule: 1990-2002 
After experimenting a politically closed system for almost 30 years, Côte d’Ivoire 
transitioned to democratic institutions in 1990. On April 30, Houphouët-Boigny agreed to 
democratize by allowing opposition parties to form (Bailly 1995). Later in October, multi-
candidate presidential elections were held for the first time since independence. Houphouët-
Boigny decisively won against his longtime critic Laurent Gbagbo. A month later, the first 
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multiparty legislative elections since independence opposed candidates from twenty-six different 
parties (Widener 1991). The PDCI won 71% of the seats, followed by Gbagbo’s Front Populaire 
Ivoirien (FPI), which obtained about 20%. 
The democratic transition was the consequence of a number of external factors that 
significantly impacted Côte d’Ivoire’s domestic affairs. The first was the decline in the prices of 
cocoa and coffee on the world market. The Ivorian economy was highly dependent on exports of 
cocoa and coffee. In the early 1980s, the global prices of these goods dropped dramatically. This 
affected the earnings of farmers and businesses involved in the production and exports of these 
commodities (Kouadio 2009). The government’s initial response was to provide subsidies to 
farmers. However, the prolonged decrease in price forced the authorities to cut back on the 
subsidies. This decision was also driven by the requests of the IMF and the World as a part of the 
1989 structural adjustment plans. The result of the government’s responses to the economic crisis 
was a series of public outcry from farmers, public servants and students. Several strikes and 
protests ensued, forcing the administration to consider demands for more democratization 
(Kouadio 2009).  
The second external factor that led to political openness in Côte d’Ivoire was the global 
wave of democratization that emerged in the years 1989 and 1990. With the fall of the Berlin 
Wall on November 9, 1989, several countries around the world began opening up their 
institutions, which inspired African societies, including the people in Côte d’Ivoire. In the case 
of the former French colonies in Africa, this global desire for democratization led the French 
government to revise its longstanding policy of turning a blind eye on repressive practices of 
allied authoritarian regimes (Lissouck 1994). This shift in French policy was explicitly 
communicated by President François Mitterrand to African leaders. In a historic speech delivered 
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at the end of the 16
th
 Summit of African and French Heads of State held on June 20, 1990 at La 
Baule-Escoublac (France), the French president urged African leaders to undergo reforms that 
seek “representative systems, free elections, multiparty system, freedom of the press, 
independent judiciary, and abdication of censorship.”25  
The transition to democratic institutions significantly impacted the governance and the 
crisis bargaining strategies of the successive administrations from 1990 until the outbreak of the 
civil war in 2002. The structured, focused comparison is used to examine the causes and the 
effects of these strategies. The following three questions provide the framework to analyze the 
governance strategies of four administrations that ruled the country in the 12 years preceding the 
first civil war. First, what was the executive’s governance strategy and what motivated that 
choice? Second, how much support did the executive’s governance strategy enjoy within the 
other branches of the government and why? Third, how much did the executive’s governance 
strategy determine public discontent, and to what extent did leaders’ consensus contribute to that 
outcome? 
Under the multiparty system, Côte d’Ivoire was ruled by Houphouët-Boigny for three 
years, from 1990 until his death on December 7, 1993. Following his victory in the 1990 
presidential elections, he appointed Alassane Dramane Ouattara as his prime minister. He 
assigned him one important mission: to help implement reforms that would mitigate the 
country’s economic difficulties. A former IMF official, Ouattara began to execute a series of 
drastic measures that in no way resembled Houphouët-Boigny’s traditional cooptation strategy 
(Collet 2006; Akindès 2004). Ouattara’s attempts to repress social unrest that followed his 
                                                 
25
 An electronic copy of the Mitterrand’s speech is available on the George Washington University’s website at 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB461/docs/DOCUMENT%203%20-%20French.pdf. 
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policies were largely met with even more resistance. The opposition used the executive’s 
repressive practices as a recruitment tool (Kirwin 2006).  
The administration’s inability to resort to Houphouët-Boigny’s traditional governance 
style was primarily the result of the change in state environment in Côte d’Ivoire. The first aspect 
of this change is the adoption of a new political system under harsh economic circumstances. As 
Kirwin (2006, 46) argues, “The internal politics of Côte d’Ivoire would be forever changed by 
the introduction of multipartism … In the days of better economic conditions and before the 
advent of multipartism Houphouët-Boigny was able to co-opt leaders of the various ethnic 
groups, and offers of cash and political appointment were enough to quiet ethnic discontent.”  
To be specific, the change in state environment in Côte d’Ivoire altered the incentives as 
well as the actions of citizens and leaders alike. The economic decline increased citizens’ and 
leaders’ need for more economic means, while reducing Houphouët-Boigny’s capacity to supply 
these goods. Meanwhile, the new multiparty system allowed leaders like Laurent Gbagbo, now 
represented in parliament, to exploit these weaknesses for political gains. In addition, France’s 
decision to withdraw its support to the strong men of Africa further weakened Houphouët-
Boigny in his ability to keep his opponents under control without being exposed to international 
criticism.   
The situation only worsened under President Bédié. Leaders’ consensus within the PDCI 
openly broke after Houphouët-Boigny died in December 1993. Although Bédié was believed to 
have been handpicked by the late president to succeed him, he lacked the legitimacy of his 
predecessor. Ouattara, who was then the prime minister, resisted Bédié’s ascension to power 
after the president’s death. As it became clear that he could not stop it, Ouattara resigned from 
his prime minister position (Kouadio 2009; Chaléard 2000; Konaté 2004).  
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Following Ouattara’s resignation, internal dissensions within the PDCI reached their peak 
in January 1994. Just a few weeks into Bédié’s administration, a group of leaders publically 
announced their dissidence from the PDCI, the party that had managed to remain united behind 
Houphouët-Boigny for more than 30 years. The dissidents formed a new party under the name of 
Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR). Upon its formation, the RDR pleaded allegiance to 
Ouattara (Chaléard 2000, 45), whom Bédié now perceived as the most serious threat to his 
political survival.   
In response to the emergence of this new threat, Bédié resorted to a governance strategy 
that emphasized politics of exclusion. In preparation of the 1995 general elections, an electoral 
law was passed by PDCI-controlled parliament on December 8, 1994. The new law, also known 
as the as the “94-642” Law, suppressed voting rights for foreigners, who had previously been 
allowed to vote (Konaté 2004; Kouadio 2009). In addition, it required presidential candidates to 
be descendants of two Ivorian-born parents. This marked the introduction of the so called 
Ivoirité, which is often referred to as a major turning point in Ivorian politics (Collet 2006; Keita 
2013).  
The goal of the Ivoirité institution was political in essence (Akindès 2004; Gadou 2009). 
The new law was intended to disqualify Ouattara, the principal threat to Bédié’s victory in the 
upcoming 1995 elections. It was widely believed that Ouattara either had Burkina Faso 
citizenship or was born to at least one parent with Burkinabe citizenship. Another goal of the 
Ivoirité was to rally supporters while dividing the opposition (Keita 2013). The exclusion of 
foreigners was a political concession of the PDCI majority in parliament to the minority, which 
feared that foreigners’s votes would favor the regime as it was the case in Houphouët-Boigny’s 
victory in the 1990 presidential election (Kouadio 2009; Konaté 2004).  
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Although Bédié won the 1995 presidential elections, the introduction of the Ivoirité 
further fragmented the political elite, while polarizing the Ivorian society. For Ouattara and his 
supporters, the continuation of Ivoirité meant the end of his ambitions to hold the highest office, 
whereas its repeal would further his political chances. For some ethno-regional groups, 
especially Muslims and residents from the northern region, Ivoirité had political and 
socioeconomic consequences. On one hand, they were being deprived from the right to vote, 
which they had been provided under Houphouët-Boigny’s one-party rule (Kablan 2013). On the 
other hand, Ivoirité also entailed provisions that legally made it more difficult for them, 
especially those with Burkinabe descent, to own land. For instance, a law passed in 1998 
deprived non-Ivorian residents from land ownership rights (Chauveau and Colin 2010; Kablan 
2013, 151). This ultimately excluded large numbers of families that “had worked under the 
[Houphouët-Boigny] patronage systems for years” (Kablan 2013, 151). 
The sociopolitical crisis associated with the implementation of Ivoirité would eventually 
have dire consequences on the country’s domestic stability. The following three questions serve 
as a basis to examine how the Bédié regime and subsequent administrations handled the crisis. 
First, how did the executive respond to the demands of the people impacted by Ivoirité and why? 
Second, how much support did the executive’s response enjoy within the other branches of the 
government and why? Third, did the executive’s response result in escalation into or avoidance 
of civil war, and to what extent did leaders’ consensus contribute to that outcome?   
As the initiator of the Ivoirité provisions, Bédié made no significant efforts to repeal the 
law. Rather, he and his supporters consistently defended the concept and its implications (Kablan 
2013). They were hoping to gain political benefits from this line of rhetoric and policy. Also, by 
accusing the FPI and RDR of representing ethnic groups rather than national constituencies, they 
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intended to delegitimize them (Collet 2006). This was a carefully chosen tactic designed to 
appeal to a large audience in a “multiethnic Côte d’Ivoire, where Houphouët-Boigny had 
constructed a one-party state based on alliances between potentially opposed regional groupings” 
(Collet 2006). The strategy was conceived in preparation of the upcoming 2000 general 
elections. In December 1999, however, a military coup d’état prematurely deposed Bédié and his 
regime.  
Bédié was succeeded in office by (retired) General Robert Guéi. Having been selected by 
the perpetrators of the 1999 coup to lead a democratic transition, Guéi promised to “clean up the 
house” and step down after organizing presidential elections in 2000. He too failed to address the 
grievances associated with the introduction of Ivoirité. He even used it in his attempt to remain 
in power. Contrary to his promise, the retired General decided to run for the 2000 election. His 
“handpicked Supreme Court disqualified all the major candidates of the PDCI and RDR from 
standing in the presidential elections” (Collet 2006). Before the results of the election were 
announced, he suspended the electoral commission and declared victory. Ultimately, his main 
opponent in the election, Laurent Gbagbo, urged the population into the streets. Angry protesters 
eventually forced Guéi to flee the capitol city, and seek refuge in his hometown in the western 
region of Côte d’Ivoire.   
In October 2000, Gbagbo succeeded Guéi in the aftermath of what he referred to as 
“calamitous” electoral process. In all fairness, he inherited the sociopolitical crisis associated 
with the Ivoirité. Yet, like his predecessors, he did little to address the issues. He also attempted 
to utilize Ivoirité for political gains. According to Collet (2006), Gbagbo “used ivoirité to 
consolidate governmental power in the south at the expense of the northerners and Muslims, who 
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he increasingly associated with foreigners.” Like Bédié and Guéi, Gbagbo perceived Ouattara as 
the main threat to his survival in office.  
In response to Gbagbo’s exploitation of Ivoirité, Ouattara and his supporters became 
radicalized in their demands. They began to describe Ivoirité as “a concept inspired by fear … 
with the musty smell of xenophobia that is dangerous for national unity” (Collet 2006). 
Populations in the northern region started calling for Gbagbo’s resignation. The tensions 
expanded to the neighboring countries as immigrant communities in Côte d’Ivoire became the 
targets of verbal and physical abuses under the pretext of Ivoirité. Presidents Abdoulaye Wade of 
Senegal and Alpha Oumar Konaré of Mali openly criticized Gbagbo for his handling of the issue 
(Gadou 2009). Appalled by the situation, the Malian president declared that “We have never seen 
a hostile Côte d’Ivoire toward immigrants … and we reject this image” (Gadou 2009, 3).26 
Gbagbo and his administration also adopted policies that further deteriorated the 
country’s social order. They attempted to demobilize soldiers who had been enlisted by Guéi ’s 
regime (Collet 2006). In addition, several ethno-regional communities suspected that “the 
government of Gbagbo and his ethnic group had a stranglehold on the means of entry into the 
police and gendarmerie” (Kirwin 2006, 48; Akindès 2004). On some occasions, he would 
promise to repeal Ivoirité. Yet, on others, he would ensure supporters about his commitment to 
upholding it. This sent no clear signal to Ouattara, who had now “become the symbol for the 
grievances of the disenfranchised northern political, economic, ethnic and regional grouping” 
(Collet 2006). To some extent, the disenfranchised groups became united in their search for 
                                                 
26
 The original quote in Gadou (2009, 3) is “Nous n’avons jamais connu une Côte d’Ivoire d’hostilité vis-à-vis des 
étrangers. Et cette image nous la refusons.” 
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justice, and were “only waiting for the signal to rebel against Gbagbo’s southern-based 
government” (Collet 2006).  
 
 6.4 Process Tracing 
This section examines specific historical events that have influenced the outbreak of the 
2002 Civil War in Côte d’Ivoire. It relies on Slater and Simmons’ (2010) method to identify the 
critical antecedents that shaped the process leading up to the civil war. In addition, the analysis 
focuses on the instrumentalization of Ivoirité by the country’s political leadership, which was the 
critical juncture that preceded the emergence of the civil war.  
 
 6.4.1 Critical Antecedents: Political Openness in Difficult Socioeconomic Context 
As highlighted in figure 6.1, the occurrence of the 2002 civil war in Côte d’Ivoire 
appeared to be an indirect consequence of changes in the country’s socioeconomic and political 
conditions. Three of these changes in state environment, which took place over several years, 
constitute the critical antecedents to the conflict. The first is the socioeconomic crisis that 
resulted from the decline in the commodity prices. The second is the global wave of 
democratization that resulted in the introduction of a multiparty system and open elections. 
Third, the death of President Houphouët-Boigny on December 7, 1993 created a power vacuum 
and a struggle for succession that would profoundly influence the course of events leading up to 
the civil war.     
Côte d’Ivoire experienced rapid changes in its economy at the beginning of the 1980s. As 
figure 6.2 indicates, the first twenty years of Houphouët-Boigny’s rule were characterized by 
steady economic prosperity. On average, country income grew by 8.13% between 1960 and 1980 
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(World Bank 2017). This led many observers and scholars to refer to pre-1980 Côte d’Ivoire as 
an African exception (Kouadio 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the 1980s, the country entered economic recession. In 1980, economic growth dropped 
by 10.95% compared to the previous year (figure 6.2). In the subsequent years, growth levels 
remained below 5% until the end of Houphouët-Boigny’s era. As highlighted in figure 6.3, the 
country’s debt also increased significantly. In 1975, Côte d’Ivoire’s external debt stocks 
represented about 97% of its exports of goods and services. In 1980, that debt level doubled to 
about 205%. At the end of that decade in 1989, it rose dramatically to about 457%. 
Consequently, the government defaulted on its international debt payment several times during 
the 1980s (Kirwin 2006).  
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Figure 6.2 Côte d’Ivoire: Annual GDP Growth, 1960-2015 
 
   Source: World Bank (2017) 
 
In response to Côte d’Ivoire’s inability to maintain its debt under control, the 
International Monetary Funds (IMF) and the World Bank required the Houphouët-Boigny 
administration to undergo a set of austerity reforms. The policies are commonly known as 
“structural adjustment” or “stabilization” programs (Kisangani 1997, 17). Their goal was to 
lower the government budget deficit by reducing government spending, eliminating government 
subsidies for items of popular consumption such as food, and privatizing state-owned enterprises 
(Naiman and Watkins 1999). The initial phase of the IMF programs started with two stand-by 
arrangements in November 1989 and 1991.
27
 These arrangements with the IMF were 
accompanied by six World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans from 1989-1993 (Naiman and 
Watkins 1999). 
 
                                                 
27
 A stand-by arrangement is an agreement between a government and the IMF on an outline of economic policy 
changes, which precedes a full agreement (Naiman and Watkins 1999). 
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Figure 6.3 Côte d'Ivoire: External Debt Stocks, 1975-2002 
 
   Source: World Bank (2017) 
The origin of the economic downturn was the dramatic drop in the prices of cocoa and 
coffee, which were two critical commodities for the Ivorian economy. As figure 6.4 indicates, 
the price of cocoa on the global market in 1977 was 8.29 US dollars per kilogram. In 1980, it 
declined by more than 50% to 3.99 US dollars. At the end of the decade in 1989, one kilogram of 
cocoa only cost 1.56 US dollars. The trends were similar for coffee robusta, of which Côte 
d’Ivoire was one of the largest producers in the world. In 1977, one kilogram cost 10.78 US 
dollars. This price dropped to 4.97 US dollars in 1980 and 2.08 US dollars in 1989.  
The sudden and prolonged decline in the commodity price affected citizens and the 
government alike. Average citizens and businesses that relied on the production and exports of 
cocoa and coffee saw a reduction in their economic capacity. Kouadio (2013, 17) reports that 
“many people could not afford to send their children to school, and buy basic goods, including 
medicine … [and] their habits and lifestyles changed dramatically creating anger, frustration, and 
general misery.” Also, public revenues significantly decreased as a result of the negative changes 
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in the global prices. The severity of the economic crisis for both citizens and government was 
reflected in the difference in per capita income. In 1979, the per capita income level was about 
2,348 US dollars. In 1989, it dropped to 1,529 US dollars (World Bank 2017). 
 
Figure 6.4 Global Commodity Price, 1975-1995 
 
   Source: Food & Agriculture Organization (2017) 
 
The economic downturn required the government to implement long-term oriented 
policies that would reduce deficit and increase savings in order to pay its external debts. Some of 
these measures were imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions, which conditioned any help to 
the Ivorian government to their implementation. Thus, in November 1990, Houphouët-Boigny 
appointed a former IMF executive, Alassane Ouattara, as his prime minister. The months 
preceding his appointment, Ouattara had chaired a special commission on economic recovery at 
the Ivorian president’s request (Kouadio 2009).  
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Ouattara’s main mission as a prime minister was to lead the implementation of the 
recommendations made by the committee he had chaired a few months earlier. As one would 
expect, he initiated cuts in the budget that affected public servants. Several enterprises, 
previously owned by the state, laid off workers. These drastic measures led to social unrest in the 
form of strikes by students, police, customs officers, university professors, transport workers and 
trade union members (Kirwin 2006, 46). The most extreme of these incidents was the takeover of 
the national airport in Abidjan in 1990 by army conscripts (Kirwin 2006, 46). 
The Ivorian government’s ability to manage the public anger associated with the 
socioeconomic difficulties was significantly restrained by several aspects of the country’s new 
political environment. The fall of the Berlin Wall On November 9, 1989 did not just impact the 
sociopolitical life in East European countries. It also affected African societies. For instance, it 
generated a sense of liberation, and provided citizens and activists with incentives for 
democratization. Traditional authoritarian regimes, like Houphouët-Boigny’s administration, 
were suddenly confronted with more challenges than they were used to. Demands for more 
political and civil rights increased because citizens felt empowered by what was happening in 
other states.  
Meanwhile, the French government, which was Houphouët-Boigny’s main ally, was 
sending a clear signal that it would no longer support or intervene on behalf of crony regimes. 
This shift in the global structure heavily constrained Houphouët-Boigny’s ability to cope with 
domestic challenges to his rule. Most importantly, it forced his regime to respond favorably to 
the demands for democratization.  
The introduction of open political institutions further restrained the Houphouët-Boigny 
administration’s options for political order. Specifically, this new structure of the political 
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environment made it difficult for Houphouët-Boigny to resort to its traditional cooptation 
strategy, especially in the face of the country’s economic downturn. As Kablan (2013, 147) 
suggests, “Within the one party Ivorian state, Houphouetism was able [to] subdue social tensions 
because the majority of farmers—autochthones and alogenes—prospered from the plantation 
economy. In less prosperous time and under the Ivorian multiparty state, disagreements between 
autochthones and alogenes became politicized in the diverse party structures of the electorate and 
government.”  
The adoption of political openness also weakened consensus among leaders in Côte 
d’Ivoire. This became most apparent after Houphouët-Boigny passed away on December 7, 
1993. The death of the charismatic leader who had ruled the country for more than 30 years 
created a power vacuum followed by a struggle among his potential successors. By law, the 
President of the parliament, Henri Konan Bédié, was to take over as an interim president until the 
next elections. Yet, Ouattara, who had been appointed as a prime minister by Houphouët-Boigny 
three years earlier, believed he was the de facto successor. These struggles for succession 
occurred although both individuals were from the ruling party.  
Under the single party system, these events might have unfolded differently. However, 
the adoption of open political institutions provided different incentives. The next presidential 
election following the power struggle between Bédié and Ouattara was scheduled to be held in 
1995. With the advent of open elections, Ouattara and some other members of the PDCI, many 
of whom were represented in parliament, believed they could further their political future by 
forming their own party. Thus, in January 1994, just a few weeks after the power struggle, nine 
PDCI members of the parliament announced that they were creating a new party under the name 
of Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR). The new party declared its intention to mobilize 
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followers behind Ouattara in the presidential election (Chaléard 2000; Konaté 2004; Kouadio 
2009), which was less than two years away. This was the sign that consensus had broken within 
leaders of the PDCI, the party that controlled all branches of government since independence.   
In sum, by 1993, Côte d’Ivoire’s leaders were divided in a way that had not been seen 
during the single party rule. These cleavages were the consequence of the changes in the Ivorian 
state environment. In the following years, consensus among leaders continued to weaken. 
Ultimately, this lack of consensus materialized through a series of events that resulted in the 
occurrence of the civil war in September 2002.         
 
 6.4.2 Critical Juncture: Leaders’ Lack of Consensus Around Ivoirité  
Leaders’ instrumentalization of Ivoirité was the critical juncture in the process leading up 
to the 2002 civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. As highlighted in section 6.3, the Ivoirité Law adopted on 
December 8, 1994 redefined the terms of Ivorian citizenship. It restricted voting rights for 
immigrants, who had previously been eligible to vote (Collet 2006). Ivoirité also restrained the 
requirements for candidacy to presidential elections. Together, these rules not only excluded 
large numbers of immigrants, mostly from Malian and Burkinabe origins, but they also served to 
disqualify Ouattara from running for the highest office (Gadou 2009). For almost eight years, 
leaders of three successive regimes were unable agree on how to best address the discontent 
generated by this policy among certain segments of the population.  
Although the Ivoirité yielded political gains for Bédié in the 1995 election, its 
introduction polarized Ivorian politics and society. This polarization was most obvious in the 
years leading up to the 2000 presidential election. By 1998, two years before the scheduled 
election, the political leadership and the general population were divided into three camps. The 
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first was made of president Bédié, his party PDCI, and the Akan ethnic group located mostly in 
the center. This group was considered to be the core of Bédié’s political basis. The second was 
composed of Ouattara, his party RDR, and the Northerners, mostly Muslims, and disenfranchised 
immigrants. The third was that of Gbagbo, his party the FPI, and the Bété ethnic group, mainly 
located in the southwest.           
 Each camp had its own interests that did not necessarily match the aspirations of the 
others. For the Bédié coalition, maintaining the presidency and a majority of seats in parliament 
were considered the only way of protecting the Akan hold on power. In that regard, the priorities 
of the political leadership matched those of their core constituents. The Ouattara coalition was 
also united in similar ways. Overcoming the barriers imposed by the Ivoirité system would 
increase Ouattara’s chance for the presidency and the RDR’s political expansion. These in turn 
would provide an opportunity for the Northerners and marginalized immigrants to successfully 
have their grievances addressed. For Gbagbo and his camp, success in the 2000 presidential 
elections would provide political and socioeconomic power to a region they believed had been 
neglected for decades since independence, especially since the Guébié revolt in 1970.  
In prelude to the 2000 presidential elections, the three camps adopted strategies that 
primarily drew on the exploitation of Ivoirité and the exclusion of others. Initially, Bédié was 
reluctant to the exclusion of immigrants from the electoral process because of the significance of 
their votes to Houphouët-Boigny’s success in past presidential elections. Thus, he proposed new 
measures that would make modifications to the original Ivoirité Law. However, several 
parliamentarians made it clear they would not support his proposed provision that was believed 
to be too lenient toward immigrants (Konaté 2004; Kouadio 2009; Gadou 2009). Some leaders of 
the opposition favored termination of voting rights for foreigners. They must have calculated 
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that, without foreigners’ votes, Bédié had little chance of winning the presidential election. 
Suppression of foreigners’ votes was also in the interests of PDCI legislators because it would 
reduce the RDR’s chances. In the end, the parliament adopted a new law that imposed further 
restrictions on the political and economic rights of those who were not believed to be “true 
Ivorians” (Gadou 2009). 
By 1999, the sociopolitical tensions increased to the point of leading to a military coup 
d’état. Ouattara’s bi-nationality became a contentious issue as the 2000 election approached 
(Akindès 2004, 20). The Bédié regime issued an international warrant against the RDR leader 
(Akindès 2004, 19). Several militants of his party were imprisoned. Entire communities in the 
North, mostly Muslims, complained about harassments by the police. In this highly polarized 
context, a group of soldiers staged a coup d’état that deposed Bédié and forced him into exile.  
Apparently, the military coup was an attempt to end the tensions generated by Ivoirité in 
pre-election context. Many of the soldiers are believed to be from the northern region of the 
country. Gadou (2009, 5) reports that some of the soldiers who participated in the coup justified 
their action by the polarization that had infiltrated the ranks of the military. According to one of 
the perpetrators of the coup, “In the Ivorian army, people were judged by their ethnic or religious 
affiliation” (Gadou 2009, 5).28   
Leaders’ exploitation of Ivoirité for political gains did not end with the December 1999 
coup. General Guéi, who was from the far western region of Côte d’Ivoire, was put in charge by 
the perpetrators of the coup, most of whom were from the north. One of Guéi’s major promises 
was to repeal Ivoirité, which he considered “a threat to national unity” (Akindès 2004, 21). Also, 
                                                 
28
 The original quotation in Gadou (2009, 5) is “Dans l’armée de Côte d’Ivoire, les gens étaient jugés par rapport à 
leur appartenance ethnique ou religieuse.”  
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he offered that he would allow Ouattara to return from exile and enjoy all his political rights. 
However, in March 2000, Guéi started to renege on his promises. With an eye on the upcoming 
election, he increasingly resorted to his predecessor’s exclusionary rhetoric. Ouattara suddenly 
became a target in his speeches and actions. Guéi handpicked a supreme court that would 
disqualify several leaders from the election, including Ouattara and Bédié (Kouadio 2009; Gadou 
2009).  
In his attempt to consolidate his power, Guéi also resorted to what seemed to be a politics 
of exclusion. Following a failed coup in September 2000, he arrested several soldiers, many of 
whom were among those who brought him to power the preceding year. Some officers managed 
to escape and seek refuge in neighboring countries. Reports indicated that Guéi also started to 
enlist people from his home region into the military (Akindès 2004; Konaté 2004). Moreover, he 
became critical of Akan domination of the public administration and of politics more broadly. 
On the eve of the election, he appealed to the Akan community, a PDCI base, making the case 
for power rotation. In his own words, “power had to shift from the control of the Akan group to 
the Krou group, to which the General belonged” (Akindès 2004, 21-22). 
Guéi’s electoral strategies resulted in a presidential election that was perceived by many 
Ivorians as illegitimate and “calamitous” (Gadou 2009). Contrary to his promise, he was a 
candidate. After his administration disqualified several major contenders, the voter turnout was 
37%. Before the results were announced, he dismantled the electoral commission, and declared 
victory. Gbagbo, who was his main contender in the election, urged his followers to take to the 
streets. Large protests followed, and security forces clashed with civilians, resulting in many 
casualties. As Guéi fled to his hometown, Gbagbo proclaimed himself the elected president. The 
next days, several bodies were discovered in a river in Abidjan, most of whom were Ouattara and 
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RDR supporters (Radio France Internationale 2000). This further exacerbated the tensions that 
had accompanied the election a few days earlier. 
Having been elected in dubious circumstances, Gbagbo made no great efforts to 
legitimize his power. Rather, like his predecessors, he resorted to ethnic politics and exploitation 
of the Ivoirité. This instrumentalization of the status quo by a president largely viewed as the 
product of an “electoral hold-up” (Akindès 2004) became another step in the critical juncture 
leading to the civil war. Gbagbo signaled his intention to hold on to the status quo by refusing to 
allow Ouattara to compete for the legislative elections that took place in the month following his 
ascension to power. This led to violence and riots on December 4, 2000 between the police and 
RDR militants, whose main slogan was “Enough is enough” (Akindès 2004, 5).  
Gbagbo’s hanging onto the status quo radicalized Ouattara, his party RDR, and their 
supporters. They must have come to the realization that, after three consecutive administrations’ 
unwillingness to resolve the issue of Ivoirité, the only option they had was to force their way into 
power. This first materialized in early 2001, just one month after the clashes between the police 
and RDR militants. On January 7, a group of soldiers staged a coup that failed to depose Gbagbo. 
Believed to be RDR and Ouattara sympathizers, they were arrested although many of them 
managed to escape into exile. Gbagbo’s attempts to unify the country in the aftermath of these 
incidents were unsuccessful. A national reconciliation forum in fall 2001 and a national unity 
government featuring all major parties in August 2002 did nothing to reassure his opponents. In 
the night of September 18, 2002, a failed coup attempt in Abidjan was followed by attacks by 
three groups of rebels in different parts of the country.   
It is unclear how the rebel groups had come to organize and mobilize. However, civil 
wars in next-door Liberia and Sierra Leone must have provided opportunities for mobilization. 
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Also, alienation of immigrants from Côte d’Ivoire’s northern neighbors Mali and Burkina Faso 
certainly contributed to the mobilization process. Another possible factor that might have 
facilitated rebels’ mobilization is the polarization of the Ivorian society as a whole. In fact, 
mobilization by three different groups could not have been unnoticed by the population of the 
regions where the rebel groups were located. Yet, these same populations perceived the Gbagbo 
regime as unwilling to change the status quo that had restrained their political (voting) rights and 
their economic privileges (eligibility to own land). Thus, denouncing the rebels to the Gbagbo 
regime was not in their best interests.    
Despite the possibility of these mobilization opportunities, it is puzzling why the security 
forces were unable to detect them. One possible answer resides in the weakening of the military 
over the years, which was another manifestation of the lack of consensus among political leaders. 
Like many other Francophone countries in Africa, the Houphouët-Boigny regime had relied on 
the French patronage for its security (Collier, Hoeffler, Rohner 2009). This provided little 
incentive to build a strong military. Under the multiparty system, the military was further 
weakened by the sociopolitical dissensions that took place in the country. With the antagonist 
sociopolitical blocs that emerged around the main political figures, it would not be surprising 
that members of the military too were divided along those ethno-regional lines. This is further 
supported by reports about Guéi and Gbagbo’s efforts to enroll members of their ethnic groups in 
the military (Collet 2006; Akindès 2004). 
The September 2002 military coup, which evolved into an armed rebellion the next day, 
was a sign of and a consequence of a weak military. Collet (2006) reports that the coup “was 
driven by soldiers protesting against their impending demobilization from the military.” They 
were members of Guéi’s ethnic group, and had enrolled in the military during his 10-month 
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tenure in office. As the coup failed, members of the Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire 
(MPCI) took the opportunity to seize control of several cities and towns in the north, the center, 
and the west. The emergence of the MPCI was quickly followed by the formation of two other 
groups, the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien pour le Grand Ouest (MPIGO) and the Mouvement 
pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP). The three organizations soon merged into the Forces Nouvelles 
(FN) under the leadership of Guillaume Soro (Adjagbe 2014; Soro and Daniel 2005). 
Many of the rebels were former military personnel forced into exile under the Guéi and 
the Gbagbo regimes (Gadou 2009). For instance, the MPCI consisted of deserters who had 
previously brought Guéi to power before falling in disgrace with him. Also, many of the MPIGO 
leaders were military personnel who deserted under Gbagbo’s rule. Thus, it is highly likely that 
these former soldiers still had contact with some of their comrades who were still in the armed 
forces. These divisions within the military were a heavy constrain on its ability to perform 
adequately. This explains its incapacity to detect and even repel the three rebel groups that 
operated in the earlier days of the rebellion, thus facilitating escalation into civil war. In short, it 
appeared that the lack of consensus among leaders translated into fragmentation of the military, 
which made it difficult for the government to compel insurgents into surrender in the early days 
of the rebellion.     
 
 6.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings 
This dissertation contends that state environment indirectly affects the likelihood of civil 
war through its impact on leaders’ consensus on accommodation and coercion. The six 
hypotheses outlined in chapter 3 highlight two features of state environment as critical in 
explaining civil war. First, the decline in socioeconomic conditions increases the risks of civil 
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war because it encourages leaders’ polarization about a strategy for political order. Second, the 
indirect impact of political openness is conditional on the socioeconomic environment. In poor 
states, it exacerbates leaders’ polarization about a strategy for political order.  
The qualitative findings of this chapter support the argument that leaders’ consensus 
mediates the impact of state environment on civil war. Like the statistical analysis in chapter 4, 
this case study indicates that state environment significantly impacts the behavior of political 
leaders during the governance and the crisis bargaining phases. Specifically, it seems that the 
inability of state leaders to rally behind a common strategy to resolve a crisis is a critical step in 
the process leading up to civil war. 
The structured, focused comparison questions examined the motivations and the actions 
of the ruling elite in Côte d’Ivoire from the country’s independence in 1960 through the outbreak 
of the first civil war in 2002. The approach compared and contrasted the one-party rule to the 
multi-party era. The results showed that the one-party era resulted in no major instance of 
political violence. Throughout this period, the political leadership, which belonged to a single 
party, was united around President Houphouët-Boigny’s cooptation or patronage strategy. 
Despite the economic decline that started in the 1980s, the ruling party registered no open 
dissidence.  
Unlike the single party era, the multi-party system of the post-Cold War years was 
associated with multiple instances of political instability in the forms of military coup and civil 
war. The structured, focused comparison of this period indicated that, in addition to a weakening 
economy, the introduction of open institutions in 1990, paralyzed the Houphouët-Boigny 
regime’s ability to govern based on the traditional cooptation strategy. Also, the desire to win 
multi-candidate elections during harsh socioeconomic times led his successors to initiate and 
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manipulate divisive policies based on ethnocentrism and nationalism. The result was polarization 
of the political leadership, the military, and society. 
The process tracing analysis highlighted the sequences that indirectly connected the 
changes in the Ivorian socioeconomic and political environment in the 1990s to the onset of civil 
war in September 2002. Three aspects of the shift in state environment were found to be critical 
antecedents in the process. First, the socioeconomic crisis that resulted from the drop in the 
prices of cocoa and coffee on the global market increased the economic needs for citizens, while 
weakening the president’s ability to rely on his traditional cooptation strategy. Second, the global 
wave of democratization that resulted in the introduction of democratic institutions in Côte 
d’Ivoire also provided incentives to citizens to make more demands, while preventing the 
government from rallying behind a common strategy to cope with these demands. Third, the 
death of Houphouët-Boigny on December 7, 1993 created a power vacuum and a struggle for 
succession that was decisive in shaping the course of events in the next years.  
Process tracing also revealed that the instrumentalization of the Ivoirité, which was 
 by Bédié in the mid-1990s as an electoral strategy, was the critical juncture that led to introduced
the civil war in September 2002. The exploitation of this polarizing policy materialized through 
the political calculations of Ivorian leaders over a course of almost eight years. Leaders who at 
one time supported repealing of the Law later retracted when continuation of exclusion of others 
benefitted their political survival. The inability of political leaders to unite around a strategy to 
resolve the  crisis not only further deteriorated cohesion among society broadly, but it Ivoirité
also restrained the military’s ability to detect and repel insurgents involved in the September 
2002 rebellion. 
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Chapter 7 - Romania: The December 1989 Revolution 
Located in southeastern Europe, Romania is bordered by the Black Sea, Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Hungary, Ukraine, and Moldova. According to a 2011 estimation, its population is composed of 
several ethnic groups. The dominant one is the Romanian community (83.4%), followed by the 
Hungarians (6.1%), the Roma (3.1%), the Ukrainians (0.3%), and the Germans (0.2%). Romania 
has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since March 29, 2004 and 
of the European Union (EU) since January 1, 2007.  
The purpose of this chapter is to qualitatively investigate the causes of the armed violence 
that occurred in this country during its revolution in December 1989. It is organized into four 
sections. Section 7.1 is an overview of political developments in Romania between 1944 and 
1990. Section 7.2 answers the structured, focused comparison questions presented by table 5.1. 
Section 7.3 traces the causes of the December 1989 civil unrest using the process tracing method 
highlighted by figure 5.1. The focus is on the critical antecedents and critical junctures that led 
to the outbreak of the conflict. Section 7.4 summarizes and discusses the findings.  
 
 7.1 Political Developments in Romania, 1944-1990 
The political history of Romania since 1944 has been dominated by the communist rule 
until December 22, 1989, followed by a transition into a democratic era that has extended to the 
present. Two main political figures shaped the course of the communist period of Romanian 
politics. The first was Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. Born on November 8, 1901 to a poor family and 
with no formal education beyond the age of 11, Gheorghiu-Dej rose to prominence during the 
1930s as one of the symbols of Romanian communism (Roper 2000, 5). At a time when 
communist ideology was still unpopular in Romania, he became famous for organizing workers’ 
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strike. Between 1933 and 1944, he was imprisoned for his activism. While in jail, he was 
recognized by both the domestic and the exiled factions of the Romanian Communist Party 
(Partidul Comunist Roman or PCR) as their leader (Roper 2000). He died in office on March 19, 
1965. 
The second most prominent figure of the communist era in Romania was Nicolae 
Ceausescu. When he assumed office as the head of the Party after Gheorghiu-Dej’s death, 
Ceausescu was the youngest Party leader in the Eastern European region (Fischer 1981, 117). 
One of ten children, he was born on January 26, 1918 to a peasant family. Like his predecessor 
in office, Ceausescu did not receive any formal education beyond the age of 11 (Siani-Davies 
2005, 27). A shoemaker by profession, he joined the communist party as a teenager. At the age 
of 21, he met Lenuta (Elena) Petrescu, whom he later married on December 23, 1947. Together, 
the couple ruled Romania until their fall from power on December 22, 1989. They were both 
executed three days after losing power (Hitchins 2014; Siani-Davies 2005). 
The emergence of a communist regime in Romania was mainly a consequence of the 
Soviet occupation during World War II. Prior to the Soviet invasion of August 31, 1944, 
communist ideology was espoused by only a small proportion of Romanians (Deletant 1995). 
From its foundation in May 1921 through the end of the 1920s, membership of the Romanian 
Communist Party “was extremely low, often numbering in the hundreds” (Roper 2000, 3-4). 
Prior to the formation of the PCR, communists’ participation into Romanian politics was through 
the Romanian Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat Roman or PSDR). The 
unpopularity of communism in this period was, in part, due to the fact that the PCR was 
considered by many Romanians as a foreign organization with antinationalist views (Roper 
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2000).
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 However, the Soviet presence decisively changed the role of communism in the 
Romanian society. On March 5, 1945, the Soviets went as far as conditioning the existence of 
Romania as an independent state to the setting-up of a pro-Soviet government (Deletant 1995). 
This contributed to the gradual rise of the PCR.  
The PCR’s gradual dominance of the Romanian political landscape was also the result of 
Gheorghiu-Dej’s leadership. Throughout the late 1940s and in the 1950s, he engaged in rapid 
recruitment of followers. As a result, the PCR’s membership rose from 884 people before 1944 
to 1,377,847 members in December 1964 (Roper 2000, 21). By 1950, both the PCR and the 
PSDR had merged to form the Romanian Workers’ Party (Partidul Muncitoresc Roman or 
PMR). During the 1950s, Gheorghiu-Dej successfully purged the new party from his political 
rivals. In March 1960, he consolidated power by merging the leadership positions of the party 
and the government (Roper 2000). Until his death, he jointly held the functions of first secretary 
of the party and president of the Council of State (unofficially president of the country). 
After Gheorghiu-Dej’s death on March 19, 1965, there were several contenders to 
succeed him. Among the most-likely successors were Nicolae Ceausescu, Chivu Stoica, Georghe 
Apostol, Ion Georghe Maurer, and Alexandru Draghici (Fischer 1981; Roper 2000). These men 
had been in prison alongside Gheorghiu-Dej, and had been in party and government leadership 
positions under his rule. While Stoica and Maurer were senior to the others, Ceausescu, Apostol 
and Draghici had equal chances for the position of first secretary of the party (Fischer 1981, 
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 Roper (2000, 4) indicates that, at the time, “ethnic Romanians constituted less than 25% of the [PCR] 
membership, and ethnic Hungarians and Jews held many of the party’s leading positions.” In addition, most people 
resented the fact that the PCR supported the Soviet claim over Bessarabia, which Romania had occupied since the 
beginning of World War II.  
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137). To minimize the risks of power struggle, the ruling elite opted for a collective leadership. 
Also, the Romanian leaders decided to separate state from party functions. 
Several nominations followed the decision for collective leadership (Roper 2000). The 
party and state functions previously held by Gheorghiu-Dej were awarded to two leaders 
(Fischer 1981, 121). Ceausescu was appointed as the first secretary of the party. The position of 
president of the Council of State (unofficially president of the country) went to Stoica. Maurer 
remained president of the Council of ministers (prime minister). 
Several rules were implemented or changed to reflect the desire to lead collectively. For 
instance, a party congress adopted new rules in July 1965 that prohibited leaders from holding 
joint positions in the state and the party apparatus (Roper 2000, 46). Ceausescu’s new position as 
the first secretary was renamed “general secretary” to indicate that no one was “first” within the 
party (Roper 2000, 46). To send a signal about the changes in leadership direction, a new 
constitution approved in August 1965 changed the name of the party from PMR back to PCR.     
Between 1965 and 1967, the collective leadership gave priority to populist policies. Thus, 
the government increased wages, reformed the pension system, and lowered the prices for 
consumer goods (Roper 2000, 47). Meanwhile, several leaders, including Ceausescu, toured the 
country to promote the idea of nationalism. They emphasized unity among all ethnic groups in 
order to form a common nation. The purpose of these policies was to “bolster the standing of the 
party,” while furthering Ceausescu’s own popularity as general secretary (Roper 2000, 47; 
Fischer-Galati 1981). Promoting nationalism, especially, was a way for leaders to measure the 
party’s popularity among all ethnic groups.  
By 1969, collective leadership had been superseded by Ceausescu’s domination of the 
state apparatus. In December 1967, a party congress made changes to the July 1965 rule that had 
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previously prohibited leaders from holding joint state and party positions. At this same congress, 
Ceausescu was elected Chairman of the Council of State in addition to his position as the head of 
the PCR (Fischer 1981, 117-118). Taking advantage of his position, Ceausescu replaced leaders 
at the local level, who then assumed joint responsibility for party and government functions. In 
prelude to the 1968 Central Committee Plenum, the general secretary and his allies reorganized 
the Central Committee, leaving the position of country’s unofficial president without a staff. This 
further reinforced Ceausescu’s authority over the party, the state, and the population more 
broadly (Roper 2000, 48). In March 1974, he became “President of the Republic,” an office that 
was specifically created for him (Fischer 1981, 118).  
After more than 30 years in power, the most serious challenge to Ceausescu’s regime 
occurred in December 1989. It started as a small-scale protest by residents of Timisoara on 
December 15 against the eviction of Pastor Laszlo Tokes from his parish house (Siani-Davies 
2005). Pastor Tokes, an ethnic Hungarian, was a priest of the Reformed Church and well known 
to the Romanian security forces for his political activism. The orders to evict him followed a 
court decision to transfer him away from Timisoara into a small village. Despite the Romanian 
government’s attempts to suppress the uprising, the protests spread to other cities within days. 
The mass demonstrators eventually prevailed over Ceausescu, whose regime collapsed on 
December 22, 1989 (Roper 2000; Siani-Davies 2005). 
 Several decades after the Romanian civil unrest, there is still controversy surrounding 
some aspects of the event. As Cinpoes (2009, 181) put it, this is “not only because important 
details are still missing but also because the nature of the events continues to be disputed in 
numerous studies, press articles and TV documentaries.” First, scholars disagree about whether it 
was a coup d’état or a revolution (Roper 2000, 59; Siani-Davies 1996, 2005). This echoed Nicu 
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Ceausescu’s claim that his father, the deposed Romanian leader, was the victim of “a coup d’état 
that took place against the background of a revolution, or a popular revolt” (cited in Calinescu 
and Tismaneanu 1991, 47). His view seemed to be shared by a large proportion of Romanians. In 
two opinion polls conducted in the country in 1992 and 1999, less than 50 % of respondents were 
willing to refer to the event as a revolution (Siani-Davies 2005, 3). Supporters of the coup 
argument often point to the fact that the subsequent regime that followed Ceausescu’s rule was 
made of former and current members of the Romanian Communist Party (Siani-Davies 2005; 
Tismaneanu 2009; Ratesh 1991). 
The exact actors involved on both sides of the armed confrontations also remain 
controversial. While the Correlates of War data indicate that the conflict occurred between the 
Romanian government and “Anti-Ceausescu rebels” (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), the 
UCDP/PRIO dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002) presents it as an opposition between the government 
and the National Salvation Front (NSF). Meanwhile, Siani-Davies (2005) reports that the 
confrontations opposed “defenders of the revolution” to forces believed to be loyal to Ceausescu. 
On the side of the defenders of the revolution were army troops, reinforced by other branches of 
the security forces. Alongside these government units were also “eager civilians responding to 
the desperate pleas heard on television and radio” (Siani-Davies 2005, 129). According to these 
same accounts, “a surprisingly large number [of these civilians] were given guns and effectively 
became armed irregulars” (Siani-Davies 2005, 129).  
The real mystery concerns the nature of the forces that opposed the government troops. 
Initially, several terms were used to describe them, including “hooligans,” “extremists,” 
fanatics,” and “hostile elements of the old regime” (Siani-Davies 2005, 146-147). Over time, 
they came to be widely called “terrorists.” According to an official communiqué by the NSF on 
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December 28, 1989, “Are considered terrorists and declared as such, persons who carry about 
themselves firearms and other offensive weapons, … [and who] struggle against the National 
Salvation Front and the victors of Free Romania” (Siani-Davies 2005, 147).  
There is also no consensus in the literature about the exact number of casualties. 
According to the Correlates of War data (Small and Singer 1982; Sarkees and Wayman 2010), 
the confrontations resulted in 1,000 battle-related deaths, of which 300 were incurred by the 
government forces. This meets the operational definition of civil war adopted by this 
dissertation. However, other sources indicate a lower death toll. For instance, the UCDP/PRIO 
dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002) categorizes the Romanian 1989 conflict as a minor one that 
resulted in fewer than 1,000 deaths. This lack of precision about the number of casualties makes 
it difficult to qualify the conflict in precise and definitive terms.   
Despite the controversy on some aspects, a number of causes have been highlighted to 
explain the Romanian Revolution at both domestic and international levels. This is in line with 
the theoretical framework of this dissertation. However, most of these studies tend to focus on 
explaining the causes of the revolution. Although this is an important step in understanding the 
event, this approach does not shed light on why the revolution in Romania was the only one in 
the region that escalated into violent armed confrontations. To fill this gap, this chapter relies on 
the methods of structural, focused comparison and process tracing to examine the events that led 
up to the violence. 
 
 7.2 Structured, Focused Comparison 
This section relies on the structured, focused comparison to investigate the relationship 
between Romanian state environment, leaders’ consensus about strategies for political order, and 
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the escalation of violence in December 1989. This is done in two steps. First, the Ceausescu 
regime’s governance strategy prior to December 1989 is examined. The second step analyzes the 
administration’s crisis bargaining strategy in the face of the uprising that started on December 
15.  
The following questions are used to analyze the regime’s governance strategy. First, what 
was the executive’s governance strategy and what motivated or facilitated that choice? Second, 
how much support did the executive’s governance strategy enjoy within the other branches of the 
government and why? Third, how much did the executive’s governance strategy determine public 
discontent and to what extent did leaders’ consensus contribute to that outcome? 
Between 1965 and December 1989, Ceausescu relied on a governance strategy that 
emphasized coercion as a strategy to deter open dissent. However, his policies greatly evolved 
over the years (Nelson 1988). From the beginning of his rule until the early 1970s, he placed a 
heavy emphasis on reforming the domestic economy (Roper 2000, 45). He prioritized the 
production of consumer goods during this period. Gradually, he de-emphasized production of 
socioeconomic goods in favor of a massive industrialization (Fischer-Galati 1981). By 1975, the 
production of machine equipment and tools in Romania had more than doubled (Roper 2000, 
52).       
Ceausescu’s emphasis on industrialization had consequences on other aspects of the 
economy. In previous years, agriculture had been the predominant sector of the economy (Roper 
2000, 53). The shift of the focus to industrial development led to a reduction of the state 
investment in agricultural outputs (Ratesh 1991; Fischer-Galati 1981). Also, the administration 
required more financial resources to sustain its industrial policies. Thus, it turned to private 
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Western banks to mobilize the necessary funds. In 1980 alone, the regime borrowed 11 billion 
US dollars on the foreign market (Le Monde 1989b).  
In the 1980s, Ceausescu’s focus was on paying back the country’s foreign debt. Thus, he 
directed a large proportion of state revenues toward that end. In 1982-1983, the regime launched 
a program of land collectivization (Le Monde 1989a). The objective was to increase agricultural 
outputs, which were primarily destined to exports in order to increase revenues. The result was a 
shortage of food for domestic consumption. The state also engaged in other austerity measures to 
reduce public spending with the goal of lowering debt (Ratesh 1991). Together, these policies 
generated socioeconomic difficulties that were directly felt by ordinary Romanians.  
Meanwhile, Ceausescu gradually consolidated his power through coercion. He heavily 
relied on the state’s secret police, the Securitate, to deter and suppress opposition to his 
leadership (Roper 2000). His use of the Securitate was not directed at opposition outside the 
Party only, but also within the Party. This was a major shift in his standpoints about the secret 
police. In fact, during the 1965 transition after Dej had died, one of Ceausescu’s main themes 
was “the need to bring the Securitate more firmly under party control” (Hall 1997, 96). However, 
“the Securitate rather than the party was the defacto institutional basis of communist rule” in 
Romania in the post-1970s (Hall 1997, 106). 
The year 1971 was a turning point in Ceausescu’s choice of coercion as a governance 
strategy. During a state visit in China and North Korea in June, he was impressed by the special 
treatment enjoyed by Mao Tse Tung and Kim Il-Sung. The personality cult of these leaders, 
especially in North Korea, inspired the Romanian ruler (Hitchins 2014). Upon returning home, 
he launched a new ideological campaign on July 6, 1971 that was “designed to enforce tighter 
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regime control over culture, art, education, and the media” (Hall 1997, 107). This was announced 
in an address that became to be known as the “July Theses” (Hitchins 2014; Hall 1997).  
The “July Theses” was the beginning of a cult of personality that lasted until Ceausescu’s 
death (Hitchins 2014). In March 1974, he was selected as “President of the Republic,” an office 
that was created for him (Fischer 1981, 118). Around this same time, he also held the functions 
of Chairman of the National Defense Council, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, as 
well as chairman of several other committees of the party and state apparatus. From the late 
1970s and beyond, Ceausescu’s cult of personality had reached exceptional levels among Eastern 
European communist states. In Fischer’s (1981, 118) accounts, “by the mid-1970s, no Romanian 
official could deliver a report or write an article without referencing to President Ceausescu’s 
political insight and leadership as the major source of inspiration and guidance.”   
  Ceausescu’s governance alienated some influential members of the Party. For instance, 
Iliescu, who succeeded him in office, declared that his break with the Romanian leader dated 
back to 1971, when they visited China and North Korea. In his accounts as reported by Ratesh 
(1991, 50), Ceausescu “was literally fascinated by Korea. On our return, he drew up a kind of 
platform for a cultural revolution Romanian style. That was the break.” After Iliescu opposed 
Ceausescu’s platform in a meeting, he was accused of intellectualism, and deprived from major 
state and party positions (Ratesh 1991; Hall 1997). 
In subsequent years, several of Ceausescu’s collaborators gradually started to publically 
express their dissatisfaction. At the 12
th
 Party Congress in 1979, Constantin Pârvulescu, one of 
the founding fathers of the Romanian Communist Party, openly criticized Ceausescu. Speaking 
after the Romanian president, Pârvulescu “launched a bitter attack on the leader and pledged he 
would not vote for his reelection” (Siani-Davies 2005, 27). This conduct cost him his position in 
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the Party, and he did not appear on the political arena until 1989.  Another prominent internal 
dissent was Karoly Kiraly. In 1977, Kiraly, who was a member of the Party’s Political Executive 
Committee, started expressing his discontent by sending out letters of protest to key leaders of 
the Party. One of the letters even made its way into the Western media in January 1988 (Siani-
Davies 2005, 27). 
Prior to 1989, these types of dissent within the ruling elite were limited (Lamasanu 2010). 
Despite their frustration with Ceausescu’s policies, many party leaders did not express their 
resentment openly. The examples of Iliescu in 1971, Kiraly in 1977, and Pârvulescu in 1979 
showed that open disagreement with Ceausescu could endanger their political future in a country 
where the state was the single most important source of employment. It was therefore not 
surprising that most leaders either pretended they were satisfied or simply avoided challenging 
Ceausescu on his policies.   
By 1989, leaders’ consensus about Ceausescu’s governance strategy had broken further. 
More leaders were willing to openly criticize the regime. The most remarquable instance of open 
elite dissent was the so called “Letter of Six” (Ratesh 1991). In a letter broadcast on BBC World 
Service on March 10, 1989, six prominent dissenting leaders publically challenged Ceausescu on 
his policies. They denounced him for suppressing civic freedom and for economic 
mismanagement, among others (Siani-Davies 2005).  
The “Letter of Six” was considered to be “the most significant piece of Party dissent to 
appear during Ceausescu’s long years of rule” (Siani-Davies 2005, 27). All six co-signatories 
were former party or state dignitaries. For example, Gheorghe Apostol was a former first 
secretary of the Party (1954-1955). At one point, rumors had it that he was chosen by Gheorghiu-
Dej to succeed him. Another co-signatory of the “Letter of Six” was Kiraly, a former member of 
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the Party leadership, who had previously criticized the regime through a series of letters. The 
other four members included a former foreign minister, a former Romanian ambassador to the 
United States, and two former party leaders (Siani-Davies 2005, 27-28).    
In the months preceding the revolution, Romanian political leaders increased their 
criticisms of the regime. Ratesh (1991) reports that three letters were sent by a group of 
dissidents to Radio Free Europe (RFE) in 1989. In one of the documents, which was broadcast 
on August 27, the authors appealed to the delegates to the 14
th
 Congress of the Romanian 
Communist Party not to reelect Ceausescu as secretary general of the party (Ratesh 1991, 89-90). 
Apparently, this did not influence the outcome of the congress as the Romanian president was 
reelected on November 24, 1989. 
The impact of Ceausescu’s governance strategy prior to 1989 rarely materialized through 
organized protests like the ones observed in December 1989. Before the 1980s, protests centered 
more on individuals rather than groups. Pastor Tokes, who was at the origin of the Timisoara 
events, was one of the few people who openly criticized the regime. He was a contributor to 
Ellenpontok (Counterpoints), a journal that featured ethnic Hungarian intellectuals (Siani-Davies 
2005). The ethnic German community was also engaged in dissident through the activities of a 
group of writers, “most of whom were dismissed from their jobs and forced into exile during the 
1980s” (Siani-Davies 2005, 29). By 1988, the scope of dissent had expanded to also include 
ethnic Romanians, especially poets.  
The absence of meaningful collective dissent in Romania could be attributed to several 
factors. Obviously, the regime’s coercive practices were effective at deterring mobilization of 
dissidents. Most party and state leaders had no incentives at risking losing their positions or more 
(Hall 2000). The same was true for other people outside the political leadership. For instance, the 
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intellectuals who criticized the regime lost their jobs. In some instances, they were denied 
publication of their academic works, or simply placed under house arrests (Siani-Davies 2005, 
29). In addition, the tactics employed by the Securitate were also effective at increasing the costs 
of mobilization (Hall 1997). The use of civilian informants to report on the political activities of 
members of their communities made it difficult for dissidents to organize.     
The ability of the Ceausescu’s regime to effectively deter collective dissent through the 
use of coercion prior to 1989 may have been facilitated by a number of elements associated with 
Romanian domestic and external environment. Siani-Davies (2005) has suggested that the 
country’s sociological context mattered. From his perspective, Romania was “a society that did 
not necessarily place value on the expression of opposing views.” This was apparent in a popular 
Romanian proverb, which states that “the sword will not severe the bowed heads” (Siani-Davies’ 
2005, 29). In Siani-Davies’ (2005) view, the intellectuals’ choice of poems and letters rather than 
organized protests to express their criticisms may also have been a product of Romanian culture. 
They may have been influenced by the teachings of the Romanian philosopher Constantin Noica, 
which emphasize “resistance through cultural development rather than outright dissident” (Siani-
Davies’ 2005, 29-30). Despite its attractiveness, the sociological argument remains open, 
especially in the face of the December 1989 Revolution.  
A more plausible explanation for the effectiveness of Ceausescu’s coercive policies prior 
to 1989 has to do with the country’s political environment. Specifically, the single party system 
excluded political competition outside the PCR. In addition, the possibility of jointly holding 
government and party functions as re-instituted in December 1967 provided Ceausescu ways to 
manipulate the elite to his advantage. There was also an informal principle of “elite rotation,” 
which he used to secure loyalty within the party, the military, and other branches of government 
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(Roper 2000). The informal elite rotation institution, especially in the single party context, 
created insecurity among the leadership while ensuring that “no individual could consolidate 
power within the party or at the local level” (Roper 2000, 51). Together, these political features 
provided favorable conditions for the success of Ceausescu’s coercive strategy for most of his 
rule. However, as the next section shows, the regional developments in East Europe in the late 
1980s triggered a change in Romanian domestic politics, thus making coercion a less viable 
option at the times of the revolution.     
Another more plausible contributor to the success of Ceausescu’s governance strategy in 
deterring collective dissent prior to 1989 was the Romanian geopolitical environment in the Cold 
War context. Throughout his tenure in office, Ceausescu pursued an “independent” or “non-
aligned” foreign policy (Roth 2016). Although his country was a communist state, he maintained 
a ‘maverick” position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This became most apparent after he had 
publically denounced the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact countries on August 28, 
1968 (Siani-Davies 2005). However, a number of observers have suggested that Ceausescu’s 
“independence” toward Moscow was rather a political strategy designed by both countries (Roth 
2016; Siani-Davies 2005; Linden 1981). This reportedly allowed the Kremlin to use Ceausescu 
as “a middleman to deal with states with which the USSR preferred not to have a direct 
interaction” (Roth 2016, 38). 
Meanwhile, Ceausescu entertained healthy economic and diplomatic relationships with 
the West for most of his rule over Romania (Roth 2016; Linden 1981). His regime benefited 
from financial loans from Western banks, especially in the late 1960s and the 1970s. Romanian 
exports to the West more than doubled between 1970 and 1975 (Linden 1981, 223). Unlike most 
Warsaw Pact countries, Romania had a Most Favored nation (MFN) status with the United 
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States. Diplomatically, Ceausescu also enjoyed Western attention. On August 2, 1969, he hosted 
Richard Nixon for a state visit, which the American president described as his “most memorable 
foreign trip” (New York Times 1969). 
These geopolitical factors must have helped Ceausescu at home. Technically, the Soviet 
Union and Western powers were the only states that had the means to effectively undermine 
Ceausescu’s coercive policies. However, doing so was not in their best interests for most of his 
time in office. The Soviets, to the extent that they had some strategic interest in his 
“independent” behavior, had little reason to destabilize his regime in its golden years. Also, 
destabilizing the Ceausescu government would not have benefited Western powers given the 
economic and diplomatic benefits at stake. Thus, until the early 1980s, both Western countries 
and the Soviet Union implicitly provided an umbrella for Ceausescu’s coercive policies at home. 
However, as will be shown in the next section, a new geopolitical context emerged in the late 
1980s that impacted his ability to maintain control at home through the use of coercion.   
The next step is to examine why Ceausescu’s coercion strategy during the December 
1989 protests failed to deter escalation into violence. The following three questions are used. 
First, how did the executive respond to the demands of dissatisfied people and why? How much 
support did the executive’s response to the crisis enjoy within the other branches of the 
government and why? To what extent did leaders’ lack of consensus contribute to the escalation 
into civil war?  
On December 15, 1989, a few residents of Timisoara gathered to prevent Pastor Laszlo 
Tokes’ eviction from his parish house. Tokes had been serving at this Hungarian Reformed 
Church since 1986 (Ratesh 1991). He was very outspoken against state interference in the affairs 
of the Church. He was also an active defender of the rights of ethnic Hungarians. In 1984, he was 
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excluded from the clergy for “indiscipline” before being reinstated in 1986 (Ratesh 1991, 20). 
Shortly after his transfer to Timisoara, Tokes’ troubles began anew. In spring 1989, he was once 
again accused of “indiscipline” by his superiors. In addition, he was charged of “entering in 
contact with political activists, foreign radio and TV station in order to denigrate and present in a 
tendencious way the realities of our country” (Ratesh 1991, 20). On May 1, his superiors ordered 
his transfer to another parish in a village. The decision to evict him followed his refusal to 
comply with the transfer orders.  
 The initial government response to the gathering outside Tokes’ house involved local 
authorities. The first day of the protests, December 15, ended with a clash between the police and 
demonstrators who tried to prevent a man from being taken into custody (Ratesh 1991). The next 
day, the mayor of Timisoara was on the scene, and his attempts to calm the crowds were 
unsuccessful. By that time, protesters’ chants that initially called for freedom for the pastor had 
evolved into “Down with Ceausescu” (Siani-Davies 2005). They were met by “fire engines 
spraying water on them” (Ratesh 1991, 23). By the end of the third day of the uprising, which 
was December 17, the central government in Bucharest had gotten involved. Ceuasescu ordered 
two of his top aides into Timisoara to direct the repression of the movements (Ratesh 1991). 
According to reports, around sunset, “with no warning, the troops started to shoot in all 
directions,” killing several people (Ratesh 1991, 30). The confrontations between the armed 
troops and civilians throwing rocks continued throughout the night.  
The next day, December 18, Ceausescu went to Iran, leaving his wife in Bucharest to 
manage the crisis. The purpose of this trip was unclear. Some speculations indicated that he was 
trying to arrange for Iranian support, while others insisted he was preparing his exile in case he 
was overthrown (Siani-Davies 2005; Ratesh 1991). By the time the Romanian dictator came 
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back from his Teheran visit on December 20, “the situation in Timisoara had become untenable, 
with a general strike and huge demonstrations, the army fraternizing with the people, and all 
attempts to negotiate an end to the uprising totally unsuccessful” (Ratesh 1991, 33). Nonetheless, 
he addressed the nation on television a few hours after his return. He informed Romanians of the 
events in Timisoara, insisting that the army acted in self-defense. He blamed the uprising onto 
foreign states, especial Hungary. 
In the morning of December 22, Ceausescu organized a rally in Bucharest, the capital 
city, to restore legitimacy to his regime. The event soon turned into a demonstration against his 
rule. As tensions grew, the Romanian leader and his wife escaped the scene by helicopter 
(Ratesh 1991; Roper 2000). They were captured the same day and detained in a military garrison 
in the city of Targoviste (Siani-Davies 2005). 
In the evening of December 22, the same day the Ceausescus escaped town, a group of 
dissidents announced that they had taken control of the government. They called themselves the 
National Salvation Front (NSF). Mostly composed of former party officials, intellectuals, and 
military authorities, the NSF moved quickly to secure power. A list of the new leaders was 
presented on television to the public. In addition, a 10-point program was read that “embraced 
the widest aspirations for freedom, democracy, prosperity, and independence of the Romanian 
people” (Ratesh 1991, 56).  
The new regime’s ascension to power on December 22 coincided with armed violence in 
Bucharest. The exact circumstances of the shootings remain unclear (Siani-Davies 2005). The 
same evening when the NSF announced its assumption of power, there were gun shots reported 
in the vicinity of the national television and elsewhere in Bucharest (Siani-Davies 2005, 123-
125). The subsequent “battle” lasted for the following three days. It must however be noted that 
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“during this time the fighting was never continuous, being essential sporadic in nature, reaching 
several crescendos, and then subsiding into a fitful warfare of occasional isolated shots” (Siani-
Davies 2005, 125).  
In the morning of December 25, Ceausescu and his wife were placed on a trial before a 
military tribunal at the same garrison. Several charges were brought by the prosecutor, including 
genocide and economic mismanagement. The deposed leader refused to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of the tribunal. After no more than fifty-five minutes of proceedings, the couple was 
convicted. They were executed immediately after the trial ended (Siani-Davies 2005, 134-143). 
Apparently, Ceausescu’s decision to repress the uprising was not shared by some other 
state and party leaders. In Ratesh’s (1991) accounts, his orders to let security forces shoot 
demonstrators with live ammunition were purposefully ignored by members of his cabinet. 
During an emergency meeting held during the Timisoara protests, the Romanian dictator was 
furious at Minister of Defense Vasile Milea and Minister of the Interior Tudor Postelnicu for not 
following his orders. “I told you to arm them all,” he recalled in his rage, adding “Why did you 
send them unarmed?” (Ratesh 1991, 27). This “foot-dragging” by cabinet members was a sign 
that consensus within the leadership had broken over how to manage the demonstrations. 
There was another instance of foot-dragging by high-level officials. In the morning of 
December 22, Ceausescu was scheduled to speak at a rally at the Party headquarters in 
Bucharest. The event was set to start at 11:00 am. In order to secure order at the proceedings, a 
large number of troops and equipment were deployed to the area at least four hours ahead of 
time. By Siani-Davies’ (2005) account, there were fourteen tanks, forty-five armored personnel 
carriers, more than a thousand troops from the army and the Securitate. By the time the event 
began, all the troops had been withdrawn from in front of the building where Ceausescu was to 
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speak (Siani-Davies 2005, 91-92). Although it is still unclear who gave the order to remove the 
troops, this seems to suggest that some of the commanders were breaking ranks.   
These instances of foot-dragging denoted a lack of consensus among the top leaders 
about a strategy to handle the crisis. This form of leaders’ disunity had consequences for political 
order. In Timisoara, the attitude of the defense and the interior ministers undermined the 
effectiveness of the government’s initial response in the early hours of the protests. In Bucharest, 
the decision to withdraw the troops from the main scene provided a favorable condition for the 
protesters to move freely toward the building, forcing Ceausescu to escape. To fully understand 
how the breaking of leaders’ consensus about the events in Timisoara led to the collapse of 
political order and to violent confrontations in Bucharest, the next section relies on the method of 
process tracing.   
A number of factors might explain the breaking of consensus within the Romanian 
leadership with regard to how to respond to the crisis. One is the change in the structure of the 
international system, especially the political developments in Eastern Europe. Other scholars 
have argued that the wave of revolutions in the region in the late 1980s increased Romanians’ 
desire to challenge the regime. For instance, Siani-Davies (2005, 45-52) contended that “The 
events of December [1989] cannot be divorced from the other Eastern European revolutions of 
that year and the breakup of the Soviet bloc.” Together, these two interrelated factors “provided 
the permissive international context required” for a successful mobilization of the regime’s 
challengers (Siani-Davies 2005, 45).
30
 While this is a valid claim, it is also likely that this same 
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 Writing about the revolutions of 1989 in East and Central Europe more broadly, Tismaneanu (2009) also 
attributes the uprisings to the change in Soviet Union policies, particular Gorbachev’s moderate positions regarding 
political liberalization.  
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regional element impacted the process of the revolution through its effect on Ceausescu and the 
other leaders. The process tracing analysis investigates this possibility in the next section. 
The lack of consensus within the Romanian leadership during the crisis might also have 
been induced by domestic factors. The literature on the domestic causes of the Romanian 
Revolution focuses on the decline of the country’s economy in the late 1980s, the weakening of 
its security forces, and the structure of the state apparatus. In the words of Siani-Davies (2005, 
31), the economic crisis faced by the country during the 1980s was at “the heart of the causes of 
state breakdown, but also of the sense of grievance which was to fuel popular mobilization” (see 
also Roper 2000). In addition, some scholars emphasize Ceausescu’s cult of personality as a 
cause of the dissent within the ruling elite. “While the circumstances of the Romanian revolution 
are still unclear,” writes Roper (2000, 45), “there is no doubt that by the time of his death, 
Ceausescu had alienated domestic groups that were essential to his very survival.” Process 
tracing will help to investigate the potential causal paths relating these elements to one another.  
 
 7.3 Process Tracing 
This section examines specific historical events that influenced the outbreak of deadly 
confrontations during the December 1989 Revolution in Romania. A few months prior to the 
Romanian civil unrest, other countries in East Europe experienced similar popular uprisings. The 
difference, however, was that they did not escalate into deadly armed confrontations. Thus, it is 
important to shed light on the circumstances that led to this divergent outcome. This is done by 
relying on Slater and Simmons’ (2010) method to identify the critical antecedents that preceded 
the breakdown of consensus among Romanian leaders over the government’s response to the 
demonstrations in Timisoara. This lack of consensus on a bargaining strategy during this 
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particular crisis constitutes the critical juncture that led to the escalation into deadly armed 
violence.  
 
 7.3.1 Critical Antecedents: Changes in Domestic and Regional Environment 
Figure 7.3 highlights two factors that constitute the critical antecedents in the process 
leading up to the occurrence of armed violence in December 1989 in Romania. The first is the 
socioeconomic decline that took place in the country throughout the 1980s. The second is the 
political developments that led to a democratic transition in several East European countries. 
Together, these two changes in the Romanian domestic and external environment shaped the 
aspirations and demands of Romanian citizens. Moreover, they affected consensus within 
Ceausescu’s government by changing leaders’ calculations for political survival.  
    Romania experienced a decline in its socioeconomic conditions throughout the 1980s. 
From 1965 through 1984, infant mortality had been continuously decreasing. However, it started 
rising in 1985 and remained on the rise throughout 1989 (World Bank 2017). As figure 7.1 
shows, food production decreased between 1984 and 1989. Meanwhile the size of the population 
grew by 2.2% during this same period (World Bank 2017). This, in part, created food shortage 
that led the government to impose food rationing. 
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Figure 7.1 Romania: Food Production, 1960-1990 
 
   Source: World Bank (2017) 
 
Romanians’ living standards were affected by the socioeconomic decline of the late 
1980s. On August 22, 1989, a French Newspaper reported that each Romanian was entitled one 
kilogram of sugar and one liter of cooking oil per month. It seemed as if “Nicolae Ceausescu’s 
Romania had installed itself in a wartime economy that had taken the country 40 years back” (Le 
Monde 1989a). In addition to food shortage, other critical goods such hot water, gas, and 
electricity, were also under rationing. Ratesh (1991, 7) noted that in 1988 “only 5.4 percent of 
the electricity consumed in the country went to the people for household use.” 
The decline in socioeconomic condition was largely the result of Ceausescu’s policy that 
prioritized the country’s debt payment. As figure 7.2 indicates, Romania’s external debt stocks in 
1980 constituted 80.28% of its exports of goods and services. This level remained fairly constant 
for the next three years. However, in 1989, it dropped to about 9.45%. These trends reflected 
Ceausescu’s efforts to repay its foreign debt. On August 22, 1989, Le Monde reported that, 
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between 1975 and 1989, the country paid back 21 billion US dollars of foreign debt (Le Monde 
1989b). In March 1989, Ceausescu proudly announced that Romania had effectively reimbursed 
the last dollar of the 11 billion US dollars it had borrowed in 1980 (Le Monde 1989b).  
The rapid debt repayment was only possible through massive exports of goods and 
services, including food and agricultural products. As Ratesh (1991, 6) contends, “Ceausescu’s 
decision to repay Romania’s $12 billion foreign debt in a few years meant that everything that 
could be sold abroad for hard currency, raw materials, or energy was exported.” The debt 
reimbursement also occurred at the expense of investment in other areas of the economy. It also 
induced large cuts in government consumption. Together, these measures aggravated the 
country’s socioeconomic situation throughout the 1980s (Ratesh 1991).31   
 
Figure 7.2 External Debt Stocks, 1972-1990 
 
Source: World Bank (2017) 
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 For a recent study on Ceausescu’s debt policies, see Ban (2012).  
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Although the devastating impact of the socioeconomic decline on citizens’ daily lives 
was palpable, Romanians remained passive for most of the 1980s. Rather than mobilizing and 
expressing their dissatisfaction, they actively schemed “to bypass the most unpleasant aspects of 
the system and to secure goods and services through the informal economy” (Siani-Davies 2005, 
14). As noted by Le Monde, the people of Romania responded to the economic challenges with 
great humor. In the midst of a cold winter and despite the rationing of gas and electricity, they 
were heard saying “Close the window! Otherwise people on the streets would be cold” (Le 
Monde 1989a).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It was only in the late 1980s that Romanian citizens began to show evidence of 
frustration. This was illustrated in the city of Brasov on November 15, 1987. On that day, a 
group of factory workers on their way to a voting location began to chant anti-regime slogans 
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(Siani-Davies 2005, 35; Lamasanu 2010). They were quickly joined by other people from the 
town as they ransacked the local Party headquarters (Siani-Davies 2005, 35). At the core of their 
grievance were dissatisfaction over food shortage and rationing, and cuts in wages at the factory 
(Siani-Davies 2005, 36; Lamasanu 2010). Although authorities managed to contain this uprising, 
it was a sign that citizens were gradually willing to openly challenge the government. By the 
time of this incident, food shortage had become “more accurate and fewer and fewer people, 
even with the requisite connections, were able to acquire the goods they required” (Siani-Davies 
2005, 34).  
Besides citizens, the worsening of the country’s socioeconomic condition must have 
affected Romanian leaders as well. Prior to the 1980s, some leaders were dissatisfied with 
Ceausescu, but they rarely expressed their frustration openly. According to (retired) General 
Nicolae Militaru, the minister of defense in the post-revolutionary government, dissent within the 
leadership dated back to 1974 with the idea of a conspiracy against Ceausescu (Ratesh 1991, 91-
92). It involved himself and several other key members of the regime, including the then Prime 
Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer. However, the plot was never conducted in the 1970s because the 
conspirators believed that the conditions were not right (Ratesh 1991, 91-92). 
In the early 1980s, the group of conspirators quickly extended to other government and 
party officials. One of them was Ion Iliescu, who later succeeded Ceausescu in office. Among 
others were Ion Ionita, a former minister of defense, and Virgil Magureanu, who was a member 
of the Securitate. They “were all dissatisfied Communists” who all served the party faithfully 
(Ratesh 1991, 94). However, the coup never materialized. It was aborted in 1984 by the 
government (Ratesh 1991, 94).  
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Dissent extended to bureaucratic leaders as well. According to Radu Nicolae, who served 
as an officer in the Romanian navy, the military and the Securitate were both involved in 
planning plots against Ceausescu (Ratesh 1991, 92-93). This was later confirmed by (retired) 
General Militaru, the minister of defense in the post-revolutionary government. On August 23, 
1990 he publicly acknowledged that “sectors of the army and the Securitate had been already 
won over by a conspiracy against Ceausescu by the time of the uprising” (Ratesh 1991, 85).  
The expansion of the group of conspirators coincided with the worsening of the economic 
and social conditions. Rather than a mere coincidence, the dissidents believed at the beginning of 
the 1980s that the socioeconomic decline provided the right circumstances to act against 
Ceausescu (Ratesh 1991, 93). Apparently, the country’s socioeconomic difficulties provided an 
opportunity for dissidents to expand the group. It is however unclear whether the economic 
situation motivated their behavior. 
A succession of political developments in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s constituted 
the second critical antecedent in the process leading up to the bloody December 1989 revolution 
in Romania. At the beginning lied Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking.” In February-March 
1986, a year after his ascension to power, the Soviet leader announced his new plans for 
economic liberalization (perestroika) at 27
th
 Party Congress. It was followed two years later by 
the initiation of political openness (glasnost), which granted more political freedoms to the 
Soviets (Serban 2012; Roth 2016). 
Gorbachev’s “new thinking” triggered a series of political changes in the region. As 
argued by Sianis-Davies (2005, 46), the Soviet leader’s reforms “were crucial in providing a 
permissive environment for revolution in Eastern Europe.” Consequently, by December 1989, 
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several East European countries, including Romania’s neighbors Hungary and Bulgaria, had 
begun a transition toward democratic institutions.  
This cascade of regional events impacted the behavior of Romanian citizens and leaders 
alike. They provided new aspirations to the general population. The news about the removal of 
the elderly Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, from power on November 10, 1989, must have 
generated among the population new incentives for leadership change in their country (Siani-
Davies 2005, 46). This was highly plausible given that Bulgarian television channels could be 
accessed in Bucharest (Siani-Davies 2005).  
Meanwhile, these new regional political developments must have further fragmented 
consensus among the political leadership about how to respond to the protests of December 
1989. On one side, there were those who perceived these events to be a threat to their political 
survival. Ceausescu was one of them. The Romanian leader disapproved of the ease with which 
other regimes seemed to be collapsing in the region. During a meeting in Moscow on December 
4, 1989, less than two weeks before the Timisoara uprising, he urged Gorbachev to take a firm 
stance against these new trends (Siani-Davies 2005, 49). On the other side, there were those 
leaders, like the signatories of the “Letter of Six,” who saw the events in the region as a political 
opportunity. They were mostly dissatisfied communist leaders who had been waiting for the right 
moment to overthrow Ceausescu.  
Within this regional and domestic context, the 14
th
 Party Congress, which opened on 
November 20, 1989 in Bucharest, was a missed opportunity for a peaceful change in Romania. 
Throughout the Congress, many leaders and citizens were hoping for “news of a last-minute 
conversion to Gorbachev-style reforms” (Siani-Davies 2005, 51). Instead, the Romanian leader 
vowed to maintain his position in party and state. Even the call of dissident leaders through the 
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“Letter of Six” urging Party officials not to reelect him changed nothing. Ceausescu was 
“unanimously” reelected by the Congress. At this particular moment, Romanian dissidents, 
leaders and citizens alike, lost hope. They felt that “the last prospects for peaceful change 
evaporated, the only option left was to be a violent overthrow” (Siani-Davies 2005, 52).   
 
 7.3.2 Critical Juncture: Leaders’ Dissent over the Timisoara Uprisings 
The lack of consensus among Romanian leaders about how to respond to demands of 
democratization was the critical juncture that led to a diverging outcome. In other countries, such 
as Hungary and Poland, the communist leadership not only shared power with the opposition, but 
it eventually lost it (Tismaneanu 2009, 274). On November 10, 1989 the Bulgarian president was 
removed from power without bloody confrontations. In Romania, however, the communist 
regime appeared to be divided about the necessity of reforms. Thus, when Ceausescu ordered the 
repression of the uprising in Timisoara, some members of his cabinet were in disaccord with 
him, even though they did not express their disagreement. This was shown in the December 17 
emergency meeting described in section 7.2.  
 The lack of leaders’ consensus about a strategy to address the demonstrations in 
Timisoara had profound implications for political order. As described by Pasti (1997, 65), “On 
the moment when the institutions of the power were seriously challenged … they collapsed, 
offering no resistance.” Apparently, leaders and managers in charge of defense and internal 
security deliberately sent military troops onto the streets with no live ammunition. In other 
instances, they purposefully positioned their troops to avoid direct confrontations with the 
protesters (Siani-Davies 2005). These types of “foot-dragging” were aimed at walking around 
Ceausescu’s orders for repression. Ultimately, they undermined the troops’ ability to contain the 
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crowds early on. In addition, the demonstrators must have realized that the military was 
disoriented, especially in the early hours in Timisoara. It was not surprising that protesters were 
able to seize armored tanks from the military (Ratesh 1991).   
Ceausescu’s sudden trip to Iran amid the Timisoara crisis potentially reduced the scope of 
support to his actions, while widening dissent among Romanians. Leaving the country during 
this sensitive period not only created a vacuum in leadership. Most importantly, it sparked 
speculations about his intentions. Some people even interpreted it as an exile (Ratesh 1991). At 
that moment, many leaders who were contemplating the possibility of regime change may have 
had an opportunity to mobilize other members of the ruling elite. Thus, uncommitted leaders 
could have easily been converted into dissidents during his absence.  
Ironically, it was during and after Ceausescu’s trip to Teheran that protests grew stronger. 
The Romanian leader returned on December 20. By that time, demonstrations against his regime 
had spread to several towns outside Timisoara. The next day, many cities followed, including 
Bucharest (Siani-Davies 2005). During this same period, the breakdown of consensus over the 
government’s response to the civil unrest extended to the security forces. One evidence was 
provided on December 20 in Timisoara, where “the army was fraternizing with the people” on 
the streets (Ratesh 1991, 34).  
Disparity within the security forces also materialized through the contrasting behavior of 
the army and the Securitate. There were no reports of the type of open collaboration between the 
secret police and the protesters similar to the army’s “fraternizing with the people.” According to 
Ratesh (1991), the army was always resentful of Ceausescu’s preferred treatment of the 
Securitate. Compared to the Securitate, the army was underequipped and poorly trained (Bacon 
1981; Ratesh 1991). In addition, Ceausescu relied on the secret police to control the army, while 
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the latter was used in construction and agriculture. As a result, “In the wake of the revolution, the 
army sought to take advantage of the strong popular sentiment against the Securitate to affirm its 
preponderance in the power structure” (Ratesh 1991, 137). 
The escalation of violence in Bucharest after the National Salvation Front took over on 
December 22 seemed to be a consequence of a chaos. This was subsequent to the lack of 
cohesion in the leadership after Ceausescu had escaped town. There must have been elements of 
the political leadership and the security forces, especially the Securitate, who sought to prevent a 
leadership change. In contrast, several high-level officials appeared to have contributed to the 
NSF’s ascension to power immediately after Ceausescu’s departure from Bucharest on 
December 22. This disparity within the political leadership translated into incoherent orders to 
and a fragmentation of the security forces. Ultimately, many casualties occurred that were 
attributed to this lack of coordination between leaders and military commanders.   
 
 7.4 Summary and Discussion of Findings 
This dissertation theorizes that the impact of a country’s structural and institutional 
conditions on the likelihood of civil war is mediated through leaders’ consensus about strategies 
for political order. Chapter 3 outlined six hypotheses that indirectly relate socioeconomic 
environment and political openness to civil war through leaders’ consensus on accommodation 
and coercion. The qualitative findings support the argument that the effect of state environment 
on civil war is mediated through leaders’ consensus on the government’s strategy for political 
order. 
The structured, focused comparison relied on several questions to examine Ceausescu’s 
governance and crisis bargaining strategies. The first set of questions revealed that, for the most 
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part of his tenure in office, Ceausescu relied on a governance strategy that emphasized coercion 
as a way to deter challenge to his rule. Prior to the late 1980s, his policies were effective at 
minimizing open dissent among leaders and citizens alike. The analysis showed that three 
features of the Romanian state environment enabled the effectiveness of Ceausescu’ coercive 
practices in deterring mobilization of citizens. First, the single party system excluded political 
competition outside the communist party. Thus, leaders had little incentives to openly challenge 
Ceausescu’s policies. Second, the geopolitical context prior to the late 1980s implicitly provided 
the Romanian dictator an umbrella under which he could freely coerce citizens and leaders 
without criticism from the Soviet Union and the West. 
The second set of questions examined Ceausescu’s bargaining strategy during the civil 
unrest that started on December 15, 1989 in Timisoara. The findings show that, by December 
1989, a number of changes had occurred in the Romanian state environment. First, the Soviet 
Union’s reforms toward political openness in the late 1980s provided new incentives for citizens 
and leaders contemplating the possibility of liberalization. Second, the regime changes 
undergone by some East European states only reinforced the prospects for a new direction. 
Together, these factors influenced the calculations of leaders and citizens alike. As a result, 
citizens rose up to demand reforms. In response, Ceausescu ordered repression, which many 
leaders seemed to disapprove of. 
The findings of the process tracing method also support the mediating effect of leaders’ 
strategic consensus in the process that relates state environment to civil war. Two elements were 
critical antecedents to the December 1989 revolution in Romania. The first was the 
socioeconomic decline that occurred in the country throughout the 1980s. The second was the 
wave of democratic transition that started in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. Together, these 
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two changes in the Romanian domestic and external environment shaped the aspirations and 
demands of Romanian citizens. Moreover, they affected consensus within Ceausescu’s 
government by changing leaders’ calculations for political survival.   
The process tracing technique also indicated that leaders’ lack of consensus about a 
strategy to respond to the demands for political reforms was the critical juncture that led to a 
violent outcome. Members of Ceausescu’s administration engaged in foot-dragging as an 
apparent consequence of their disapproval of his decision to repress protesters. This in turn 
undermined the effectiveness of the security forces on the ground. Ultimately, the chaos that 
resulted from the lack of cooperation among political leaders and managers of the security forces 
laid the conditions for escalation into armed violence. 
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Chapter 8 - Benin: The August 1992 Military Mutiny 
Benin, formerly known as Dahomey, is located in West Africa on the Atlantic coast. It 
borders Nigeria to the east, Burkina Faso and Niger to the north, and Togo to the west. Its total 
area is 112,622 km
2. It is considered “one of Africa’s most stable democracies” today (British 
Broadcasting n. d.). Historically, the peoples of the area were involved in slave trade in the 17
th
 
century, during which the shore was used as the departure point for captives destined to the 
Americas. Thus, many elements of the culture of Benin, including Voodoo, are present in parts 
of the American continent, mostly Haiti, Cuba, and Brazil (British Broadcasting n. d.).
32
  
Prior to the French invasion in the 1890s, the area of present-day Benin was under the 
control of several kingdoms. In the southern region, the most prominent ones were Danhome or 
Dahomey, Allada, and Xogbonou or Porto-Novo. The northern area was dominated by the 
kingdoms of Nikki, Kouande, and Kandi, among others. Many of these kingdoms were bitter 
rivals (Decalo 1973). Most of Benin’s population immigrated from the west (Togo and Ghana), 
the east (Nigeria), and from the north (Burkina Faso and Niger). 
The colonial period began in 1863 with the installation of a French protectorate in Porto-
Novo. By 1894, the French had conquered most of the territory. They established a colony under 
the name Dahomey, thus implicitly raising the status of the people of the former Danhome 
Kingdom over the others. On December 4, 1958 the colony of Dahomey officially became a 
republic within the French Community. The internal affairs of the new republic were led by 
Prime Minister Hubert Maga, a former teacher from the northern city of Parakou. On August 1, 
1960 Dahomey achieved independence from France.  
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 Some of the general information in this section is obtained from the official website of Benin government. See 
http://gouv.bj/histoire/.  
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Present-day Benin is a multiethnic society. It is composed of about 42 ethnic groups 
speaking more than 60 languages. The main religions are Christianity, Islam, and Voodoo. The 
ethno-regional configuration is as follows. The south and the center are predominantly occupied 
by the Fon, Gun, Mina, Adja, and Yorouba. The northeast is dominated by the Bariba ethnic 
group. The northwest is occupied by several groups, including Dendi, Somba, and Pila-Pila 
(Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989). The Fon, who are mostly from the former Dahomey 
kingdom, constitute the largest group in the country (about 26%). Traditionally, ethno-regional 
identity is of great importance in Benin (Codjo 2016). In addition to being attached to their 
ethnic group of origin, the people of Benin tend to identify themselves in terms of “southerners” 
and “northerners.” This is sometimes a source of instability (Decalo 1973).  
This chapter examines a military mutiny that occurred in Benin on August 2, 1992. Its 
purpose is to investigate the causes of the mutiny while assessing why it did not escalate into 
civil war. It is organized into four sections. Section 8.1 provides a brief overview of political 
developments in the country from 1960 through 1998, the year in which the crisis related to the 
mutiny was successfully resolved. Section 8.2 relies on the structured, focused comparison 
questions presented by table 5.1 to identify the factors that led to the emergence of the mutiny. 
Section 8.3 uses the process tracing method highlighted by figure 5.1 to focus on the critical 
antecedents and critical junctures that enabled a peaceful outcome in 1998. Section 8.4 
summarizes and discusses the findings.  
 
 8.1 Political Developments, 1960-1998 
The political course of post-independence Benin revolves around three main periods. The 
first is generally referred to as “the instability period” and covers the years 1960 through 1972. 
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The second is the “Revolution Era,” which was an autocratic rule. It lasted about 18 years. The 
third period, the “Democratic Era,” started in 1990 with a transition into democratic institutions.  
The first 12 years of the post-independence history of Benin was marked by many 
instances of political instability. When the country achieved independence on August 1, 1960, 
the political regime was a parliamentarian system resulting from the French Community era. 
Three months after achieving sovereignty, Benin opted for a presidential system instituted by a 
new constitution adopted on November 25, 1960. By switching to a presidential system, Benin’s 
leaders were hoping to avoid political instability that they feared would result from a 
parliamentary regime (Codjo 2016).  
Just three years after the instauration of a system that concentrated power in the hands of 
the president, Benin experienced its first military coup d’etat (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 
1989; Decalo 1973). On October 28, President Hubert Maga was deposed by Colonel Christophe 
Soglo, the army chief of staff. The last few weeks preceding the coup had been characterized by 
violent demonstrations in the northern city of Parakou, Maga’s home town, and in Porto-Novo, 
the capital city. At the core of the protests in the south, were complaints that President Maga, a 
northerner, had been engaging in ethno-regionalist discriminations. The coup occurred without 
any violence. The next day, Colonel Soglo justified the coup as necessary to preserve national 
unity and cohesion. In December, he returned power to a civilian leadership that included Sourou 
Migan Apithy as the president and Justin T. Ahomadegbe as his vice-president. The following 
month, a new constitution was adopted on January 5, 1964 (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989, 
370; Decalo 1973).   
The new leadership did not last long in office. In late 1965, rivalry between Apithy and 
his vice-president resulted in Colonel Soglo asking both leaders to resign. Following 
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constitutional rules, the president of the parliament, Tahirou Goncagou, assumed power as an 
interim president. However, a political impasse soon followed. Once again, Colonel Soglo 
intervened. On December 22, 1965 he dismissed the parliament and government, suspended the 
two-year old constitution, banned all political parties, and declared himself president (Morrison, 
Mitchell and Paden 1989, 371; Decalo 1973).  
The following seven years were marked by a series of coups d’etat. On December 17, 
1967 Colonel Soglo’s regime was overthrown by a group of soldiers led by Lieutenant-colonel 
Maurice Kouandete and Major Mathieu Kérékou. Two years later, on December 10, 1969 
another coup occurred. The following year, a three-member Presidential Council was installed on 
May 7, 1970. The three main political figures, Maga, Ahomadegbe, and Apithy, respectively 
from the north, the center, and the south, were to rotate as heads of state every two years. Maga 
completed his term and was followed by Ahomadegbe. However, six months into the latter’s 
term, the military intervened on October 26, 1972. Regime change occurred once again without 
any violence (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989, 370). The new junta was led by Major 
Mathieu Kérékou, who would shape the history of Benin for the remainder of his life until his 
death on October 14, 2015. 
Mathieu Kérékou was born on September 2, 1933 in Kouarfa, in the northwestern region 
of Benin. The Cotonou-based daily newspaper Fraternité describes him as “enigmatic and 
unpredictable” (Fraternité 2015). He attended school in Senegal and Mali before enrolling in the 
French army. As a young officer, he was once a special aid to President Maga. Prior to the 
October 1972 military coup, he was commanding an armored unit in Ouidah, in the south, not far 
from Cotonou. He also attended military courses in different schools in France (Fraternité 2015). 
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Kérékou’s ascension to power on October 26, 1972 brought political stability to the 
country. His regime lasted until March 1990, when Benin transitioned into democratic 
institutions. Over the course of these 18 years of authoritarian rule, the country went through 
several changes. On November 30, 1974, he proclaimed his adherence to Marxism-Leninism. A 
year later, he changed the name of the country from Dahomey to Benin. The intent was to foster 
national unity because “Dahomey” was perceived by many people as the domination of the 
ethnic group Fon, whose identity was tightly related to the pre-colonial history of the Dahomey 
Kingdom. That same year, on November 30, 1975, he instituted a single party system. The Parti 
de la Révolution Populaire du Bénin (People’s Revolution Party of Benin or PRPB) became the 
official state party (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989, 371; Decalo 1973).  
On January 16, 1977 Kérékou’s regime was challenged by a group of mercenaries (Jeune 
Afrique 2015). They invaded Benin by plane, arriving from Morocco via Gabon. It turned out 
that in these early hours of Sunday, the regime was expecting them. Soon after they landed, they 
were attacked by Benin troops before they had time to leave the airport. The subsequent fighting 
resulted in casualties on both sides. The mercenaries quickly retreated, leaving behind one of 
their men. In his memoires, Bob Denard, a French citizen and leader of the group, revealed that 
he was on a paid mission to overthrough the Kérékou’s regime at the demand of some his 
opponents, including former President Emile Derlin Zinsou (Denard 1998; Nandjui 1995, 185-
189).    
In the 1980s, Kérékou’s regime began to face difficulties. An economic decline that 
began in the late 1970s gradually worsened (Adekounte 1996). In his description of the situation, 
Adjaho (1992, 15), a finance inspector, “the financial situation of the state of Benin rapidly 
deteriorated, and began, in 1983, to descend into hell.” In 1987, the state lacked the means to pay 
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salaries to its civil servants. This was believed to be the product of a “total absence of 
appropriate oversight of state revenue and expenditure, and above all because of reckless 
investment” (Adjaho 1992, 15; Adekounte 1996). From January through August 1989, a general 
strike organized by public servants and students paralyzed state and society (Dossou 2005). In 
response, President Kérékou called for a national conference that took place from February 19 
through February 28, 1990.   
The February 1990 National Conference opened a new era in the domestic politics in 
Benin. During the Conference, participants agreed on a set of decisions. A one-year transitional 
system would be put in place. Kérékou was to remain head of state during the transition. He was 
to be assisted by a prime minister who would be responsible for the chief executive. Legislative 
duties would be provisionally performed by the Haut Conseil de la République (High Republican 
Council or HCR). A new constitution was to be adopted, and general elections were scheduled 
for the following year. Kérékou accepted to implement these measures. Thus, on March 1, he 
signed a series of executive acts that effectively suspended the old constitution, dissolved the old 
parliament, appointed a prime minister, and changed the country’s official denomination from 
People’s Republic of Benin to Republic of Benin (Dossou 2005).    
The one-year transition lasted from March 1990 through April 1991. It was conducted by 
Presented Kérékou and his prime minister Nicéphore Soglo, who had been selected at the 
National Conference. According to plans, a new constitution was approved in a referendum on 
December 2 and signed into law on December 11, 1990. Its provisions instituted a presidential 
regime and a multiparty system. On February 2, 1991, legislative elections took place. Neither 
the president nor the prime minister had a political party. The next month, both men ended up in 
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a run-off during the presidential election featuring more than 10 candidates. Soglo won the 
election. Kérékou effectively released power on April 4, 1991. 
During Soglo’s tenure in office, political stability deteriorated quickly. Between April 
1991 and April 1992, there were at least three instances of alleged coup attempts. The most 
dramatic act of instability occurred in the morning of August 2, 1992. A group of soldiers took 
control of a military base in the northwestern town of Natitingou, the hometown of former 
President Kérékou. The event occurred a day after the celebration of the independence. The 
mutiny was led by an army officer, Captain Pascal Tawès. As the army tried to retake control of 
the base in the next hours, the soldiers felt outnumbered and retreated. Many of them fled the 
country, including their leader. This incident came to be known as the Affaire Tawès.  
For the remainder of Soglo’s term in office, the Affaire Tawès remained a central concern 
to citizens and government alike. Until he left office on April 4, 1996, his administration never 
captured Tawès. It was only in 1998, during his successor’s tenure in office that the issue was 
peacefully resolved. Despite the anxiety it created in Benin for several years, the Affaire Tawès 
has not been previously examined in the literature. This chapter fills this gap. To do so, the 
structure, focused method and process tracing are used. The first will help to understand why the 
crisis occurred and why it sustained for so long. Process tracing will focus on explaining why 
and how escalation into civil war was avoided by Soglo’s successor in 1997-1998.  
 
 8.2 Structured, Focused Comparison 
This section relies on the structured, focused comparison to investigate the role of 
government actions in causing the August 1992 military mutiny. It is composed of two 
subsections. The first seeks to examine the relationship between government actions, leaders’ 
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consensus and the emergence of the mutiny. To do so, the governance strategy adopted by the 
Soglo administration in the years preceding the incident is analyzed. The purpose of the second 
subsection is to determine the conditions that allowed the Benin government to avoid escalation 
of the mutiny into civil war. This is accomplished by assessing how the Soglo regime managed 
the crisis.  
 
 8.2.1 Soglo’s Governance Strategy, 1991-1996  
The following questions are used to analyze the Soglo administration’s governance 
strategy from its assumption of office on April 4, 1991 until the outbreak of the mutiny on 
August 2, 1992. First, what was the executive’s governance strategy and what motivated or 
facilitated that choice? Second, how much support did the executive’s governance strategy enjoy 
within the other branches of the government and why? Third, how much did the executive’s 
governance strategy determine public discontent and to what extent did leaders’ consensus 
contribute to that outcome? 
Nicéphore Soglo was born on November 29, 1934 in Lome (Togo). He graduated from 
the University of Paris with a degree in law and economics. At the age of 31, he was appointed 
finance minister in the Cabinet of his cousin Colonel Christoph Soglo. For most of the single 
party rule, he lived in Washington, DC where he worked at the International Monetary Funds 
and the World Bank. He returned to Benin to attend the February 1990 National Conference.
33
  
 During his single five-year term, the focus of Soglo’s governance was on economic 
policies. He was most preoccupied by creating favorable conditions for foreign investment. As a 
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 In the absence of a biography on Nicéphore Soglo, most of the information provided here about his background 
was obtained from the official website of the government of Benin (see http://gouv.bj/les-anciens-presidents). 
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result, foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percentage of GDP was higher under his 
administration than for most of the subsequent years. On average, FDI constituted 2.44% of GDP 
during his 5-year term (see table 8.1). This was more than double of what would later be 
produced in the next three terms. The Soglo administration also emphasized agriculture and 
exports. During its 5-year term, the value added by agriculture was 35.04% on average (see table 
8.1). With the exception of the immediate following term, the level was much lower in all 
subsequent years. In a country that whose economy was largely based on agriculture, this was a 
sign of Soglo’s commitment to economic policies that involved the most vulnerable class in 
society.     
 
 
Table 8.1 Benin: Regime Performance in the Democratic Era 
Regimes 
External Debt 
(current US$) 
FDI 
( % of GDP) 
GDP 
Growth 
Trade 
(%GDP) 
Agriculture  
(value added as % GDP) 
Nicéphore Soglo 
(1991-1995) 1,190,000,000 2.44 4.22 58.33 35.04 
Mathieu Kérékou 
(1996-2000) 1,230,000,000 1.04 5.04 59.10 35.71 
Mathieu Kérékou 
(2001-2005) 1,410,000,000 -0.16 3.91 49.93 25.34 
Boni Yayi 
(2006-2010) 854,000,000 0.65 3.85 54.97 28.26 
Boni Yayi 
(2011-2015) 1,550,000,000 3.28 4.68 65.85 25.64 
Country  
(1991-2015) 1,250,000,000 1.45 4.34 57.64 28.89 
Note: Numbers are average values for each of the periods indicated in the first column. Data are from the World Bank (2017). 
 
Although his economic policies seemed to yield good results, Soglo faced hostility on the 
political front. When he assumed office in April 1991, he had no party affiliation. Thus, he had 
no clear and stable basis of support in parliament. In 1992, however, his wife Rosine Vieyra-
Soglo, created a political party under the name Renaissance du Benin. This intensified some of 
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the opposition to the Soglos. The first lady’s front role was often criticized. People were not 
accustomed to seeing a woman play a major role in a field dominated by men.  
Soglo also drew negative attention through his public posture. For instance, his constant 
criticism of Kérékou’s 18-year autocratic regime was perceived as arrogant, especially given that 
Kérékou had rarely appeared in public since he lost the 1991 election. It was also not well 
received by his peers in the region who, for the most part, were dictators. He also commonly 
referred to his professional experience in terms of “when I was at the World Bank” or “when I 
was in the United States,” which was sometimes perceived as an attempt to lecture others. One of 
his opponents famously asked him “to leave the banks of the Potomac River and come back to 
Lake Nokoué,” implying that the president should stick to local realities and stop lecturing them 
about his American experience. People’s resentment over Soglo’s attitude was summarized by 
his wife during a discussion in parliament on July 21, 1998, two years after they left office. “I 
have heard people all over the country say: [President] Soglo must apologize to us,” she said. “I 
have often asked myself: about what? What crime did he commit? But I have been told 
repeatedly that he must apologize for his arrogance,” the former first lady disappointedly 
reported (Assembleé Nationale, unpublished 1998b).    
Soglo’s unpopularity was materialized in the legislative election of March 28, 1995. As 
the sitting president, he certainly had some advantage over his opponents. He could easily travel 
around the country and campaign on behalf of his party the Renaissance du Bénin (RB), which 
was participating in an election for the first time since it was founded in 1992. Despite being the 
party of the incumbent president, the RB performed poorly. It won only 21 out of the 84 seats. 
Although no other party exceeded that number, the opposition parties heavily dominated the new 
legislature (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished n. d.a).  
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Another major defeat soon followed for President Soglo. For the upcoming presidential 
election, some of his opponents lobbied for Kérékou’s candidacy. The former president had 
rarely spoken in public since he left office in April 1991. He had become a Christian (Tawès 
1998), which his supporters presented as a sign that he was a new born. On March 18, 1995 
Kérékou or Saint Mathieu as he was then called, defeated Soglo in the run-off, winning 52, 49% 
of the votes. Soglo reluctantly conceded.  
Another criticism that Soglo often faced while in office was that of ethno-regional 
discrimination. These charges echoed complaints in the 1960s about his cousin Colonel Soglo, 
who, as a president, was then “accused of nepotism and a pro-southern bias” (Decalo 1973, 460). 
Ethno-regional discrimination had traditionally been a source of political disorder. Several of the 
military coups staged during the period of instability in the 1960s were orchestrated on the 
ground of governance along ethno-regional lines. This was confirmed by Decalo (1973) in his 
study. He found that ethnic and regional discrimination in politics and the military largely 
accounted for the 12-year instability observed in post-independence.  
In his choice of the military leadership, Soglo either paid little attention to the importance 
of perception about ethno-regional balance, or he was simply condescending toward northerners. 
In either case, this was a risky governance style in a country where southerners were often 
accused of “typical expatriate arrogance, disdain, and displeasure at their posting to the ‘savage 
north’” (Decalo 1973). As indicated in table 8.2, he barely had a northerner in a key military 
leadership position. All defense ministers and army chiefs of his administration were 
southerners. Only in the Chief Defense Staff did he have a northerner, who was actually 
appointed during the 1990 transition. In contrast, President Kérékou, who was from the north, 
almost exclusively appointed southerners in these three key military leadership positions. Out of 
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the six individuals who assumed these functions during his first 5-year term, only one was from 
the north and was appointed a year before his term was set to expire.   
 
Table 8.2 Benin: Key Military Leadership, 1991-2001 
Position Occupant : 1991-1996 
(Soglo’s Term) 
Occupant : 1996-2001 
(Kérérou’s Term) 
Defense Minister Florentin Feliho        (South) 
Désiré Vieyra            (South) 
Sévérin Adjovi              (South) 
Pierre Osho                    (South) 
Chief of Defense Staff Aristide A. Boni        (North) 
Séraphin Noukpo      (South) 
Kodjia Gandonou           (South) 
Félicien Dos Santos        (South) 
Fernand Amoussou         (South) 
Army Chief of Staff Séraphin Noukpo       (South) 
Félicien Dos Santos     (South) 
Fernand Amoussou          (South) 
Jean Kouagou M’pina       (North) 
Source: Based on information obtained at the Benin Ministry of Defense. 
Within this context of ethno-regionally unbalanced leadership in military affairs, the 
Soglo administration took a number of actions that generated frustration among some members 
of the military. On April 11, 1991 (see Decret nº 91-71), a week after assuming power, President 
Soglo signed a decree that dissolved the Bataillon de la Garde Présidentielle (Presidential Guard 
Battalion or BGP). This was the unit that had previously been in charge of the president’s 
security under the single party rule. The dismantling of the BGP, although understandable from 
the president’s security standpoint (given his rivalry with his predecessor), created an 
atmosphere of persecution.  
The feeling of harassment developed by members of the BGP was aggravated by the fact 
that the military leadership took no immediate action to position them into new functions. It was 
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only two months later that most of them were transferred to new stations. For instance, the 
transferring order for the commander of the BGP, Major Jean N’tcha, and his deputy, Captain 
Pascal Tawès, was signed on July 1, 1991 (Note de Service nº 316/S1/CH/D1/EMAT). 
According to the order, signed by Army Chief of Staff Colonel Séraphin  Noukpo, a southerner, 
the officers and their men were given a week to report to their new stations. After a waiting for a 
transfer for more than two months, a one-week notice only reinforced the sentiment of 
persecution or harassment among members of the BGP.  
This sense of persecution and harassment among members of the former presidential 
guard was the beginning of a situation that later deteriorated and evolved into a revolt or the so 
called Affaire Tawès. Its leader was Captain Pascal Tawès. Born on May 10, 1956 in Tourou, in 
the northern region, Tawès was a very athletic man when he joined the military on July 21, 1978 
at the age of 22. He was promoted Second Lieutenant on October 1, 1980. A year later he 
attained the rank of First Lieutenant and became a Captain on October 1, 1985. He attended an 
infantry course in Montpellier in France in 1984. From January through July 1987, he attended a 
captain career course in Porto-Novo in Benin. Three months after completion of this course, he 
married Christine Kata on October 16, 1987. On July 20, 1988 he was appointed by then 
President Kérékou as a deputy commander of the BGP.
34
 
Captain Tawès particularly resented the administration’s governance of the military. 
First, he disapproved of the treatment inflicted up on members of the former BGP. As a former 
deputy commander, he was being transferred to the Bataillon des Service (BS) with no portfolio. 
This felt like a humiliation for a man once in charge of hundreds of soldiers committed to the 
                                                 
34
 The information contained in this paragraph was obtained from Pascal Tawès’ personnel file at the Direction de 
l’Organisation et du Personnel des Armées (DOPA), which is the directorate in charge of personnel in the Benin 
Armed Forces. 
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security of the most powerful man in the country. In his accounts of the events leading up to the 
mutiny, he often referred to his being transferred to a unit with no responsibility. Second, he also 
constantly pointed to what he perceived as ethno-regionalist management of the military. For 
instance, he wrote in a short memoire that one of the goals of the August 1992 mutiny was to 
“demand termination, within the Benin armed forces, of a system based on regionalism and 
tribalism.” He implicitly accused Soglo of appointing “his cousins and nephews to [several] 
command posts in the Benin military” (Tawès 1998, 6).    
Captain Tawès did not last long at his new position “with no portfolio.” On December 20, 
1991 he was ordered to transfer to the Deuxième Bataillon Inter-Armes in Parakou, which was 
located up north about 450 kilometers away from Cotonou. In his accounts, the decision to 
transfer him, and several others, followed rumors about plots that had allegedly been in 
preparation. He complained about the brutality with which they were being transferred. “On the 
unsubstantiated ground of rumors of alleged coups d’état,” the captain wrote, “some soldiers 
including myself have been transferred by force to their regions of origin and put under the 
command of their subordinates without any precise functions, like criminals” (Tawès 1998, 3). 
He added that “all attempts to be heard by the military hierarchy were unsuccessful.”   
During a discussion in parliament on September 2, 1997, Honorable Pascal N’Dah-Sekou 
referred to the circumstances of Tawès’ transfer to Parakou to explain why the captain decided to 
rebel. He informed his colleagues that Captain Tawès was notified by his hierarchy at 11 am that 
he was being transferred to the northern city of Parakou. An hour later, a military truck parked in 
front of his residency at the military base. He was asked to aboard the vehicle for his new post. 
Despite his complaints, he was forced to enter the truck, which then drove him to Parakou. A few 
days after he arrived at his new station, the captain was called back to Cotonou. Upon his arrival, 
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he was simply arrested and put in a military jail. However, informed Honorable N’Dah-Sekou, 
“as a proud soldier, who had correctly learned all his lessons about physical and strategic 
training, he escaped” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 33). 
It is unclear whether Captain Tawès was given an hour to prepare for the trip to his new 
station. However, Honorable N’Dah-Sekou’s accounts about the timing of the captain’s 
imprisonment do not match the reality. On May 28, 1992 the administration announced that there 
was a coup attempt the night before. The exact circumstances of the incident remain 
controversial. Nevertheless, there were security breaches in three cities in the south, including 
Ouidah, Cotonou, and Porto-Novo. Soldiers had broken into the armament storage unit of police 
stations to steal weapons and ammunition. The authorities insisted that this was a coup attempt 
(Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 1997b). 
On May 29, the government formed a commission to investigate the incident. Captain 
Tawès was summoned to the Army headquarters in Cotonou for July 10. Upon his arrival, he 
was asked by the commission to testify about the incident. In his own accounts, “After [rounds 
of] audition, confrontation, and whispering, I was kept in Camp Guezo by an armed troop, on 
regionalist basis.” He added that “when a soldier is arrested under such circumstances, he must 
escape.” He explained that after escaping he went to Natitingou to “intervene” in the garrison 
known as Camp Kaba (Tawès 1998, 5).  
What Captain referred to as an “intervention” was an armed attack on the garrison in the 
morning of August 2, 1992. With his men they took control of the base. In Tawès’ accounts, the 
military hierarchy was notified by radio that Camp Kaba was no longer under the government’s 
command. The commander of the garrison and several other personnel were held hostage. There 
were no casualties reported during the operation. The captain insisted that the armed assault was 
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the expression of frustration by “patriotic soldiers fed up with being tracked by a regionalist 
regime” (Tawès 1998, 6). They demanded that the administration freed up all soldiers that had 
been detained in connection with the alleged plots. They also asked the regime to stop its ethno-
regionalist management of the military. 
The next step is to examine how the Soglo administration responded to Captain Tawès’ 
demands. The following questions are used. First, how did the executive respond to the demands 
of dissatisfied people and why? How much support did the executive’s response to the crisis 
enjoy within the other branches of the government and why? To what extent did leaders’ lack of 
consensus contribute to the escalation into civil war?  
The administration’s initial response was to deploy military troops to recapture Camp 
Kaba. As the troops were moving toward Natitingou, there was an encounter with a group of the 
mutineers aboard a military truck. Captain Tawès referred to the incident as an ambush staged by 
the military. He found it deplorable that the commander of the troops ordered his men to shoot 
their “comrades.” While the official records make no indication of casualties, Captain Tawès 
claimed that one of his men was killed (Tawès 1998).  
Apparently, some members of the unit that deployed to Natitingou did not like the idea of 
a confrontation with the mutineers. In his accounts, Captain Tawès reported that his team was 
informed of the counter-attack by two men of the unit that was deployed to “capture or destroy 
Tawès.” He said that the leaders of the unit deliberately sent these two soldiers as precursors to 
let them know that “more than 90% of the soldiers selected to fight them were from the north” 
(Tawès 1998, 7). Upon learning that information, the captain decided that it was better to avoid a 
“fratricide confrontation.” Thus, he and several of his men escaped town. He would spend the 
next years in exile in Togo and Burkina Faso (Tawès 1998). 
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While Tawès was in exile, instability persisted in Benin. In March 1994, there was 
another instance of security breach where weapons and ammunition were stolen. In 1995, rockets 
were fired into the International Conference Center in Cotonou. This was a new building 
scheduled to host an international summit that many heads of state, including the French 
president, were expected to attend that year. In November 1995, there was another alleged plot 
against the regime. Several people were arrested, including military officers and a French citizen. 
Also, a local government official went missing in Boukoumbe, the home town of Captain Tawès. 
These various incidents further increased the anxiety and fear that had started since the August 
1992 mutiny (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 1997b, 1998a).  
Besides the military operation to retake Camp Kaba, the Soglo regime took other 
measures. The first was an administrative action to discharge Captain Tawès and his colleague 
Captain Raymond Saghi and revoke their ranks. It was proposed to the president by his minister 
of defense, Jean Florentin Feliho. On October 21, 1992, the issue was considered in a cabinet 
meeting. A month later, on November 25, President Soglo signed a decree that effectively 
discharged both officers and revoked their ranks. The sanction was to start retroactively from 
September 3, 1992. The reason was that both officers had been “absent from their units for more 
than two months and [were] on the run outside the national territory” (Decret nº 92-319, 
unpublished).  
Following the occurrence of other instances of political instability, the Soglo 
administration took a legal action (Procès-verbal des débats nº 63, unpublished; Arrêts nº 64, 65, 
66, 67, 68, unpublished). On August 16, 1994 the criminal court in Cotonou indicted 27 military 
personnel for “Preparation or execution of acts qualified as plots.” Among them were four 
officers, including Captain Tawès. Of the 27 indicted soldiers, who were all from the northern 
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region of Benin, only 11 showed up. Captain Tawès did not. The four jurors, randomly selected 
by lot, were from the southern region. This may have been because the prosecution was taking 
place in Cotonou, a city predominantly composed of southerners. The court was presided by Guy 
Martin Correia, a judge who was from the southern region. He was assisted by two other judges, 
Pascal Ahouangonou and Jerôme Assogba, both of whom were also from the southern region. 
The defense team was composed of two state-appointed lawyers and five legal counsels. Most of 
them were also from the south (Procès-verbal des débats nº 63, unpublished; Arrêts nº 64, 65, 66, 
67, 68, unpublished).  
After more than two weeks of proceedings, the court rendered a decision on September 5, 
1994. Of the 27 indicted men, three were acquitted, while the other 24 were convicted. They 
were found guilty of “planning a plot, around 1991 and 1992, at unspecified time and on the 
national territory [of Benin], with the purpose of destabilizing or overthrowing the government in 
place in Benin” (Arrêt nº 68, unpublished). They were also guilty of a number of acts 
“committed in preparation of the execution of the plot,” including duplication of the keys to the 
weapon storage unit of the National Police Academy, attempt to steal weaponry, and movement 
of soldiers from the city of Ouidah to Cotonou. The court sentenced two of the individuals who 
attended the proceedings to two years in prison, while six of them walked away with a sentence 
of five to 10-year forced labor. All the 16 individuals who did not attend the proceedings were 
sentenced to lifetime forced labor (Procès-verbal des débats nº 63, unpublished; Arrêts nº 64, 65, 
66, 67, 68, unpublished).  
None of the measures considered by the Soglo administration succeeded in resolving the 
crisis known as the Affaire Tawès. The regime’s military operation failed to capture Captain 
Tawès and many of his colleagues. This was mainly because members of the military unit sent to 
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accomplish the mission were uncommitted to the government’s strategy. This lack of 
commitment suggests the regime’s crisis bargaining strategy was not shared in the military and 
maybe in other parts of government and society. In his accounts, Captain Tawès claimed that, 
while in exile in Burkina Faso, he would visit his hometown in Benin passing through Togo and 
showing his identity. He concluded that “everybody was convinced that I did not do anything 
wrong, and that I was just a victim of human evilness” (Tawès 1998, 10). The next section 
examines the conditions that enabled President Kérékou to resolve the conflict. 
 
 8.3 Process Tracing 
Between 1997 and 1999, a process initiated by President Kérékou led to the effective 
resolution of the Affaire Tawès. The decisions that resulted from this process accommodated 
Captain Tawès and his comrades. On December 22, 1998, President Kérékou signed into law a 
bill approved by the parliament that granted amnesty to 319 military and civilians involved in 
this or other similar affairs (Loi nº 98-028, unpublished).  
In accordance with the amnesty law, the president signed a decree on August 5, 1999 that 
repealed the previous regime’s 1992 sanction of discharge and rank revocation (Decret nº 00-
377, unpublished). On December 30, 1999 he signed another decree that readjusted the career of 
79 military officers and enlisted personnel who had been associated with various national 
security issues. Captain Tawès, like his colleagues, was retroactively promoted. His new rank of 
Lieutenant-colonel was set on January 1, 1997. In addition, the decree ordered the payment to the 
soldiers of all the financial benefits induced by this career readjustment (Decret 99-633, 
unpublished). This section examines the critical antecedents and the critical juncture that led to 
this peaceful outcome.   
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 8.3.1 Critical Antecedents: Democratic Transition, 1989-1991  
As figure 8.1 shows, two elements related to the 1989-1991 democratic transition are the 
critical antecedents in the process that led to a peaceful resolution of the Affaire Tawès. On one 
hand, the outcome of the 1991 presidential election created conditions that facilitated the 
occurrence of the crisis. On the other hand, despite the tensions generated by this first element, 
the legacy of tolerance and inclusiveness that accompanied the preparation and the organization 
of the 1990 National Conference later enabled the different actors to lower the risks of 
instability.  
Kérékou’s loss of power on April 4, 1991 laid the ground for the occurrence of the 
Affaire Tawès. It significantly affected Captain Tawès’ behavior. For the last two years of 
Kérékou’s autocratic regime, the young captain had been accumulating power and gaining the 
trust of the president. On November 15, 1989 Captain Tawès, who was deputy commander of the 
presidential guard, was appointed by President Kérékou to chair a 10-men special commission. 
His mission was, to lead the investigation of three state-owned financial institutions, including 
the Banque Commerciale du Bénin, the Banque Béninoise pour le Développement, and the 
Crédit Agricole (Decret nº 89-400, unpublished). These organizations were accused of 
mismanaging state resources. Allegedly, they arbitrarily granted loans to their customers, but 
failed to recover the money back.  
Captain Tawès and the members of his commission were given “full power” by President 
Kérékou to conduct the investigations. Most importantly, they were instructed to “recover, by all 
necessary means” all the money lent by the three institutions (Decret nº 89-400, unpublished). 
The president also gave the commission the authority to “call upon or hear any person whose 
competency or audition it judges necessary for the proper execution of its mission” (Decret nº 
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89-400, unpublished). According to the president’s orders, Captain Tawès and his collaborators 
were to report to him monthly. At a time when state resources were scarce, this was an important 
mission. As the chairman of a commission entrusted with such a high priority mission, Tawès 
most certainly, to say the least, enjoyed the president’s full confidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
In addition to his responsibilities as head of the loan recovery commission, Captain 
Tawès was also given another task by the President Kérékou. This time, he was to chair a four-
men inquiry commission. Their mission was to investigate a claim of mismanagement within the 
Société Béninoise des Travaux Publics, which was a state-owned public infrastructure company 
(Decret nº 89-401, unpublished). The president once again entrusted him with the power to “call 
upon any person whose competency was judged necessary for the proper execution of [his] 
mission.” The commission had 12 days to submit its findings. The decrees that created these two 
commissions chaired by Captain Tawès were signed the same day by President Kérékou. This 
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suggests that the president knowingly sent Tawès on two critical simultaneous missions, which 
could only be a sign of confidence in the young captain.  
Soglo’s ascension to power at the very moment when the captain was on the rise was 
certainly not a situation he appreciated. This was reflected in some of his declarations, where he 
traced the beginning of his problems back to the 1991 presidential election. He stated that “My 
disgrace started with the process of opaque (not transparent) ballot during elections in my 
country in 1991” (Tawès 1998, 2). Describing the electoral process, he offered that “The 
procedure was often based, among others, on regionalism.” In another strikingly political 
statement, he indicated that “Benin plunged into insecurity for accepting the verdict of opaque 
ballot” (Tawès 1998, 11). The implication seems to be that people should have contested the 
outcome of the 1991 election. 
As a military officer, bound by his country’s constitutional prescription of political 
neutrality, casting such judgements on the electoral process could only mean he had more to lose 
than the ordinary citizen or soldier. In this context, his later treatment by the military leadership 
must have amplified his resentment. His frustration also seemed to result from his belief that he 
was the victim of a “witch hunt.” He felt that he was being harassed for his role in the 
investigation of state affairs. He found this to be unfair given that the commission he had led 
“worked diligently and recovered several million francs CFA for the state” (Tawès 1998, 1). In 
short, the source of his bitterness appeared to be in strong connection with the regime change of 
1991. As such, any solution short of leadership change offered by the Soglo regime had little 
chance to dissolve the crisis.   
The second critical antecedent that indirectly influenced the observed outcome was the 
legacy associated with the process that led to the democratic transition in 1989-1990. The 
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February 1990 National Conference, which opened the door to the adoption of democratic 
institutions, was itself a product of compromise and tolerance. Its main source lied in Kérékou’s 
leadership style. As described in section 8.1, the country’s socioeconomic difficulties were 
severe in the late 1980s. Amid the social tensions generated by the general strikes of 1989, 
Kérékou was approached by René Ahouansou and Robert Dossou, two university professors who 
were newly elected to the parliament. He met with both men on July, 28 1989. Both leaders were 
concerned about the direction of the country. They explained to the president that “democracy 
was inevitable” (Dossou 2005, 595). They told him that, by accepting the structural adjustment 
programs of the IMF, he had opted for economic liberalization. It was better for him, they 
advised, to also include political liberalism before it was imposed upon him. 
Three days later, on July 31, Kérékou addressed the parliament and alluded to the 
possibility of political openness. On August 4, he appointed Robert Dossou as a member of his 
Cabinet. In November, the president announced to his minister that “I have been thinking about a 
national conference” (Dossou 2005, 595). On December 5, he informed Party leaders about his 
intent. They gave their approval, and thus started the planning of the event. 
The National Conference lasted from February 19 through February 24, 1990. Its legacy 
was one of inclusiveness, forgiveness and tolerance. The 520 delegates who attended the 
discussions came from different backgrounds. These included, soldiers, educators, farmers, 
students, and even former exiled citizens who resented the single party rule. The youngest 
delegate was a 22-year old student. The chairman of the discussions was Monseigneur Isidore de 
Souza, a catholic bishop. The debates were covered on live radio, thus allowing people to 
connect to the historic moment. After days of heated arguments, several compromises were made 
to accommodate the different views represented. There were rumors that President Kérékou 
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would reject some of the conclusions. However, Bishop De Souza, with tact and diplomacy, 
convinced the president. The last day of the Conference, Kérékou appeared in front of the 
audience, and solemnly announced his willingness to implement their decisions (Dossou 2005). 
As the next sub-section shows, this legacy of compromise and inclusiveness later influenced the 
course of Benin’s sociopolitical life, especially with regard to the Affaire Tawès. 
 
 8.3.2 Critical Juncture: Kérékou’s Outreach to Parliament 
The critical juncture that enabled a peaceful outcome to the Affaire Tawès resided in 
Kérékou’s decision to reach out to the parliament in 1997 to resolve the crisis. As a president, he 
had the constitutional authority to pardon Captain Tawès and his comrades. However, he decided 
to involve members of parliament in his strategy to address the issue. Thus, a year into his first 
term as a democratically elected president, he sent a bill to the parliament that would provide 
amnesty to all people involved in the August 1992 mutiny and in other national security related 
incidents.
35
 The purpose of the bill was to “create better conditions for political détente in order 
to enable true national reconciliation” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 1).  
Although Kérékou’s outreach to parliament was a risky decision, it allowed large 
discussions about the Affaire Tawès. Through this action, the executive broadened the scope of 
consensus about its strategy to accommodate Captain Tawès and his comrades. The first round of 
debates in parliament opened on September 2, 1997 under the auspices of the second vice-
president of the parliament, Honorable Théophile Natta (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 
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 The bill related to several incidents. The first concerned the theft of arms and ammunition in the night of May 27-
28 1992. The second was the firing of rockets upon the International Conference Center. Third, the bill also covered 
felonies and crime perpetrated during all elections held between 1990 and 1996 (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 
1997a). 
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1997a). A former member of Soglo’s Cabinet during the mutiny, Honorable Natta was a native 
of the same region as both President Kérékou and Captain Tawès.  
The amnesty bill proposed by President Kérékou faced some opposition in parliament. 
One of the opponents was Honarable Emile Kpikpidi, a deputy from Soglo’s party. He called for 
caution. “If soldiers can join a rebellion today, wander around and come back in three or four 
years,” he wondered, “are we consolidating the military?” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 
1997a, 3). His position was that the management of the Affaire Tawès should be left to the 
military. Another argument against the bill came from Honorable Guy Soglo, who was also from 
the opposition party. He expressed what some members of the Soglo administration back in 1992 
might have thought was at the core of the events: “For some of our fellow citizens, tribal 
patriotism prevails over national patriotism, and I believe that is why they find it impossible to 
accept an order, however democratically established, as long as it is not incarnated by a citizen 
from the [ethno-regional] community of their origin” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 
4).  
A number of parliamentarians were not opposed to the idea of amnesty, but they were 
reluctant to vote for the bill as proposed. They were concerned about the security implications of 
granting an amnesty without recovering the weaponry that had been stolen back in 1992. This 
view was best expressed by Honorable Candide Azannai, a member of Soglo’s opposition party 
RB, on the second day of the first round of debates. Referring to President Kérékou who 
proposed the bill, he explained that “I do not understand why a president, who is a military 
officer by profession, who knows the gravity of national security … [wants to] provide amnesty 
for these incidents even though the country is still facing threats because the [stolen] arms have 
not been recovered” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997b, 30).     
186 
There were also reservations in other parts of the government. One was the Commission 
des Lois (Law Committee), which was the parliamentarian committee that had studied the bill 
before it was presented to the plenary for discussion. According to Honorable Pascal N’Dah-
Sekou, a member of the committee who was also from the same region as Captain Tawès, there 
were diverging views within the committee. Some committee members even tried to block the 
process entirely. He informed the plenary that it took the personal efforts and the “intellectual 
honesty” of Honorable Rosine Vieyra-Soglo, the former first lady, to enable the committee to 
move past these tactics (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a).  
The military leadership also had reservations. Their main concern was a provision of the 
bill that called for a career readjustment for the mutineers. According to the initial bill, the 
readjustment measure should ensure that the beneficiaries’ new career situation “is neither worse 
nor better than that of their colleagues who remained in the military” (Assemblée Nationale, 
unpublished 1997a, 32). During a hearing at the parliament, the commanders told the 
Commission des Lois they only disapproved of this part of the bill. Later, changes were made to 
reflect the commanders’ concern. Overall, they strongly recommended adoption of the bill “to 
avoid a ‘Kabila’ effect” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 30). The reference was about 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Joseph Kabila had led a rebellion to seize power in 
the previous year.  
In response to these reservations, supporters of the amnesty bill drew on a number of 
precedents, especially in relation with the process that led to the democratic transition in 1989-
1990. First, they recalled an executive action “voluntarily” signed by President Kérékou on 
August 30, 1989 to grant amnesty to all exiled citizens. These individuals were thus allowed to 
return home without facing charges for criminal acts they might have committed prior to their 
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exile. Second, supporters of the bill also drew on a presidential ordonnance signed by Kérékou 
on March 8, 1990 that provided general amnesty for plots staged against his government in the 
1980s (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a; 1997b).  
Defenders of the bill also relied on a third example from the democratic transition in 
1990, thus showing how decisive the legacy of the National Conference was to the adoption of 
the bill. Back in 1990, they argued, President Kérékou personally lobbied members of the Haut 
Conseil de la République (HCR) to pass a bill that extended amnesty for all national-security-
related criminal cases that had occurred since the beginning of his October 26, 1972. The HCR, 
which was the provisional legislative body during the transition, effectively passed the bill. It 
was signed into law by the president on October 9, 1990 (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 
1997a, 31). 
The supporters of the bill claimed that this third precedent was significant because it 
granted amnesty to the people that were involved in the mercenary invasion of January 16, 1977. 
Honorable N’Dah-Sekou used this example to urge his colleagues to “listen to the voice of 
wisdom and vote for this bill” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 33). If President 
Kérékou could forgive and extend amnesty to people who invaded the country trying to 
overthrow his regime, he suggested, members of the parliament had no reason to deny a similar 
gesture to Captain Tawès and his colleagues.   
Throughout the discussions, the legacy of the 1990 National Conference was constantly 
referred to as a reason to rally members of the parliament around a peaceful resolution. One 
example was provided on September 3, 1997, by Honorable Albert Chinkoun, who was a 
member of the opposition party. Despite being from the opposition, he urged his colleagues to 
vote for the bill. “We wish that the spirit of the National Conference continues to prevail,” he 
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pleaded, adding “I mean the sense of tolerance and forgiveness” (Assemblée Nationale, 
unpublished 1997b, 51). He argued that  
“Since our historic national conference of February 1990, Benin has astonished [the people of] 
Africa and the world. By adopting the proposed bill, we would give liberty and justice to other 
citizens of Benin. We will thus continue to astonish [the people of] Africa and the world” 
(Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997b, 4).  
 
After two days of debates, the bill was adopted on September 3, 1997. A total of 59 
members voted in favor of it, while two opposed it and 12 abstained (Assemblée Nationale, 
unpublished 1997b, 51). In his closing statements, Honorable Marcellin Degbe, First Vice-
president and chairman of the discussions, praised President Kérékou for his sense of consensus. 
He could have used his executive authority to pardon the convicted fellows. “Had he used this 
[constitutional] right, we would not have attained our goal, that of creating an environment of 
peace [and] national cohesion, necessary for the nation’s socioeconomic development” 
(Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997b, 51).  
The Chairman concluded that “by introducing the bill [to parliament], … the 
administration wanted to waken in you, the representatives of our population, a sense of 
consensus that everyone envies us for” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997b, 51). He 
thanked his colleagues for allowing the country to overcome “the devil of division [and] 
ethnocentrism.” In a rather prophetic tone he declared that “the fear of civil war is over” 
(Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997b, 51). Five days after its adoption in parliament, the 
bill was signed into law by President Kérékou. 
The victory of the supporters of amnesty was, however, short lived. Some members of 
the opposition soon engaged in counter-efforts. On September 9, just a day after the president’s 
189 
signature, the new law was challenged in court. Nathaniel Bah, a member of Soglo’s party, filed 
a legal complaint before the Constitutional Court. He argued that, among other things, the 
process by which the bill was introduced to parliament by the executive was unconstitutional. On 
October 7, 1997 the court rendered its decision. It declared the amnesty law unconstitutional on 
the ground that, through the lack of proper procedure, the bill was in violation of the constitution 
(Cour Constitutionnelle, unpublished 1997, 221-225).     
On February 20, 1998, the bill was back in parliament. After long discussions, it passed 
the vote, with 49 in favor of it, zero against it, and 11 abstentions (Assemblée Nationale, 
unpublished 1998a). However, Honorable Bah once again took the newly approved bill to task. 
Just three days after its adoption, he filed a complaint before the Constitutional Court. He 
contended that the vote in parliament had occurred in the absence of the two parliamentary 
secretaries, which he claimed was a violation of the legislative rules. This time too, the court 
ruled in his favor (Cour Constitutionnelle, unpublished 1998, 199-203). For the second time, one 
man’s counter-efforts were preventing the majority to have its way. Consensus was being proven 
to be a delicate goal to achieve. 
A new bill was introduced by a group of members of parliament. It was debated on July 
21, 1998. The debates centered around the themes of previous rounds. There was a general 
consensus about the need to forgive in order to consolidate national unity and domestic peace. 
However, there were still reservations due to the fact that the stolen weapons had not been 
recovered. In the end, after several amendments, the bill was passed. A total of 60 deputies voted 
in favor of it, 18 against, and three abstained (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1998b). On 
December 22, 1998 the president signed the approved provisions into law.  
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Thanks to broad consensus initiated by President Kérékou, the Affaire Tawès was 
resolved in a peaceful manner. Amnesty to Captain Tawès and his comrades became a reality 
after several years of trying. They were effectively reintegrated in the military in 1999. Captain 
Tawès rose to the rank of Colonel. From 2011 through 2013, he was stationed in Washington DC 
as a deputy Defense Attaché and later as a Defense Attaché. On October 1, 2013 he retired from 
the military after 35 years of service. 
   
 8.4 Summary and Discussion of Findings 
This dissertation theorizes that leaders’ consensus about a strategy for political order 
mediates the effect of state environment on civil war. The six hypotheses in chapter three predict 
that two features of state environment are critical in explaining civil war. First, the decline in 
socioeconomic conditions increases the risks of civil war because it encourages leaders’ 
polarization about a strategy for political order. Second, the indirect impact of political openness 
is conditional on the socioeconomic environment. In poor states, it exacerbates leaders’ 
polarization about a strategy for political order.  
The evidence presented in this chapter supports the argument about the mediating impact 
of leaders’ consensus. Although the case examined was not an instance of civil war, the analysis 
shows that the lack of consensus increases the risks of escalation. In contrast, de-escalation is 
more likely when leaders share broad consensus about a strategy, especially during a crisis. 
The Structured, focused comparison method was used to investigate the causes of the 
August 1992 military mutiny. The examination of President Soglo’s governance strategy showed 
that the actions of his administration, especially the treatment of members of the former 
presidential guard by the military leadership, contributed to the onset of the mutiny. When 
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managing the crisis, the administration made little effort to associate other people outside the 
executive. This only complicated the bargaining process. In addition, Soglo’s military leadership 
team did not reflect the ethno-regional diversity of the country. This appeared to have influenced 
how the affair was managed. Ultimately, the lack of ethno-regional diversity within the military 
and judiciary leadership, coupled with the failure of the president to reach out to other people 
beyond the circle of his advisors made de-escalation of the crisis less likely, thus raising the risks 
of civil war. 
The use of process tracing focused on Kérékou’s strategy to manage the crisis. The main 
finding is that de-escalation was made possible because of broad consensus within government 
as a whole. The analysis about critical antecedents revealed that the outcome of the 1991 
presidential election generated frustrations among members of Kérékou’s presidential guard. 
These frustrations were later exacerbated by the way some of these members of the former 
presidential guard were treated by the military leadership. Another critical antecedent was the 
legacy of compromise, inclusiveness, and tolerance that surrounded the democratic transition 
during the years 1989-1990. That legacy was later useful in uniting members of the parliament 
around an amnesty bill in 1997-1998. 
Process training also showed that the 1991 Kérékou’s outreach to parliament to extend 
amnesty to Captain Tawès and others was a critical juncture in the process leading to a peaceful 
outcome. In 1997, about a year after his return to power, Kérékou made a decision not to rely on 
his executive constitutional power, but to associate members of the parliament to his strategy to 
accommodate the mutineers. Although many members of parliament were initially opposed to an 
amnesty bill, the discussions allowed the opponents to express their concerns and hear from the 
supporters. Also, the spirit of the 1990 National Conference (tolerance and peace) was constantly 
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invoked by members of parliament to rally their colleagues. This significantly contributed to a 
peaceful resolution of the crisis.   
In sum, a change in the state environment provoked a sense of deprivation among 
members of the armed forces who were invested in the old system. This grievance was further 
amplified by the treatment they received from the military leadership. Within this context of high 
tensions, another dimension of state environment, this time a socio-historical one, was important 
in indirectly influencing the outcome by enabling broad consensus among leaders regarding how 
to resolve the crisis. This supports the theoretical argument of this dissertation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
193 
Chapter 9 - Conclusion 
The main purpose of this dissertation was to explain why governments sometimes are 
unable to avoid the occurrence of civil war. This puzzle is particularly intriguing given that states 
are traditionally invested with the function of providing political order. In addition, government 
capabilities often outweigh those of their domestic challengers (Goldstone et al. 2010). Building 
upon existing scholarship on civil war, this dissertation proposes a state-centered theory that 
emphasizes the link between political structures and elite-relationships as recommended by 
scholars of the Political Instability Task Force (Goldstone et al. 2010). The argument is that the 
outbreak of civil war is an indirect consequence of the structural and institutional conditions that 
account for the lack of consensus among state leaders about a strategy for political order. 
 
 9.1 Summary 
This dissertation contains nine chapters, including this one. Chapter one, which is the 
introduction, provides an overview of the study. Chapter two provides a review of the existing 
literature on civil war. It is organized around three approaches that dominate empirical research 
on the subject. First, studies in the political science tradition rely on the grievance and state 
capacity frameworks. Grievance-based studies emphasize the importance of vertical inequality, 
horizontal inequality, and repression. The findings about vertical inequality, often measured as 
economic inequality, ethnic fractionalization and religious diversity, do not conclusively support 
the proposed positive relationship. Horizontal inequality, operationalized in terms the share of 
excluded population, is generally found to be positively associated with civil war. In contrast, 
empirical results about the effect of repression, commonly captured through regime type and 
respect for civil liberties and human rights, provide no consistent evidence.  
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The empirical evidence about state capacity and civil war in previous studies generally 
supports the argument that countries with weak capabilities are more prone to civil war. Proxies 
for state capacity usually include, among others, GDP per capita (Fearon and Laitin 2003), 
military personnel per capita (Gibler and Miller 2014), mountainous or rough terrain (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003), bad neighborhood (Goldstone et al. 2010), oil dependency (Fearon and Laitin 
2003), and foreign support to rebels in the form of sanctuary or material support (Salehyan 
2009).  
Scholars also rely on the economic approach to investigate the causes of civil war. They 
tend to focus on economic factors that provide opportunity for greed and those that represent cost 
of rebellion. The findings are mixed. While some works (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; 
Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009) show that civil war is caused by the availability of primary 
commodity, lack of economic growth, and foreign financing (proxied through a Post-Cold War 
dummy), others (Fearon 2005; Ross 2004b) find no such evidence.  
The third main approach that dominates the empirical study of civil war is the structural 
framework. Studies in this tradition explain civil war as a consequence of shortage in critical 
resources produced by environmental degradation or exponential increase in population (Homer-
Dixon 1999, 2010; Kahl 2006). Traditional measures of environmental scarcity include 
population growth, population density, ethnic and religious fractionalization, and climate 
disasters (Hauge and Ellingsen; Urdal 2005). While qualitative studies (Homer-Dixon 1994, 
1999; Bretthauer 2014) find a positive relationship between environmental scarcity and civil war, 
statistical works do not support these results (see Theisen 2008; Gleditsch 2012; Slettebak 2012).   
Although the existing literature on civil war provides important insights about why and 
when people would rise against the state, it is still unclear why governments are sometimes 
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unable to avoid escalation of domestic disputes into civil war. Also, most scholars model civil 
war as a direct function of political, economic, and structural factors. By doing so, they overlook 
the possibility that structural and institutional factors may affect the public policy process, and 
thus indirectly determine whether or not the government produces political order.  
In light of some weaknesses in extant literature, chapter three theorizes that civil war is 
an indirect function of the structural and institutional conditions that affect the scope of state 
leaders’ consensus on a strategy to provide political order. The theory revolves around 
accommodation and coercion, which are two strategies that are commonly used by governments 
to supply political order. The main argument is that when leaders lack broad consensus on either 
of these strategies, the government is less likely to succeed in deterring dissidence or avoiding its 
escalation into violent conflict because leaders opposed to the implementation of the strategy 
may engage in counter-efforts or foot-dragging that would reduce its chances of success. This 
contention about leaders’ strategic consensus and government performance is inspired by 
research in the business management field (Bourgeois 1980; Floyd and Wooldridge 1992).    
Chapter three also develops six hypotheses that highlight mediated and conditional 
effects between the state’s socioeconomic and political environment and civil war. It is predicted 
that the state’s socioeconomic condition inversely and indirectly impacts civil war through 
leaders’ consensus on accommodation and coercion. Meanwhile, open political institutions are 
expected to be indirectly and positively related to civil war. However, it is hypothesized that 
their mediated impact through leaders’ consensus on accommodation is conditional on the 
country’s socioeconomic environment. 
Chapter four statistically evaluates the theoretical argument developed in chapter three. It 
examines a time series cross sectional dataset of 161 countries from 1960 through 2007. The 
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findings are twofold. First, the impact of the state’s socioeconomic environment on civil war is 
negative and largely mediated through the actions of state leaders. Second, political openness 
increases the risks of civil war, but its mediated effect appears to be conditional on the country’s 
socioeconomic environment. 
The evidence meets the expectation of hypothesis 1. The state’s socioeconomic level is 
positively associated with the scope of leaders’ consensus on accommodation, proxied through 
an index that includes the quality of economic quality, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, and level 
of corruption. As predicted by hypothesis 2, political openness, measured as party system, is 
positively related to accommodation in advanced states, but its effect is negative in poor 
countries.  
The statistical results also support the expectations of hypotheses 3 and 4. Leaders’ 
consensus on coercion is measured through an index of coercion that captures military 
involvement in politics, military capacity, repression, and military spending. Socioeconomic 
development is found to be negatively related to coercion. The effect of political openness on 
coercion is negative in advanced societies, but positive in poor states.  
Hypotheses 5 and 6 are also confirmed. The likelihood of civil war increases as the level 
of accommodation declines. The risks of civil war are higher when coercion is used in a 
politically open society than otherwise. This suggests that a coercion strategy is less likely to 
work if the environment does not foster leaders’ consensus on repression.  
The statistical test also supports the argument of mediating effect of leaders’ strategic 
consensus on civil war. The use of two mediation techniques reveals that up to two-thirds of the 
effect of socioeconomic condition on civil war is mediated through accommodation. Meanwhile, 
about one third of that impact occurs through coercion.             
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Chapter five outlines the qualitative research design. The choice for a qualitative analysis 
is intended to enable an assessment of the causal mechanisms relating state environment to civil 
war. This is specifically oriented toward investigation of the role of leaders’ strategic consensus 
in the outbreak or the avoidance of civil war. Two qualitative methods are used. The first is that 
structured, focused comparison. It highlights a set of six questions directed at examining the 
executive’s governance and crisis bargaining strategies. The second qualitative technique is 
process tracing. Slater and Simmons’ (2010) approach of critical antecedent and critical juncture 
is used.  This technique enables this research to trace the specific causal paths that connect state 
environment and civil war. These two qualitative methods are applied to two positive cases, 
Coôte d’Ivoire and Romania, and one negative case, Benin.  
Chapter six qualitatively investigates the causes of the September 2002 civil war in Côte 
d’Ivoire. The findings show that the actions of political leaders mostly accounted for the 
emergence and the escalation of a social crisis around the concept of Ivoirité. The onset of the 
crisis dated back to the 1994 Ivoirité policy adopted by Henri Konan Bédié as a strategy for 
political survival. However, it took about eight years and two additional regimes for the crisis to 
escalate in 2002.  
The process tracing revealed that the instrumentalization of the crisis for political gains 
was the critical juncture that led to the outbreak of the civil war. Political calculations prevented 
leaders to agree on a strategy to resolve the crisis. The process tracing also showed that, during 
this eight year-period preceding the escalation, aggrieved people relied on other methods to 
obtain satisfaction, including electoral participation and several coups attempts, of which one 
succeeded. This suggests that, even though the government failed to address their concern, civil 
war was not the first resort of the deprived groups and individuals.   
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Another finding of chapter six was that, under the 30-year single party system (1960-
1990), the Ivorian government faced two incidents of rebellion that it effectively repressed 
before they escalated. Although the focus of the analysis was not on these events, the evidence 
suggests that members of the state party were united around the Ivorian president’s strategies to 
provide order because the political system provided leaders with no incentives to instrumentalize 
the issues at stake during this period.  
Chapter seven qualitatively examined the Romanian December 1989 Revolution. The 
findings show that a change in the regional sociopolitical environment mostly accounted for the 
revolution and its escalation into violence. Gorbachev’s policies of political liberalization and the 
beginning of democratic transition in the region affected the aspirations of Romanian citizens 
while also influencing the political calculations of some members of the ruling elite. The 
consequence was a weakening of consensus among leaders, many of whom became less willing 
to commit to President Ceausescu’s coercion strategy. The process tracing showed that 
escalation into violence was the results of foot-dragging, a manifestation of lack of consensus, by 
members of the administration who were in charge of the implementation of the coercion 
strategy. 
Chapter eight qualitatively analyses the August 1992 military mutiny (also known as 
Affaire Tawès) in Benin. This is a negative case because the crisis did not escalate into civil war. 
The findings revealed that the mutiny occurred largely because of government actions. The 
military leadership’s treatment of some members of the former presidential guard aggravated 
existing frustrations. In response to the mutiny, the executive unsuccessfully relied on military 
operations, administrative measures, and legal actions. All these three components of the Soglo 
regime’s crisis bargaining strategy involved the military and the judiciary branches of the 
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bureaucratic apparatus only, all of which were under the supervision of the chief executive. The 
fact that a strategy failed to de-escalate the crisis suggests that the lack of inclusion of other 
political leaders into the process may have reduced the chances of success. 
Most importantly, the process tracing method showed that de-escalation became possible 
only as a new administration reached out to leaders in parliament to seek their implication into 
the process. A legislative rather than an executive action generated broad consensus around the 
executive’s strategy to accommodate the soldiers involved in the incidents. Ultimately, a law was 
adopted by the parliament that granted amnesty to the mutineers.  
The analysis in chapter eight also found that broad consensus within the parliament and 
beyond was largely the product of the president’s leadership style, and most importantly of the 
legacy of a historical event. The inclusive nature of the process that surrounded the February 
1990 National Conference was decisively used in 1997-1998 to rally leaders around the amnesty 
bill.    
In sum, the quantitative and qualitative analyses largely support this dissertation’s 
argument that leaders’ consensus on a strategy for political order mediates the impact of state 
environment on civil war. The cases examined revealed that several aspects of state environment 
may affect leaders’ strategic consensus. These may be domestic or international factors, which 
could be structural or institutional. While these elements may simultaneously determine the 
behavior of citizens and leaders alike, their impact on the latter seems to be more decisive in 
avoiding or precipitating escalation of a crisis into civil war. 
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 9.2 Implications for Policymaking  
This dissertation has policy implications for institutional design. First, the evidence of the 
statistical analysis suggests that, in poor states, multiparty systems tend to be associated with 
poor governance and high levels of coercion. Apparently, under harsh socioeconomic 
circumstances, leaders of politically open societies may turn to exclusionary and coercive 
policies to secure their survival in office. Thus, sociopolitical crises can easily be intrumentalized 
for political gains at the expense of political order. Second, the findings of the qualitative studies 
indicate that, although dissidence may occur for several reasons, escalation into civil war is not 
automatic. The critical juncture that determines whether a domestic conflict is resolved 
peacefully or escalates into armed violence seems to be the extent to which leaders share broad 
consensus on how to respond to the challenge.  
One way to reduce political instability in poor states would be through the crafting of 
institutional arrangements that make it difficult for political leaders to benefit from 
instrumentalization of sociopolitical crises. To this end, institutional designers in the developing 
world should pay special attention to mixed arrangements that provide a balance between 
democratic and non-democratic institutions. For instance, the institutionalization of an unelected 
branch of government that is specifically dedicated to preventing the onset of and avoiding 
escalation of sociopolitical crises could minimize the risks of civil war in poor states, especially 
if the following three conditions are met. First, members of this government body should not be 
subject to political competition. Second, they must not be dependent on the political branches for 
their survival in office. Third, they ought to have a constitutional power to constrain political 
leaders at times of crises (see Codjo 2016 for an example).      
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 9.3 Prospects for Future Research  
This dissertation opens new venues for research on civil war. First, in light of the results 
of the statistical analysis, scholars should explore the possibilities of indirect and conditional 
effects of other aspects of state environment on civil war. Second, the statistical significance of 
the relationship between party system and civil war suggests that regime type studies should rely 
on measures that dissociate institutions from the outcomes produced by the government or by 
other elements of society. Third, future works seeking to use this framework for the study of civil 
war should try alternative measures of strategic consensus, although it is difficult to capture the 
type of process highlighted in the qualitative studies of this dissertation. Last, students of civil 
war should pay closer attention to the conditions that explain divisions among elites during a 
domestic crisis bargaining situation. Ultimately, the factors that determine the extent to which 
leaders agree on a bargaining strategy might account for whether a domestic conflict is 
peacefully resolved or escalates into civil war. 
This study also has implications for future research on government performance. The 
theory developed in chapter three identified the socioeconomic capacity and the openness of the 
political institutions as two factors that are critical to leaders’ performance in office. Together, 
they capture the preferences of individuals who have the institutional power to select leaders. 
Whether members of the selectorate prioritize short-term benefits over long-term gains, or 
private over public goods, might be decisive in determining what types of leaders are selected in 
the first place. It will also account for how leaders behave in office. Thus, future research on 
government performance should pay more attention to the role of voters’ socioeconomic 
conditions in influencing leaders’ performance.     
 
202 
References 
Adekounte, Fatiou. 1996. Entreprises Publiques : la descente aux enfers. Cotonou : Les Editions 
du Flamboyant. 
Adjagbe, Mathieu. 2014. “De la guerre contre le terrorisme à la conquête impériale des états 
défaillants: une perspective néogramscienne de l'impérialisme américain en Côte d'Ivoire 
[2001-2010].”  PhD diss., Université d'Ottawa/University of Ottawa. 
Adjaho, Richard. 1992. La faillite du contrôle des Finances Publiques au Bénin (1960-1990). 
Cotonou : Les Editions du Flamboyant. 
Akindès, Francis. 2004. “The Roots of the Military-Political Crises in Côte d’Ivoire.” 
Urppasala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 
Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in 
America. Cambridge University Press.  
Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. 1999. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. Longman New York.  
Amani, Georges. 2013. “L’affaire du Sanwi, ou les evenements d’Aboisso (1959-1981).” 
Retrieved March 23, 2017 (http://news.abidjan.net/h/448437.html). 
Amason, Allen C. 1996. “Distinguishing the Effects of Functional and Dysfunctional Conflict on 
Strategic Decision Making: Resolving a Paradox for Top Management Teams.” Academy of 
Management Journal 39: 1 (January): 123-148.  
Arrêt nº 64 du 16/08/1994. Unpublished. Cour d’Assises de la République du Bénin séant à 
Cotonou, première session de l’année mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-quatorze, audience 
publique du 16 août 1994, Affaire ministère public contre Tawès Pascal et consorts, Arrêt de 
disjonction, 24ème affaire du rôle d’assises.     
203 
Arrêt nº 65 du 27/08/1994. Unpublished. Cour d’Assises de la République du Bénin séant à 
Cotonou, première session de l’année mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-quatorze, audience 
publique du 27 août 1994, Affaire ministère public contre Gomina S. Fousséni et autres, 
Arrêt avant-dire-droit, 24ème affaire du rôle d’assises. 
Arrêt nº 66 du 2/09/1994. Unpublished. Cour d’Assises de la République du Bénin séant à 
Cotonou, première session de l’année mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-quatorze, audience 
publique du vendredi 2 septembre 1994, Arrêt avant-dire-droit, 24ème affaire du rôle 
d’assises. 
Arrêt nº 67 du 05/09/1994. Unpublished. Cour d’Assises de la République du Bénin séant à 
Cotonou, première session de l’année mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-quatorze, audience 
publique du lundi 5 septembre 1994, Affaire ministère public contre Tawès Pascal et 
consorts, Arrêt de condamnation et d’acquittement, 24ème affaire du rôle d’assises. 
Arrêt nº 68 du 05/09/1994. Unpublished. Cour d’Assises de la République du Bénin séant à 
Cotonou, première session de l’année mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-quatorze, audience 
publique du lundi 5 septembre 1994, Affaire ministère public contre Tawès Pascal et 
consorts, Arrêt de défaut, 24ème affaire du rôle d’assisses. 
Assemblée Nationale. Unpublished. 1997a. “Débats parlementaires : compte rendu intégral,” 
cinquième session extraordinaire 1997, séance du 2 septembre 1997. 
Assemblée Nationale. Unpublished. 1997b. “Débats parlementaires : compte rendu intégral,” 
cinquième session extraordinaire 1997, séance du 3 septembre 1997. 
Assemblée Nationale. Unpublished. 1998a. “Débats parlementaires : compte rendu intégral,” 
Deuxième session extraordinaire 1998, séance du 20 février 1998.  
204 
Assemblée Nationale. Unpublished. 1998b. “Débats parlementaires : compte rendu intégral,” 
Troisième session extraordinaire 1998, séance du 21 juillet 1998.  
Assemblée Nationale. Unpublished. No date(a). “Deuxième législature : Liste des députes.” 
Service de la Documentation et des Archives de l’Assemblée Nationale. 
Assemblée Nationale. Unpublished. No date(b). “Deuxième législature : Différentes 
commissions permanents et compétences respectives.” Service de la Documentation et des 
Archives de l’Assemblée Nationale. 
Bacon, Jr. Walter M. 1981. “Romanian Military in the 1980s.” In Romania in the 1980s, eds. 
Daniel N. Nelson. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 202-218. 
Badmus, Isiaka Alani. 2009. “Even the Stones Are Burning: Explaining the Ethnic Dimensions 
of the Civil War in Côte d’Ivoire.” J Soc Sci 18(1): 45-57. 
Bah, Abu Bakarr. 2010. “Democracy and Civil War: Citizenship and Peacemaking in Côte 
d’Ivoire.” African Affairs 109(437): 597-615. 
Bailly, Diégou. 1995. La restauration du multipartisme en Côte d’Ivoire. La double mort 
d'Houphouët-Boigny.” Paris, éditions L'Harmattan. 
Ballentine, Karen, and Jake Sherman. 2003.  The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond 
Greed and Grievance. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.  
Ban, Cornel. 2012. “Sovereign Debt, Austerity, and Regime Change – The Case of Nicolae 
Ceausescu’s Romania.” East European Politics & Societies 26 (4): 743–776. 
Baron, Reuben M. and David A. Kenny. 1986. “The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in 
Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations.” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 5: 1173-1182. 
205 
Bates, Robert H. 2008. When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-century Africa. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
Beach, Derek, and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. 2013. Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and 
Guidelines. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. “What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series 
Cross-Section Data.” American Political Science Review 89:03 (July): 634-647. 
Bédié, Henri Konan, and Eric Laurent. 1999. Les chemins de ma vie: entretiens avec Eric 
Laurent. Plon. 
Boas, Morten, and Kevin Dunn. 2015. Politics of Origin in Africa: Autochthony, Citizenship and 
Conflict. London: Zed Books. 
Bouchard, Thomas J. 1976. “Unobtrusive Measures: An Inventory of Uses.” Sociological 
Methods and Research 4(3): 267-300. 
Bourgeois, Lawrence J. 1980. “Performance and Consensus.” Strategic Management Journal 1:3 
(July): 227-248.  
Bovcon, Maja. 2009. “France's Conflict Resolution Strategy in Côte d'Ivoire and its Ethical 
Implications.” African Studies Quarterly 11(1). 
Brambor, Thomas, William R. Clark, and Matt Golder. 2006. “Understanding Interaction 
Models: Improving Empirical Analyses.” Political Analysis. 63-82. 
Bretthauer, Judith M. 2014. "Conditions for Peace and Conflict: Applying a Fuzzy-Set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis to Cases of Resource Scarcity." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution: I-24. 
British Broadcasting Corporation. No date. “Benin Country Profile.” Retrieved March 25, 2017 
(http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13037572). 
206 
British Broadcasting Corporation. 2017a. “Ivory Coast Defense Minister Freed by Mutinous 
Soldiers.” Retrieved March 15, 2017 (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38542532). 
British Broadcasting Corporation. 2017b. “Ivory Coast Mutiny: Deal Struck Between Army and 
State.” Retrieved March 15, 2017 (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38618731). 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. 2010. “Leader Survival, Revolutions, and the 
Nature of Government Finance.” American Journal of Political Science 54(4): 936-950. 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Silverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003. 
The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.   
Calinescu, Matei, and Vladimir Tismaneanu. 1991. "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's 
Future." Problems of Communism 40(1-2): 42-59. 
Carter, David B. and Curtis S. Signorino. 2010. “Back to the Future: Modeling Time 
Dependence in Binary Data.” Political Analysis. 271-292. 
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min. 2010. "Why do Ethnic Groups Rebel? 
New Data and Analysis." World Politics 62 (01): 87-119. 
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2011. "Horizontal 
Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison." American Political 
Science Review 105 (03): 478-95.  
Chaléard, Jean-Louis. 2000. “Les Derniers Carrés de Chocolat: La Fin d’Un Système 
Economico-Politique en Côte d’Ivoire?” Afrique Contemporaine, 193(1): 45-55. 
Chauveau, Jean-Pierre, and Jean-Philippe Colin. "Customary transfers and land sales in Côte 
d'ivoire: revisiting the embeddedness issue." Africa 80, no. 01 (2010): 81-103. 
Cheibub, José A., Jennifer Gandhi, and James R. Vreeland. 2009. “Democracy and Dictatorship 
Revisited Codebook.” Retrieved August 12, 2016 
207 
(http://www.nber.org/ens/feldstein/ENSA_Sources/Democracy%20and%20Dictatorship/ddr
evisited%20codebook%20v1.pdf). 
Cheibub, José A., Jennifer Gandhi, and James R. Vreeland. 2010. “Democracy and Dictatorship 
Revisited.” Public Choice 143: 67–101. 
Chirot, Daniel. 2006. “The debacle in Côte d'Ivoire.” Journal of Democracy 17(2): 63-77. 
Cingranelli, David L., and David L. Richards. 2010. “The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) 
Human Rights Data Project.” Human Rights Quaterly 32(2): 401-424. 
Cinpoes, Radu. 2009. “Book Review: Siani-Davies, Peter. The Romanian Revolution of 
December 1989.” European History Quarterly 39(1): 181-182. 
Cissé, Ibrahim Bacongo. 2007. Alassane Dramane Ouattara: histoire d'une vie singulière: 
légende et épopée. Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire: NEI/CEDA. 
Clark, William R., Matt Golder, and Sona N. Golder. 2013. Principles of Comparative Politics. 
Thousand Oaks, CA : CQ Press. 
Clayton, Govinda. 2014. "Quantitative and Econometric Methodologies in the Study of Civil 
War." In K. DeRouen and E. Newman. Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars. London: 
Routledge.  
Codjo, Juste. 2016. Consencratie: Un modèle de démocratie consensuelle adapté aux réalités du 
Bénin. Cotonou, Benin : Ifa Strategy. 
Cohen, A. Michael. 1974. Urban Policy and Political Conflict in Africa, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Collett, Moya. 2006. “Ivoirian Identity Constructions: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Prelude 
to Civil War.” Nations and Nationalism 12(4): 613-629. 
208 
Collier, David. 2011. “Understanding Process Tracing.” PS: Political Science & Politics 44(4): 
823-830. 
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. “On Economic Causes of Civil War.” Oxford Economic 
Papers 50:4 (December): 563-573.  
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic 
Papers 56:4 (December): 563-595.  
Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner. 2009. “Beyond Greed and Grievance: 
Feasibility and Civil war.” Oxford Economic Papers 61: 1–27. 
Cour Constitutionnelle. Unpublished. 1997. Recueil des décisions et avis. Cotonou, Bénin. 
Cour Constitutionnelle. Unpublished. 1998. Recueil des décisions et avis. Cotonou, Bénin. 
Davies, James C. 1962. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." American Sociological Review: 5-19.  
Decalo, Samuel. 1973. “Regionalism, Politics, and the Military in Dahomey.” The Journal of 
Developing Areas 7(3): 449-478. 
Décret nº 89-400 du 15 novembre 1989 portant création d’une commission spéciale. 
Unpublished. 
Décret nº 89-401 du 15 novembre 1989 portant création d’une commission d’enquête. 
Unpublished. 
Décret nº 91-71 du 11 avril 1991 portant dissolution du Bataillon de la Garde Présidentielle. 
Unpublished. 
Décret nº 92-319 du 25 novembre 1992 portant destitution de grade et radiation de certains 
Officiers des Forces Armées Béninoise. Unpublished. 
Décret nº 99-310 du 22 juin 1999 portant application de la loi d’amnistie nº 98-028 du 22 
décembre 1998. Unpublished. 
209 
Décret nº 99-633 du 30 décembre 1999 portant reconstitution de carrier des personnels militaires 
bénéficiaires de la loi d’Amnistie nº 98-028 du 22 décembre 1998 portant amnistie de 
certains faits commis entre le 1er janvier 1990 et le 30 juin 1996. Unpublished. 
Décret nº 00-377 du 05 août 1999 portant abrogation du décret nº 92-319 du 25 novembre 1992 
portant destitution de grade et radiation de certains Officiers des Forces Armées Béninoise. 
Unpublished. 
Deletant, Dennis. 1995. Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-
1989. ME Sharpe. 
Denard, Bob. 1998. Corsaire de la République. Paris, France : Robert Laffont. 
Denny, Elaine K., and Barbara F. Walter. 2014. "Ethnicity and Civil War." Journal of Peace 
Research 51 (2): 199-212. 
Dess, Gregory G. 1987. “Consensus on Strategy Formulation and Organizational Performance: 
Competitors in a Fragmented Industry.” Strategic Management Journal 8(3): 259-277. 
Dess, Gregory G. and Nancy K. Origer. 1987. “Environment, Structure, and Consensus in 
Strategy Formulation: A Conceptual Integration.” Academy of Management Review 12:2 
(April): 313-330.  
Dess, Gregory G. and Richard L. Priem. 1995. "Consensus‐Performance Research: Theoretical 
and Empirical Extensions." Journal of Management Studies 32 (4): 401-17.  
Deudney, Daniel. 1990. "National Security." Millennium-Journal of International Studies 19 : 
461. 
Diaby, Moustapha Ben Ismaila and Brahima Ouattara. 2012. Alassane Ouattara : vingt ans de 
comb\at. Abidjan: L’Harmattan Côte d’Ivoire. 
210 
Diakité, Bouakary Sidiki. 2008. Alassane Dramane Ouattara: une ambition au service du 
développement de la Côte d'Ivoire. Paris, France: Edilac. 
Dickovick, James Tyler and Jonathan Eastwood. 2013. Comparative Politics: Integrating 
Theories, Methods, and Cases. 2
nd
 Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Diener, Ed, Ronald Inglehart, and Louis Tay. 2013. “Theory and Validity of Life Satisfaction 
Scales.” Social Indicators Research 112(3): 497-527. 
Dixon, Jeffrey. 2009. “What Causes Civil Wars? Integrating Quantitative Research Findings.” 
International Studies Review 11: 707–735. 
Dossou, Robert. 2005. “Rapport introductive nº 1 : l’expérience béninoise de la Conférence 
Nationale.” Retrieved April 19, 2015 
(http://democratie.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/1592.pdf). 
Duignan, Peter, and Robert H. Jackson. 1986. Politics & Government in African States, 1960-
1985. Vol. 348. Croom Helm. 
Economist, The. 2000. “Côte d’Ivoire: Guei Gone.” Accessed March 28, 2017 
(http://www.economist.com/node/404141). 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. 1989. “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review.” Academy of 
Management Review 14:1 (January): 57-74. 
Elbadawi, Ibrahim and Nicolas Sambanis. 2002. “How Much War Will We See? Explaining the 
Prevalence of Civil War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(3): 307-334. 
Election Guide. 2017. “Democracy Assistance and Election News.” Retrieved March 20, 2017 
(http://www.electionguide.org/countries). 
211 
Ender, Philip B. n.d. “Binary_mediation: Indirect Effects with Binary Dependent Variables 
and/or Mediating Variables.” UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group. Retrieved August 10, 
2016 (http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/ado/analysis/binary_mediation.sthlp). 
Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 
49(03):379-414. 
Fearon, James D. 2005. "Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 49 (4): 483-507.  
Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” American 
Political Science Review 97:1 (January): 75-90.  
Fischer, Mary E. 1981. “Idol or Leader? The Origin and Future of the Ceausescu Cult.” In 
Romania in the 1980s, eds. Daniel N. Nelson. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 117-141. 
Fischer-Galati, Stephen. 1981. “Romania’s Development as a Communist State.” In Romania in 
the 1980s, eds. Daniel N. Nelson. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 4-16. 
Floyd, Steven W. and Bill Wooldridge. 1992. “Managing Strategic Consensus: The Foundation 
of Effective Implementation.” The Executive 6:4 (December): 27-39.  
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2017. “Production Prices – Annual.” 
Retrieved April 3, 2017 (http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/PP). 
Fraternité. 2015. “Biographie de Mathieu Kérékou.” Retrieved March12, 2017 
(http://www.fraternitebj.info/politique/article/biographie-de-mathieu-kerekou). 
Gadou, Dakouri. 2009. “Crise ivoirienne: enjeux et sens d’une mobilisation patriotique.” Afrika 
focus 22(2): 65-88. 
212 
Gates, Scott, Håvard Hegre, Mark P. Jones, and Håvard Strand. 2006. ‘‘Institutional 
Inconsistency and Political Instability: Polity Duration, 1800–2000.’’ American Journal of 
Political Science 50 (4): 893-908. 
Gbagbo, Laurent, and François Mattei. 2014. Pour la vérité et la justice. Paris, France: Editions 
du Moment. 
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.  
Gibler, Douglas M. and Steven V. Miller. 2014. “External Territorial Threat, State Capacity, and 
Civil War.” Journal of Peace Research 51(5): 634–646. 
Gleditsch, Nils P., Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard 
Strand. 2002. “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 
39(5): 615-637. 
Gleditsch, Nils Petter. 2012. "Whither the Weather? Climate Change and Conflict." Journal of 
Peace Research 49 (1): 3-9.  
Glickman, Harvey. 1992. Political Leaders of Contemporary Africa South of the Sahara: A 
Biographical Dictionary. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.  
Goldstone, Jack A. 1998. ‘‘Initial Conditions, General Laws, Path Dependence, and Explanation 
in Historical Sociology.’’ American Journal of Sociology 104:829-45.  
Goldstone, Jack A. 2001. "Demography, Environment and Security: An Overview." 
Demography and National Security: 38-61.  
Goldstone, Jack A., Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted R. Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty 
G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward. 2010. “A Global Model for Forecasting 
Political Instability.” American Journal of Political Science 54:1 (January): 190-208.  
213 
Greene, Jennifer C., Valerie J. Caracelli, and Wendy F. Graham. 1989. “Toward a Conceptual 
Framework for Mixed-Method Evaluation Designs.” Educational Evaluation and Policy 
Analysis 11(3): 255-274. 
Grossman, Herschell I. 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections." The American 
Economic Review: 912-21.  
Grossman, Herschell I. 1999. “Kleptocracy and Revolutions.” Oxford Economic Papers 51(2): 
267-283. 
Guáqueta, Alexandra. 2003. “The Columbian Conflict: Political and Economic Dimensions.” In 
The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, eds. Karen 
Ballentine and Jake Sherman. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.  
Gujarati, Damodar N. 2003. Basic Econometrics. 4
th
 Edition. New York: Tata McGraw-Hill 
Education. 
Gurr, Ted R. 1968. “A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New 
Indices.” American Political Science Review: 1104-1124.  
Gurr, Ted R. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1993. "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization 
and Conflict since 1945." International Political Science Review 14 (2): 161-201.  
Gurr, Ted Robert. 2000. Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. US 
Institute of Peace Press.  
Guth, William D. and Ian C. MacMillan. 1986. “Strategy Implementation Versus Middle 
Management Self-interest.” Strategic Management Journal 7:4 (December): 313-327.  
214 
Hall, Richard A. 1997. “Rewriting the Revolution, Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the 
Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceauşescu Romania.” PhD diss., Indiana 
University. 
Hall, Richard A. 1999. “The Uses of Absurdity: The Staged War Theory and the Romanian 
Revolution of December 1989.” East European Politics and Societies 13(3):  501-542.   
Hall, Richard A. 2000. "Theories of Collective Action and Revolution: Evidence from the 
Romanian Transition of December 1989." Europe-Asia Studies 52(6): 1069-1093. 
Hargreaves, John D. 1979. The End of Colonial Rule in West Africa: Essays in 
ContemporaryHhistory. Springer. 
Hauge, Wenche and Tanja Ellingsen. 1998. “Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways 
to Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 35:3 (July): 299-317.  
Hausman, Jerry A. 1978. “Specification Tests in Econometrics.” Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society 46: 1251-1271. 
Hayes, Andrew F. 2009. “Beyond Baron and Kenny: Statistical Mediation Analysis in the New 
Millennium.” Communication Monographs 76:4 (December): 408-420. 
Hegre, Håvard and Håvard M. Nygård. 2014. “Governance and Conflict Relapse.” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution: I-33.  
Hegre, Håvard and Nicholas Sambanis. 2006. “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil 
War Onset.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50:4 (December): 508-535.  
Hegre, Håvard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates and Nils P. Gleditsch. 2001. “Toward a Democratic 
Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992.” American Political 
Science Review 95 (1): 33-48.  
215 
Hegre, Håvard. 2002. "Trade Decreases Conflict More in Multi-Actor Systems: A Comment on 
Dorussen." Journal of Peace Research 39 (1): 109-14.  
Hegre, Håvard. 2003. “Disentangling Democracy and Development as Determinants of Armed 
Conflict.” The World Bank. Retrieved March 10, 2016 
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/disentangling_democracy_and_develop
ment.pdf). 
Hegre, Håvard. 2014. “Democracy and Armed Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 51:2 
(April): 159–172.  
Hendrix, Cullen S. 2010. “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for 
the Study of Civil Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 47 (3): 273-285. 
Hitchens, Keith. 2014. A Concise History of Romania. New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Hobbes, Thomas. [1651]1994. Leviathan. Ed. Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Homburg, Christian, Harley Krohmer, and John P. Workman Jr. 1999. “Strategic Consensus and 
Performance: The Role of Strategy Type and Market-related Dynamism.” Strategic 
Management Journal 20 (4): 339-357. 
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 1994.  “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from 
Cases.” International Security 19(1): 5-40.  
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 1999.  Environment, Scarcity and Violence.  Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 2010.  Environment, Scarcity and Violence.  Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
216 
Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering 
the Mechanisms." Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (4): 508-37.  
Ikpo, Ley G. 2015. Côte d’Ivoire: An African Economic Model Transformed into a Chaotic 
Arena from September 19th, 2002 until April 11th, 2011. Bloomington, IN: Xlibris 
Corporation. 
Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change, and 
Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Jaffee, David. 1998. Levels of Socio-economic Development Theory. Greenwood Publishing 
Group.  
Jeune Afrique 2015. “Mathieu Kérékou, une histoire africaine.” Retrieved April 2, 2017 
(http://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/272530/politique/Bénin-mathieu-Kérékou-une-histoire-
africaine/). 
Johnson, R. Burke, Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie, and Lisa A. Turner. 2007. “Toward a Definition of 
Mixed Methods Research.” Journal of Mixed Methods Research 1(2): 112-133. 
Journal of Soviet Nationalities 1 (Summer): 8-27.  
Justino, Patricia. 2009. “Poverty and Violent Conflict: A Micro-Level Perspective on the Causes 
and Duration of Warfare.” Journal of Peace Research 46 (3): 315-33.  
Kablan, Pierre. 2013. “Land and Houphouetism in Ivorian Political Leadership.” PhD Diss., 
Union Institute & University, Cincinnati, Ohio. 
Kahl, Colin H. 2006. States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World. Princeton 
University Press.  
217 
Keita, Balla Mohamed. 2013. “Politics of Ethnicity, Region and Religion in Post Houphouet-
Boigny Cote D'Ivoire.” PhD diss., Howard University. 
Kellermanns, Franz W., Jorge Walter, Christoph Lechner, and Steven W. Floyd. 2005. “The 
Lack of Consensus about Strategic Consensus: Advancing Theory and Research.” Journal 
of Management 31(5): 719-37.  
Kellermanns, Franz W., Jorge Walter, Steven W. Floyd, Christoph Lechner, and John C. Shaw. 
2011. "To Agree Or Not to Agree? A Meta-Analytical Review of Strategic Consensus and 
Organizational Performance." Journal of Business Research 64 (2): 126-33.  
King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg. 2000. “Making the Most of Statistical 
Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation.” American Journal of Political 
Science 44 (April): 341-355. 
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing social inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton University Press.  
Kirwin, Matthew. 2006. “The Security Dilemma and Conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.” Nordic Journal 
of African Studies 15(1): 42-52. 
Kisangani, Emizet F. 1997. “Zaire after Mobutu: A Case of a Humanitarian Emergency.” 
Research for Action 32: 1-95. 
Kisangani, Emizet F. 2012. Civil Wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1960-2010. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.  
Klare, Michael. 2001. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. Macmillan.  
Knight, Don, Craig L. Pearce, Ken G. Smith, Judy D. Olian, Henry P. Sims, Ken A. Smith, and 
Patrick Flood. 1999. “Top Management Team Diversity, Group Process, and Strategic 
Consensus.” Strategic Management Journal 20(5): 445-465. 
218 
Kouadio, Bertin K. 2009. “From Stability to Insurgency: the Root and Proximate Causes of the 
September 2002 Civil War in Cote d'Ivoire.” PhD diss., Florida International University. 
 Koubi, Vally and Tobias Böhmelt. 2014. “Grievances, Economic Wealth, and Civil Conflict.” 
Journal of Peace Research 51:1 (January): 19–33. 
Lamasanu, Stefana. 2010. “Capturing the Romanian Revolution: Violent Imagery, Affect and the 
Televisual Event.” PhD diss., McGill University. 
Langer, Arnim. 2005. “Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Group Mobilization in Côte d'Ivoire.” 
Oxford Development Studies 33(1): 25-45. 
Le Billon, Philippe. 2001. "The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed 
Conflicts." Political Geography 20 (5): 561-84.  
Le Monde. 1989a. “Roumanie : un ‘splendide’ isolement, l’hiver en toute saison. » Retrieved 
March 30, 2017 (http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1989/08/22/iv-roumanie-un-
splendide-isolement-l-hiver-en-toute-
saison_4139788_1819218.html?xtmc=roumanie_1989&xtcr=2383). 
Le Monde. 1989b. « La révolution roumaine : Le jugement de Nicolae et Elena, cinquante-deux 
minutes de l’audience. » Retrieved March 30, 2017 
(http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1989/12/28/la-revolution-roumaine-le-jugement-de-
nicolae-et-elena-cinquante-deux-minutes-de-l-
audience_4163582_1819218.html?xtmc=roumanie_1989&xtcr=2291). 
Levy, Jack S. 2001. “Explaining Events and Developing Theories: History, Political Science, and 
the Analysis of International Relations.” In Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political 
Scientists, and the Study of International Relations, eds. Elman, Colin and Miriam F. Elman. 
MIT Press, 39-83 
219 
Levy, Jack S. 2007. “Qualitative Methods and Cross-Method Dialogue in Political Science.” 
Comparative Political Studies 40(2): 196-214. 
Levy, Jack S., and William R. Thompson. 2010. Causes of War. Malden, MA: John Wiley and 
Sons.  
Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1989. "An Evaluation of “Does Economic Inequality Breed Political 
Conflict?” Studies." World Politics 41 (04): 431-70.  
Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1995. The Rebel’s Dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Linden, Ronald H. 1981. “Romanian Foreign Policy in the 1980s.” In Romania in the 1980s, eds. 
Daniel N. Nelson. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 219-253. 
Lissouck, Felix. F. 1994. “Le discours de la Baule et le pluralisme politique en Afrique noire 
francophone.” Master Thesis, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Lyon. Retrieved March 10, 
2017 (http://doc.sciencespo-
lyon.fr/Ressources/Documents/Etudiants/Memoires/Cyberdocs/DEA/lissouck_ff/lissouck_ff
.pdf) 
Loi nº 60-356 du 3 novembre 1960 portant constitution de la République de côte d’Ivoire. 
Unpublished.  
Loi nº 90-028 du 9 octobre 1990 portant amnistie des faits autres que les faits de droit commun 
commis du 26 octobre 1972 jusqu’à la promulgation de ladite loi. Unpublished. 
Loi nº 98-028 du 22 décembre 1998, portant amnistie de certains faits commis entre le 1er 
janvier 1990 et le 30 juin 1996. Unpublished. 
MacKinnon, David P. 2008. Introduction to Statistical Mediation Analysis. Routledge. 
220 
MacKinnon, David P., Chondra M. Lockwood, Jeanne M. Hoffman, Stephen G. West, and Virgil 
Sheets. 2002. “A Comparison of Methods to Test Mediation and other Intervening Variable 
Effects.” Psychological Methods 7: 83-104. 
Mahoney, James, and Gary Goertz. 2006. “A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and 
Qualitative Research.” Political Analysis: 227-249. 
Mahoney, James. 2012. “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in Social Sciences.” Sociological 
Methods & Research 41(4): 570–597.  
Malthus, Thomas. [1798]2003. An Essay on the Principle of Population. Norton Critical 
Editions.  
Markóczy, Livia. 2001. "Consensus Formation during Strategic Change." Strategic Management 
Journal 22 (11): 1013-31.  
Marshall, Monty G. 2016. “Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2015.” Center for 
Systemic Peace. Retrieved August 18, 2016 (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html). 
Marshall, Monty G., Ted R. Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. 2016. “Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2015, Dataset Users' Manual.” Retrieved August 8, 
2016 (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2015.pdf). 
Marshall-Fratani, Ruth. 2006. “The War of ‘Who Is Who’: Autochthony, Nationalism, and 
Citizenship in the Ivoirian Crisis.” African Studies Review 49(2): 9-43. 
McGovern, Mike. 2011. Making War in Côte d'Ivoire. C. Hurst. 
Mitchell, David F. 2016. “NGO Insecurity in High-Risk Conflict Zones: The Politicization of 
Aid and its Impact on ‘Humanitarian Space’.” PhD diss., Kansas State University Societies. 
Morris, Morris D. 1979. Measuring the Condition of the World’s Poor: Physical Quality of Life 
Index. New York: Pergamon. 
221 
Morrison, Donald G., Robert C. Mitchell, and John N. Paden. 1989. Black Africa: A 
Comparative Handbook. Springer. 
Muller, Edward N. 1985. “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence.” 
American Sociological Review: 47-61.  
Muller, Edward N. and Erich Weede. 1990. “Cross-National Variation in Political Violence: A 
Rational Action Approach.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 34:4 (December): 624-651.  
Naiman, Robert and Neil Watkins. 1999. “A Survey of the Impacts of IMF Structural 
Adjustment in Africa: Growth, Social Spending, and Debt Relief.” Center for Economic and 
Policy Research. Retrieved March 23, 2017 
(http://cepr.net/documents/publications/debt_1999_04.htm). 
Nandjui, Pierre. 1995. Houphouët Boigny: l'homme de la France en Afrique. Editions 
L'Harmattan. 
Ndikumana, Léonce, and Emizet F. Kisangani. 2005. "The Economics of Civil War: The Case of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo." In Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, 
Vol. 1, Africa, eds. Paul Collier and Nicolas Sambanis. Washington DC: World Bank.  
Nelson, Daniel N. 1988. Romanian Politics in the Ceausescu Era. New York, NY: Gorden and 
Breach Science Publishers. 
New York Times. 1969. “Nixon, Mobbed by Friendly Crowds, tells Ceausescu Visit to Rumania 
Is His Most Memorable Trip.” Retrieved March 30, 2017 
(http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9804E5DA1739EF3BBC4C53DFBE66838
2679EDE&legacy=true). 
Note de Service nº 316/S1/CH/D1/EMAT du 1
er
 juillet 1991 portant affectation des militaires de 
l’Armée de Terre. 
222 
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 
Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press.  
Olson, Mancur. 1990. "The Logic of Collective Action in Soviet Type Societies." Journal of 
Soviet Nationalities 1 (Summer): 8-27.  
Østby, Gudrun. 2013. “Inequality and Political Violence: A Review of the Literature.” 
International Area Studies Review 16(2): 206–231. 
Pasti, Vladimir. 1997. The Challenges of Transition: Romania in Transition. Translated by Fraga 
Cheva Cusin. East European Monographs. 
Pedler, Frederick. 1979. Main Currents of West African History: 1940-1978. London: 
Macmillan.  
Peluso, Nancy Lee, and Michael Watts. 2001. Violent Environments. Cornell University Press. 
Pfannenstiel, Melia T. 2015. “Strongmen and State Authority: A State-in-Society Approach to 
Understanding the Presence of Terrorist Sanctuaries.” PhD diss., Kansas State University. 
Poe, Steven C. and C. Neal Tate. 1994. “Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 
1980s: A Global Analysis.” American Political Science Review 88(04): 853-872. 
Preacher, Kristopher J., Derek D. Rucker, and Andrew F. Hayes. 2007. “Addressing Moderated 
Mediation Hypotheses: Theory, Methods, and Prescriptions.” Multivariate Behavioral 
Research 42(1): 185-227. 
Procès-verbal des débats nº 63 du 16/08/1994. Cour d’Assises de la République du Bénin séant à 
Cotonou, première session de l’année mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-quatorze, audience 
publique du 16 août 1994, Affaire ministère public et partie civile contre Gomina S. 
Fousséni, Tawès Pascal et consorts, 24ème affaire du rôle d’assises. 
223 
Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." 
International Organization 42 (03): 427-60.  
Radio France Internationale. 2000. “Massacre de Yopougon : l’enquête est ouverte.” Retrieved 
March 11, 2017 (http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/010/article_5133.asp). 
Ragin, Charles. 1987. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative 
Strategies. Berkeley, CA: University of California press.  
Rasler, Karen. 1996. “Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution.” 
American Sociological Review: 132-52.  
Ratesh, Nestor. 1991. Romania: The Untangled Revolution. Washington, DC: Washington 
Papers. 
Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2002. "Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 46 (1): 29-54.  
Rocco, Lorenzo, and Zié Ballo. 2008. “Provoking a civil war.” Public Choice 134(3-4): 347-366. 
Roper, Steven D. 2000. Romania: The Unfinished Revolution. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic 
Publishers. 
Ross, Michael L. 2004a. "What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?" Journal 
of Peace Research 41 (3): 337-56.  
Ross, Michael L. 2004b. "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence From 
Thirteen Cases." International Organization 58 (01): 35-67.  
Rossman, Gretchen B., and Bruce L. Wilson. 1985. “Numbers and Words: Combining 
Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in a Single Large-Scale Evaluation Study.” 
Evaluation Review 9(5): 627-643. 
224 
Roth, Eduard R. 2016. “The Romanian Revolution of 1989 and the Veracity of the External 
Subversion Theory.” Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 24(1): 37-50. 
Salehyan, Idean. 2009. Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. "What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an 
Operational Definition." Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (6): 814-58.  
Sarkees, Meredith R. 2010. “The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars 
(Version 4 of the Data).” Note with Version 4 of the Correlates of War Data. 
Sarkees, Meredith R. and Frank Wayman. 2010. Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington 
DC: CQ Press. 
Serban, Ionut V. 2012. “International Context and Romanian Causes in the Initiation and 
Affirmation of the Revolution of 1989.” Revista de Stiinte Politice, Revue des Sciences 
Politiques 35: 393-400.  
Siani-Davies, Peter. 1996. "Romanian Revolution or Coup d'Etat?: A theoretical View of the 
Events of December 1989." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 29(4): 453-465. 
Siani-Davies, Peter. 2005. The Romanian Revolution of December 1989. Cornell University 
Press. 
Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, 
and Major Power War, 1820-1965.” In Peace, War, and Numbers, eds. Bruce Russett. 
Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48. 
Slater, Dan, and Erica Simmons. 2010. “Informative Regress: Critical Antecedents in 
Comparative Politics.” Comparative Political Studies 43(7): 886-917. 
225 
Slettebak, Rune T. 2012. “Don’t Blame the Weather! Climate-related Natural Disasters and Civil 
Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 49:1 (January): 163–176. 
Small, Melvin and J. David Singer. 1982. Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-
1980. Beverly Hills: Sage.  
Sobel, Michael E. 1982. “Aysmptotic Confidence Intervals for Indirect Effects in Structural 
Equation Models.” In Sociological Methodology, eds. S. Leinhardt. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass, 290-312. 
Soro, Guillaume, and Serge Daniel. 2005 Pourquoi je suis devenu un rebelle: la Côte d'Ivoire au 
bord du gouffre: entretiens avec Serge Daniel. Paris : Hachette. 
Stewart, Frances. 2008a. Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in 
Multiethnic Societies. UK; Palgrave Macmillan.  
Stewart, Frances. 2008b. “Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: An Introduction and some 
Hypotheses.” In Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in 
Multiethnic Societies. UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 3-24.  
Tawès, Pascal. 1998. “Tawès Pascal: ‘Dieu, l’armée, les fétiches, le pouvoir.” Témoins 
d’aujourd’hui. Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso : Centre International d’Evangélisation.  
Theisen, Ole Magnus. 2008. “Blood and Soil? Resource Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict 
Revisited.” Journal of Peace Research 45 (6): 801-18. 
Tismaneanu, Vladimir. 2009. “The Revolutions of 1989: Causes, Meanings, Consequences 
Contemporary European History 18(3): Revisiting 1989: Causes, Course and Consequence: 
271-288. 
Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. New York: McGraw-Hill.  
Touval, Saadia. 1999. The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa. Universe. 
226 
Tsebelis, George. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 
(PRIO). 2016. “UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset Codebook.” Retrieved February 28, 
2016 (http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdpprio/ucdp-prio-acd-4-2016.pdf). 
Urdal, Henrik. 2005. “People Vs. Malthus: Population Pressure, Environmental Degradation, and 
Armed Conflict Revisited.” Journal of Peace Research 42:4 (December): 417-434.  
Urdal, Henrik. 2008. "Population, Resources, and Political Violence A Subnational Study of 
India, 1956–2002." Journal of Conflict Resolution 52 (4): 590-617.  
Voice of Africa. 2017. “Disgruntled Troops Seize Town in Southeastern Ivory Coast.” Retrieved 
March 28, 2017 (http://www.voanews.com/a/ivory-coast-special-forces-mutiny-in-town-of-
adiake-sources-say/3709445.html). 
Vreeland, James R. 2008. “The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy.” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 52:3 (July): 401-425.  
Walter, Jorge, Franz W. Kellermanns, Steven W. Floyd, John F. Veiga, and Curtis Matherne. 
2013. "Strategic Alignment: A Missing Link in the Relationship between Strategic 
Consensus and Organizational Performance." Strategic Organization 11 (3): 304-28. 
Welzel, Christian and Ronald Inglehart. 2009. “Political Culture, Mass Beliefs, and Value 
Change.” Democratization: 126-143. 
Widner, Jennifer A. 1991. “The 1990 elections in Cote d’Ivoire.” Issue 20(01): 31-40. 
Wimmer, Andreas, Lars-Erik Cederman and Brian MinEthnic. 2009. “Politics and Armed 
Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set.”  American Sociological 
Review, Vol. 74:2 (April): 316-337. 
227 
Wood, Reed M., and Mark Gibney. 2010. ‘‘The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-introduction 
and a Comparison to CIRI.’’ Human Rights Quarterly 32: 367-400. 
Wooldridge, Bill and Steven W. Floyd. 1989. “Research Notes and Communications Strategic 
Process Effects on Consensus." Strategic Management Journal 10:3 (July): 295-302.  
Wooldridge, Bill and Steven W. Floyd. 1990. “The Strategy Process, Middle Management 
Involvement, and Organizational Performance.” Strategic Management Journal 11:3 (July): 
231-241. 
World Bank, The. 2015. “World Development Indicators.” [Computer file]. Retrieved March 5, 
2016 (http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx). 
World Bank, The. 2017. “World Development Indicators.” [Computer file]. Retrieved March 5, 
2017 (http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx). 
Young, Joseph K. 2013. “Repression, Dissent, and the Onset of Civil War.” Political Research 
Quarterly 66:3 (July): 516-532. 
 
 
  
228 
Appendix A - Quantitative Analysis 
 
Table A.1 Country List 
Nr. State Name  COW Code Time Period  
1 United States of America 2 1960-2007 
2 Canada 20 1960-2007 
3 Cuba 40 1960-2007 
4 Haiti 41 1960-2007 
5 Dominican Republic 42 1960-2007 
6 Jamaica 51 1962-2007 
7 Trinidad and Tobago 52 1962-2007 
8 Mexico 70 1960-2007 
9 Guatemala 90 1960-2007 
10 Honduras 91 1960-2007 
11 El Salvador 92 1960-2007 
12 Nicaragua 93 1960-2007 
13 Costa Rica 94 1960-2007 
14 Panama 95 1960-2007 
15 Colombia 100 1960-2007 
16 Venezuela 101 1960-2007 
17 Ecuador 130 1960-2007 
18 Peru 135 1960-2007 
19 Brazil 140 1960-2007 
20 Bolivia 145 1960-2007 
21 Paraguay 150 1960-2007 
22 Chile 155 1960-2007 
23 Argentina 160 1960-2007 
24 Uruguay 165 1960-2007 
25 United Kingdom 200 1960-2007 
26 Ireland 205 1960-2007 
27 Netherlands 210 1960-2007 
28 Belgium 211 1960-2007 
29 France 220 1960-2007 
30 Switzerland 225 1960-2007 
31 Spain 230 1960-2007 
32 Portugal 235 1960-2007 
33 Germany 255 1990-2007 
34 German Federal Republic 260 1960-1989 
35 German Democratic Republic  265 1960-1989 
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36 Poland 290 1960-2007 
37 Austria 305 1960-2007 
38 Hungary 310 1960-2007 
39  Czechoslovakia  315 1960-1992 
40 Czech Republic 316 1993-2007 
41 Slovakia 317 1993-2007 
42 Italy 325 1960-2007 
43 Albania 339 1960-2007 
44 Montenegro 341 2006-2007 
45 Macedonia 343 1991-2007 
46 Croatia 344 1991-2007 
47 Yugoslavia 345 1960-1990 
48 Serbia & Montenegro 345 1991-2005 
49 Serbia  345 2006-2007 
50 Bosnia and Herzegovina 346 1991-2007 
51 Slovenia 349 1991-2007 
52 Greece 350 1960-2007 
53 Bulgaria 355 1960-2007 
54 Moldova 359 1991-2007 
55 Romania 360 1960-2007 
56 Soviet Union 365 1960-1990 
57 Russian Federation 365 1991-2007 
58 Estonia 366 1991-2007 
59 Latvia 367 1991-2007 
60 Lithuania 368 1991-2007 
61 Ukraine 369 1991-2007 
62 Belarus 370 1991-2007 
63 Armenia 371 1991-2007 
64 Georgia 372 1991-2007 
65 Azerbaijan 373 1991-2007 
66 Finland 375 1960-2007 
67 Sweden 380 1960-2007 
68 Norway 385 1960-2007 
69 Denmark 390 1960-2007 
70 Guinea-Bissau 404 1974-2007 
71 Equatorial Guinea 411 1968-2007 
72 Gambia 420 1965-2007 
73 Mali 432 1960-2007 
74 Senegal 433 1960-2007 
75 Benin 434 1960-2007 
76 Mauritania 435 1960-2007 
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77 Niger 436 1960-2007 
78 Ivory Coast 437 1960-2007 
79 Guinea 438 1960-2007 
80 Burkina Faso 439 1960-2007 
81 Liberia 450 1960-2007 
82 Sierra Leone 451 1961-2007 
83 Ghana 452 1960-2007 
84 Togo 461 1960-2007 
85 Cameroon 471 1960-2007 
86 Nigeria 475 1960-2007 
87 Gabon 481 1960-2007 
88 Central African Republic 482 1960-2007 
89 Chad 483 1960-2007 
90 Congo 484 1960-2007 
91 Democratic Republic of the Congo 490 1960-2007 
92 Uganda 500 1962-2007 
93 Kenya 501 1963-2007 
94 Tanzania 510 1961-2007 
95 Burundi 516 1962-2007 
96 Rwanda 517 1962-2007 
97 Somalia 520 1960-2007 
98 Djibouti 522 1977-2007 
99 Ethiopia 530 1960-2007 
100 Eritrea 531 1993-2007 
101 Angola 540 1975-2007 
102 Mozambique 541 1975-2007 
103 Zambia 551 1964-2007 
104 Zimbabwe 552 1965-2007 
105 Malawi 553 1964-2007 
106 South Africa 560 1960-2007 
107 Namibia 565 1990-2007 
108 Lesotho 570 1966-2007 
109 Botswana 571 1966-2007 
110 Swaziland 572 1968-2007 
111 Madagascar 580 1960-2007 
112 Mauritius 590 1968-2007 
113 Morocco 600 1960-2007 
114 Algeria 615 1962-2007 
115 Tunisia 616 1960-2007 
116 Libya 620 1960-2007 
117 Sudan 625 1960-2007 
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118 Iran 630 1960-2007 
119 Turkey 640 1960-2007 
120 Iraq 645 1960-2007 
121 Egypt 651 1960-2007 
122 Syria 652 1960-2007 
123 Lebanon 660 1960-2007 
124 Jordan 663 1960-2007 
125 Israel 666 1960-2007 
126 Saudi Arabia 670 1960-2007 
127 Yemen Arab Republic  678 1960-1989 
128 Yemen 679 1990-2007 
129 Kuwait 690 1961-2007 
130 Bahrain 692 1971-2007 
131 Qatar 694 1971-2007 
132 United Arab Emirates 696 1971-2007 
133 Oman 698 1970-2007 
134 Afghanistan 700 1960-2007 
135 Turkmenistan 701 1991-2007 
136 Tajikistan 702 1991-2007 
137 Kyrgyzstan 703 1991-2007 
138 Uzbekistan 704 1991-2007 
139 Kazakhstan 705 1991-2007 
140 China 710 1960-2007 
141 Mongolia 712 1960-2007 
142 Taiwan 713 1960-2007 
143 North Korea 731 1960-2007 
144 South Korea 732 1960-2007 
145 Japan 740 1960-2007 
146 India 750 1960-2007 
147 Pakistan 770 1960-2007 
148 Bangladesh 771 1971-2007 
149 Myanmar 775 1960-2007 
150 Sri Lanka 780 1960-2007 
151 Nepal 790 1960-2007 
152 Thailand 800 1960-2007 
153 Cambodia 811 1960-2007 
154 Laos 812 1960-2007 
155 Vietnam 816 1960-2007 
156 Malaysia 820 1960-2007 
157 Singapore 830 1965-2007 
158 Philippines 840 1960-2007 
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159 Indonesia 850 1960-2007 
160 Australia 900 1960-2007 
161 Papua New Guinea 910 1975-2007 
162 New Zealand 920 1960-2007 
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Table A.2 Civil War Cases, 1960-2007 
Nr. Country Name Country Code Start Year 
1 Dominican Republic 42 1965 
2 Guatemala 90 1966 
3 Guatemala 90 1970 
4 Guatemala 90 1978 
5 El Salvador 92 1979 
6 Nicaragua 93 1978 
7 Nicaragua 93 1982 
8 Colombia 100 1989 
9 Peru 135 1982 
10 Chile 155 1973 
11 Argentina 160 1975 
12 Croatia 344 1995 
13 Serbia and Montenegro 345 1991 
14 Serbia and Montenegro 345 1998 
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina 346 1992 
16 Moldova 359 1991 
17 Romania 360 1989 
18 Russian Federation 365 1994 
19 Russian Federation 365 1999 
20 Georgia 372 1991 
21 Georgia 372 1993 
22 Azerbaijan 373 1991 
23 Guinea-Bissau 404 1998 
24 Cote d'Ivoire 437 2002 
25 Guinea 438 2000 
26 Liberia 450 1989 
27 Liberia 450 1992 
28 Liberia 450 1996 
29 Liberia 450 2002 
30 Sierra Leone 451 1991 
31 Sierra Leone 451 1998 
32 Nigeria 475 1967 
33 Nigeria 475 1980 
34 Chad 483 1966 
35 Chad 483 1980 
36 Chad 483 1989 
37 Chad 483 1998 
38 Chad 483 2005 
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39 Congo (Brazzaville, Republic of Congo) 484 1997 
40 Congo (Brazzaville, Republic of Congo) 484 1998 
41 Democratic Republic of the Congo 490 1960 
42 Democratic Republic of the Congo 490 1963 
43 Democratic Republic of the Congo 490 1964 
44 Democratic Republic of the Congo 490 1978 
45 Democratic Republic of the Congo 490 1996 
46 Democratic Republic of the Congo 490 1998 
47 Uganda 500 1966 
48 Uganda 500 1980 
49 Uganda 500 1986 
50 Burundi 516 1972 
51 Burundi 516 1993 
52 Burundi 516 2001 
53 Rwanda 517 1963 
54 Rwanda 517 1994 
55 Rwanda 517 1997 
56 Rwanda 517 2001 
57 Somalia 520 1988 
58 Somalia 520 1991 
59 Somalia 520 2006 
60 Ethiopia 530 1963 
61 Ethiopia 530 1975 
62 Ethiopia 530 1976 
63 Ethiopia 530 1978 
64 Ethiopia 530 1982 
65 Ethiopia 530 1999 
66 Angola 540 1976 
67 Angola 540 1992 
68 Angola 540 1998 
69 Mozambique 541 1979 
70 Zimbabwe 552 1972 
71 Zimbabwe 552 1983 
72 Algeria 615 1962 
73 Algeria 615 1992 
74 Sudan 625 1963 
75 Sudan 625 1983 
76 Sudan 625 2003 
77 Iran 630 1978 
78 Iran 630 1979 
79 Turkey 640 1984 
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80 Turkey 640 1991 
81 Iraq 645 1961 
82 Iraq 645 1965 
83 Iraq 645 1969 
84 Iraq 645 1974 
85 Iraq 645 1985 
86 Iraq 645 1991 
87 Iraq 645 1996 
88 Syria 652 1981 
89 Lebanon 660 1983 
90 Lebanon 660 1989 
91 Jordan 663 1970 
92 Yemen Arab Republic 678 1962 
93 Yemen 679 1994 
94 Yemen 679 2004 
95 Yemen 679 2007 
96 Oman 698 1973 
97 Afghanistan 700 1978 
98 Afghanistan 700 1989 
99 Tajikistan 702 1992 
100 China 710 1967 
101 India 750 1970 
102 India 750 1984 
103 India 750 1990 
104 Pakistan 770 1971 
105 Pakistan 770 1973 
106 Pakistan 770 2004 
107 Myanmar 775 1967 
108 Myanmar 775 1983 
109 Myanmar 775 1988 
110 Sri Lanka 780 1971 
111 Sri Lanka 780 1983 
112 Sri Lanka 780 1987 
113 Sri Lanka 780 2006 
114 Nepal 790 2001 
115 Nepal 790 2003 
116 Thailand 800 1972 
117 Cambodia 811 1971 
118 Cambodia 811 1989 
119 Cambodia 811 1993 
120 Laos 812 1960 
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121 Laos 812 1963 
122 Laos 812 1976 
123 Philippines 840 1972 
124 Philippines 840 2000 
125 Philippines 840 2003 
126 Philippines 840 2005 
127 Indonesia 850 1965 
128 Indonesia 850 1976 
129 Indonesia 850 1989 
130 Indonesia 850 1999 
131 Indonesia 850 2003 
132 Papua New Guinea 910 1989 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
237 
Table A.3 Alternative Models of Accommodation 
 
PCSE Random Effect Fixed Effect 
VARIABLES Accommodation Accommodation Accommodation 
        
Lagged Accommodation  0.73*** 
  
 
(0.03) 
  GDP Capita 0.06*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
De Facto Open -0.42*** -0.22** -0.08 
 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) 
GDP x Open  0.07*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant -0.56*** -3.02*** -3.11*** 
 
(0.08) (0.13) (0.15) 
Observations 5,338 5,439 5,439 
R-squared 0.85 
 
0.18 
Chi Square 12372.10*** 1585.93*** 372.40*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
  
 
Table A.4 Alternative Models of Coercion 
Variables 
PCSE Random Effect Fixed Effect 
Coercion Coercion Coercion 
Lagged Coercion  0.84*** 
  
 
(0.02) 
  GDP Capita -0.28*** -0.74*** 0.12 
 
(0.08) (0.26) (0.30) 
De Facto Open 1.54** 2.08 1.89 
 
(0.74) (1.46) (1.51) 
GDP x Open  -0.24** -0.27 -0.24 
 
(0.10) (0.22) (0.23) 
Constant 7.78*** 38.60*** 32.00*** 
 
(1.04) (1.93) (2.148) 
Observations 5,282 5,392 5,392 
R-squared 0.78 
  Chi Square 6770.78*** 33.06*** 1.04 
    Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A.5 Alternative Models of Civil War 
Variables 
Random 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Regional 
Effect 
Regional 
Effect 
Regional 
Effect 
Civil War Civil War Civil War Civil War Civil War Civil War 
Ln GDP Capita (lag) -0.30** -0.12 -0.29** -0.51*** -0.30 -0.44*** 
 
(0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.20) (0.16) 
De Facto Open (lag) 1.63*** 1.66*** 1.54*** 1.76*** 1.80*** 1.46*** 
 
(0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.49) (0.48) (0.45) 
Accommodation (lag) -0.61** 
  
-0.59** 
 
  
(0.29) 
  
(0.30) 
 Coercion (lag) 
  
0.06*** 
  
0.06*** 
   
(0.01) 
  
(0.02) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.91* 0.89* 0.95* 1.23** 1.12** 1.28** 
 
(0.52) (0.53) (0.52) (0.54) (0.55) (0.55) 
Religious Fractionalization 0.11 0.38 0.62 0.76 0.87 1.12 
 
(0.69) (0.72) (0.68) (0.73) (0.75) (0.73) 
Excluded Population 1.24*** 0.99** 
 
1.27*** 1.09** 
 
 
(0.47) (0.49) 
 
(0.49) (0.50) 
 Mountainous Terrain 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Bad Neighborhood 0.14** 0.15** 0.15** 0.13 0.12 0.15* 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Ln Population (lag) 0.26** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.29** 0.31*** 0.31*** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) 
Oil Dependency 1.77*** 1.63*** 1.61*** 1.78*** 1.65*** 1.63*** 
 
(0.40) (0.44) (0.43) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) 
External Threat -0.83*** -0.94*** -1.02*** -0.98*** -1.06*** -1.16*** 
 
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
GDP Growth (lag) -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Mineral Rent 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) 
Mineral Rent Square -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Post-Cold War -0.70** -0.69** -0.94*** -0.66** -0.61** -0.81*** 
 
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) 
Drought -0.76 -0.74 -0.74 -0.74 -0.71 -0.71 
 
(0.53) (0.52) (0.52) (0.53) (0.52) (0.52) 
Ln Population Density (lag) 0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.01 
 
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) 
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Population Growth (lag) 0.04 0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.00 -0.09 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) 
Peace Years -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
   
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Peace Years Square 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
   
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   Peace Years Cubed 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   Lagged Civil War 
  
-0.89  -0.90 -1.13 
    
(0.77) (0.77) (0.76) 
Middle East 
   
0.66 0.51 0.56 
    
(0.75) (0.75) (0.73) 
Asia 
   
-0.26 -0.11 -0.09 
    
(0.74) (0.73) (0.71) 
Africa 
   
-0.54 -0.47 -0.48 
    
(0.76) (0.75) (0.73) 
Americas 
   
0.29 0.20 0.38 
    
(0.69) (0.70) (0.68) 
Constant -6.79*** -8.88*** -8.97*** -5.97*** -7.96*** -8.01*** 
 
(1.71) (1.99) (1.90) (1.91) (2.18) (2.09) 
Observations 3,905 3,905 4,273 3,803 3,803 4,197 
lnsig2u -12.82 -12.56 -12.36 
     (15.45) (15.74) (29.05)       
Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
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Table A.6 Physical Quality of Life, Strategic Consensus, & Civil War 
Variables 
OLS (PCSE) OLS (PCSE) Logit Logit Logit 
Accommodation Coercion Civil War Civil War Civil War 
PQLI
♀
 0.01*** -0.01 -0.03*** -0.01 -0.02*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
De Facto Open
♀
 -1.13*** 11.06*** 0.70* 0.79** 0.75** 
 
(0.10) (1.01) (0.39) (0.36) (0.37) 
PQLI x Open 0.02*** -0.18*** 
   
 
(0.00) (0.01) 
   Accommodation
♀
 
   
-0.97*** 
 
    
(0.20) 
 Coercion
♀
 
    
0.07*** 
     
(0.01) 
Constant -1.28*** 35.60*** -2.87*** -4.35*** -5.48*** 
 
(0.06) (0.86) (0.40) (0.54) (0.50) 
Observations 5,380 5,335 5,249 5,249 5,205 
Pseudo R-squared 0.48 0.13 
   Chi Square 1272.93*** 262.76*** 16.87*** 47.46*** 73.99*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
♀ These variables are lagged one year in the civil war models 
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Table A.7 Physical Quality of Life, Strategic Consensus, & Civil War 
Variables 
OLS (PCSE) OLS (PCSE) Logit Logit Logit 
Accommodation Coercion Civil War Civil War Civil War 
PQLI
♀
 0.02*** -0.07*** -0.02** -0.01 -0.02** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
De Facto Open
♀
 -1.14*** 9.55*** 1.57*** 1.567*** 1.48** 
 
(0.11) (1.31) (0.60) (0.573) (0.67) 
PQLI x Open  0.02*** -0.15*** 
   
 
(0.00) (0.02) 
   Accommodation
♀
 
   
-0.75** 
 
    
(0.31) 
 Coercion
♀
 
    
0.08*** 
     
(0.01) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.00 -0.56 1.25** 1.31** 1.40** 
 
(0.03) (0.42) (0.60) (0.58) (0.57) 
Religious Fractionalization 0.47*** -3.37*** -0.12 0.03 0.54 
 
(0.03) (0.40) (0.63) (0.68) (0.64) 
Excluded Population 
  
1.75*** 1.38*** 
 
   
(0.46) (0.50) 
 Mountainous Terrain -0.00*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Bad Neighborhood -0.02*** 0.37*** 0.15* 0.13 0.12 
 
(0.01) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Ln Population
♀
 0.00 0.28*** 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.42*** 
 
(0.01) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Oil Exporter -0.25*** 1.16 1.22*** 1.23*** 1.14*** 
 
(0.07) (0.74) (0.38) (0.37) (0.34) 
External Threat -0.15*** 3.33*** -0.96*** -1.09*** -1.19*** 
 
(0.01) (0.28) (0.25) (0.23) (0.24) 
GDP Growth
♀
 0.004* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 
(0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Mineral Rent -0.03*** 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 
 
(0.01) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Mineral Rent Square 0.00*** -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Post-Cold War -0.15*** 1.70*** -0.56* -0.62* -0.87*** 
 
(0.03) (0.41) (0.34) (0.35) (0.32) 
Drought -0.10** 0.43 -0.94* -0.99* -0.91* 
 
(0.04) (0.46) (0.52) (0.51) (0.54) 
Ln Population Density
♀
 0.00 0.18** 0.17 0.20 0.12 
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(0.00) (0.08) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) 
Population Growth
♀
 0.03* 0.35*** -0.06 -0.07 -0.16* 
 
(0.01) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Peace Years 
  
0.00 0.00 0.02 
   
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Peace Years Square 
  
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Peace Years Cubed 
  
0.00 0.00 0.00 
   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -1.59*** 33.07*** -8.88*** -10.29*** -11.81*** 
 
(0.10) (1.11) (1.55) (1.39) (1.47) 
Observations 3,950 3,918 3,551 3,551 3,875 
Pseudo R-squared 0.53 0.25 
   Chi Square 7925.14*** 4145.87*** 168.81*** 226.94*** 225.02*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
♀ These variables are lagged one year in the civil war models. 
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Table A.8 Infant Mortality, Strategic Consensus & Civil War 
Variables 
OLS (PCSE)  OLS (PCSE) Logit Logit Logit 
Accommodation Coercion Civil War Civil War Civil War 
Infant Mortality
♀
 -0.01*** -0.00 0.01** 0.005 0.01*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) 
De Facto Open
♀
 0.94*** -7.51*** 1.55*** 1.55*** 1.50*** 
 
(0.05) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.54) 
Mortality x Open  -0.01*** 0.08*** 
   
 
(0.00) (0.01) 
   Accommodation
♀
 
   
-0.61** 
 
    
(0.29) 
 Coercion
♀
 
    
0.06*** 
     
(0.01) 
Ethnic Frac. 
  
0.57 0.67 0.39 
   
(0.69) (0.67) (0.79) 
Religious Frac. 
  
0.13 0.27 0.77 
   
(0.61) (0.64) (0.66) 
Excluded Population 
  
1.19*** 0.93** 
 
   
(0.44) (0.46) 
 Mountainous Terrain 
  
0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 
   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Bad Neighborhood 
  
0.19** 0.18** 0.19** 
   
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Ln Population
♀
 
  
0.24** 0.28** 0.30*** 
   
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
Oil Exporter 
  
1.31*** 1.29*** 1.16*** 
   
(0.41) (0.40) (0.37) 
External Threat 
  
-0.72*** -0.84*** -0.84*** 
   
(0.27) (0.26) (0.27) 
GDP Growth
♀
 
  
-0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
   
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Mineral Rent 
  
0.02 0.03 0.00 
   
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) 
Mineral Rent Square 
  
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Post-Cold War 
  
-0.55* -0.63** -0.74** 
   
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 
Drought 
  
-0.49 -0.52 -0.50 
   
(0.43) (0.42) (0.43) 
Ln Population Density
♀
 
  
0.01 0.04 -0.04 
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(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Population Growth
♀
 
  
-0.04 -0.04 -0.11 
   
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
Peace Years 
  
-0.00 -0.00 0.02 
   
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Peace Years Square 
  
-0.00 -0.00 -0.000377 
   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Peace Years Cubed 
  
0.00 0.00 0.00 
   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -0.04 35.78*** -9.27*** -9.52*** -11.50*** 
 
(0.03) (0.37) (1.11) (1.13) (1.32) 
Observations 6,076 6,008 3,915 3,915 4,283 
Pseudo R-squared 0.49 0.12 
   Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1          
♀ These variables are lagged one year in the civil war models 
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Table A.9 Number of Legislative Parties, Strategic Consensus & Civil War 
Variables 
OLS (PCSE) OLS (PCSE) Logit Logit Logit 
Accommodation Coercion Civil War Civil War Civil War 
Legislative Open
♀
 -1.41*** 7.65*** 0.97*** 1.05*** 0.96*** 
 
(0.09) (0.95) (0.29) (0.29) (0.27) 
Ln GDP per Capita
♀
 0.23*** -1.39*** -0.26** -0.05 -0.25** 
 
(0.01) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
GDP x Open  0.25*** -1.47*** 
   
 
(0.01) (0.12) 
   Accommodation
♀
 
   
-0.71** 
 
    
(0.31) 
 Coercion
♀
 
    
0.07*** 
     
(0.02) 
Ethnic Frac. 
  
0.93 0.95 0.96 
   
(0.60) (0.58) (0.72) 
Religious Frac. 
  
0.05 0.31 0.73 
   
(0.58) (0.62) (0.60) 
Excluded Population 
  
1.31*** 1.05** 
 
   
(0.41) (0.42) 
 Mountain 
  
0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01** 
   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Bad Neighborhood 
  
0.15** 0.15** 0.171** 
   
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Ln Population
♀
 
  
0.26** 0.31*** 0.31*** 
   
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
Oil Exporter 
  
1.85*** 1.68*** 1.69*** 
   
(0.42) (0.42) (0.37) 
External Threat 
  
-0.77*** -0.89*** -0.97*** 
   
(0.27) (0.25) (0.26) 
GDP Growth
♀
 
  
-0.03* -0.02 -0.03* 
   
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Mineral Rent 
  
0.05 0.06 0.06 
   
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) 
Mineral Rent Square 
  
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Post-Cold War 
  
-0.57** -0.58** -0.86*** 
   
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
Drought 
  
-0.81* -0.80* -0.78* 
   
(0.44) (0.44) (0.44) 
Ln Population Density
♀
 
  
0.05 0.11 0.01 
246 
   
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15) 
Population Growth
♀
 
  
0.06 0.06 -0.06 
   
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
Peace Years 
  
-0.02 -0.02 -0.00 
   
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Peace Years Square 
  
0.00 0.00 -0.00 
   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Peace Years Cubed 
  
-0.00 -0.00 0.00 
   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -2.11*** 46.39*** -6.55*** -8.98*** -9.08*** 
 
(0.07) (1.03) (1.68) (1.44) (1.78) 
Observations 5,439 5,392 3,905 3,905 4,273 
Pseudo R-squared 0.70 0.26 
   Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1          
♀ These variables are lagged one year in the civil war models 
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Table A.10 Logit Models of Internal Armed Conflicts (UCDP/PRIO) 
Variables 
 Minor  Minor  Minor 
Any  
Intrastate 
Any  
Intrastate 
Any  
Intrastate 
Ln GDP per Capita (lag) -0.19* -0.05 -0.16 -0.18 0.07 -0.14 
 
(0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) 
De Facto Open (lag) 0.84*** 0.90*** 0.87*** 0.63** 0.76** 0.70** 
 
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) 
Accommodation (lag) 
 
-0.33** 
  
-0.63*** 
 
  
(0.16) 
  
(0.17) 
 Coercion (lag) 
  
0.05*** 
  
0.08*** 
   
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
Constant -1.27 -2.37** -3.37*** -0.84 -2.91*** -4.03*** 
 
(0.88) (1.04) (1.04) (0.92) (1.12) (1.19) 
Observations 5,283 5,283 5,237 5,283 5,283 5,237 
Chi Square 12.96*** 16.51*** 52.21*** 7.64** 20.62*** 69.22*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Minor: internal armed conflicts with at least 25 battle-deaths but less than 1000 battle-deaths. 
Any intrastate: internal armed conflicts resulting in 25 battle-deaths or higher.           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
